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Summary 
This thesis is concerned with the banking structure and its governance when the 
industrial policy and the banking technology change over time. The first part of the 
thesis briefly reviews the East Asian banking structure and its changes during the 
industrialisation. In chapter 2, we investigate the impact of industrial policy on 
banking behaviour and on the overall banking structure. We argue that the transition 
from a price-cap regulation (interest rate controo to a rate-of-return regulation (ROA 
andlor BIS ratio) induces a more concentrated banking structure as banking 
behaviour shifts from revenue maximising to profit maximising. Empirical evidence 
from Japan and Korea supports the argument. 
In chapter 3, we examine the behaviour of banks and customers when a new 
banking technology is introduced. The determinants of consumer adoption of internet 
banking are identified using survey data from Korea. Empirical issues of banking 
technology concerning customer inertia, risk aversion and pre-emption are assessed. 
Duration analysis finds no evidence of first mover advantage in internet banking, 
whilst the largest bank in commercial banking is dominant in internet banking. 
In chapter 4, we introduce 'collective relationship banking' as a new concept 
of banking to link the real and the banking sector structures. We analyse the choice 
between collective relationship banking and independent banking in addition to the 
switching between the two banking relationships using a case study. Changes in the 
corporate ownership structure appear to influence the banking relationship as well as 
its switching. Chapter 5 contains policy discussions, and some concluding remarks. 
Chapter I 
Introduction 
1.1 A Brief Review of the East Asian Banking 
The East Asian banking structure during the last decade has undergone a noticeable 
change moving towards a substantial consolidation. Japanese and Korean banks in 
particular, have made a critical shift in their banking regulation and policy, by 
relaxing many of the previously regulated areas in the banking business such as 
control over interest rates on loans and deposits, branching restrictions, and cross- 
financial sector. It was commonly believed that these regulations are necessary for 
those emerging market countries so that their industrial sectors (non-financiao can 
benefit from relatively stable financial markets and achieve more favourable overall 
economic growth. 
However, these regulations may become unsustainable when states try to 
meet international regulatory standards in order to enter world economic and/or trade 
organisations. For example, Japan and Korea 1 underwent significant structural 
changes under external pressure from other member countries of the G7 (Group of 
1 Throughout the thesis, Korea refers to South Korea, i. e. Republic of Korea (ROK). 
I 
2 
Seven) and the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) 
which promoted the ideology of a free market economy. Deregulation in banking, 
whether a response to external pressure or a purely domestic response, seems to 
coincide with the financial crises in Japan and Korea. Hence, research on financial 
crises has often focused on regulatory changes, which may potentially protect 
countries from such financial crises in the future. However, the flaw in such research 
is arguably in the generalisation of financial crises since each financial crisis appears 
to have arisen for different reasons. For example, the 1995 Mexican crisis was 
largely due to its unsustainable currency peg whilst, the Korean crisis 
2 was mainly 
caused by the speculative debt financing behaviour in the corporate sector. 
Tberefore, it is essential to investigate the evolution of the banking structure in each 
country instead of analysing banking and financial crises as a single global 
phenomenon. Much research has attempted to explain how a financial and/or 
banking crises can come about and how they can be avoided by changing and/or 
raising regulatory standards. 3 However, most of this approach overlooked the 
importance of industrial policy in East Asia to its banking sector development. 
Japan and Korea led the economic growth in East Asia and provided 
examples for neighbouring Asian countries. Moreover, the two countries do have 
similarities in their industrial structure as well as financial sector structure. In 
contrast to the existing research on banking crises, this thesis analyses the role of 
2 Referring to the Korean financial crisis in the wave of Asian financial crisis in 1997. 
3 The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has set a guideline of higher level of sound asset ratio, 
so called Asset Adequacy Ratio or also known as BIS ratio. 
3 
Japanese and Korean banks in the industrialisation process and the economic 
developments. As Castley (1997) and Cho (1994) have pointed out, the banking 
system in Japan and Korea has operated as the financing arm of the industrialisation 
policy and thanks to the stability of the financial sector, Korea and Japan enjoyed 
unprecedented economic success in the post war period. 4 They also emphasised the 
close relationship between Korea and Japan throughout the industrialisation. 
However, Castley (1997) and Cho (1994) do not investigate empirically how 
Government industrial policy had an influence over the banking activities via various 
types of regulation 5 in order to maintain the financial stability and to promote 
economic growth. 
The traditional literature of banking summarises the characteristics of 
banking activity as follows. A first function of banking activity is intermediation 
between depositors and borrowers that reduces transaction costs by diversifying risks 
(Gurley and Shaw, 1960). Second, banks provide financial transformation of short- 
term deposits into long-term loans. 6 Finally, banks also provide delegated monitoring 
more efficiently with scale economies in monitoring and expertise in investment 
appraisal (Diamond, 1984). However, in East Asia, banks perform a further function, 
namely implementation of industrial policy. 
Irrespective of whether Japan and Korea have met international guidelines 
and standards in banking and finance, one must note that the East Asian economy 
4 Japan after the World War 11 (WWII) and Korea after the Korean War. 5 For example, interest rate control, branching restrictions, cross-financial sector entry regulation, etc. 6 Diamond and Dybvig (1983) explains the liquidity crunchy when early withdrawal of short-term 
deposits faces a long-term outstanding loans. 
4 
developed quickly due to their idiosyncratic structure of conglomerates tied together 
with the banking sector. In these countries, the conglomerates, so-called Keiretsus in 
Japan and Chaebols in Korea, are the results of Government-led industrial policies, 
where the banking sector has operated as a financing arm throughout the 
industrialisation process. 7 For instance, the Japanese Keiretsu system allows its own 
group bank (Keiretsu bank) within the Keiretsu network to secure its finance. On the 
other hand, the Korean Chaebols establish a long-term banking relationship with a 
particular bank in the absence of the Japanese style group owned banks. These 
Keiretsu banks and long-term relationship banks in Korea offer preferential rates 
against their policy loans to the respective Keiretsu and Chaebol customers. 
It is therefore essential to investigate changes in banking structure and 
regulation in relation to real sector developments driven by industrial policy. The 
next section reviews changes in banking structure and introduces recent 
developments in regulation and technology in Japan and Korea with respect to their 
industrial policy. 
1.2 Overview of Changes in Banking Structure 
In light of a series of recent banking and financial crises globally, there has been a 
proliferation of research on financial crises and banking regulation. However, as 
previously mentioned, whilst existing research focuses on how to regulate the 
7 Keiretsus and Chaebols are a network of subsidiary companies with a large holding company at the 
centre of the network tied by cross-ownership. Large conglomerates in Japan and Korea are used 
interchangeably for Keiretsu and Chaebols in some literature. 
5 
financial sector with exogenous measures, there have been few studies of why such 
regulatory measures were not initially implemented in some countries in the context 
of banking evolution and structure. 
Therefore, this thesis makes a departure from the common practice of linking 
financial crises and banking regulation. Instead, it aims to bridge the gap between 
banking structure and several other factors beyond regulation. There are several 
reasons why one should care about the banking structure. Firstly, financial and 
banking crises are themselves costly. Secondly, since one of the attributes of banking 
activities is intermediation, these crises have spill-over effects on the real sector as 
well as on a macro level economy. Finally, regulation is costly both ex ante and ex 
post. One should therefore thoroughly investigate the past and current banking 
structure before identifying the future structure that regulation tries to achieve. 
Hence, the main purpose of the thesis is concerned with identifying determinants of 
banking structure in East Asia. In particular, the factors influencing changes in 
banking structure beyond conventional regulatory consideration. 
It is necessary to look at the evolution of the banking structure in East Asia in 
order to identify where the banking structure originated from and where it stands at 
present before going on to think about where it should be in the future. In the 
aftermath of the recent financial crises in Asia, there were debates over structural 
changes in the financial sector and/or in the real sector (non-financiao but these 
proceeded as two separate discussions! Although the importance of restructuring of 
8 The Financial Supervisory Service was established in Korea after the financial crises in 1997 to 
supervise the restructuring of the financial sector and its regulation. 
6 
both the financial and non-financial sectors was often addressed during this period, 
no one attempted to link these two sectors for restructuring, in particular in 
evolutionary perspectives. Although the banking structure in East Asia adopted a 
more concentrated structure following the recent crisis, the banking concentration in 
the region has followed a non-monotonic path over time. When investigating the 
non-monotonic evolution of banking concentration, it should be noted that there has 
always been Governmental interest in 'industrial policy' behind the evolution of 
banking structure by allowing certain interest rate regulation, together with the 
guidance on policy loans for strategic industries. 9 In addition, some of the East Asian 
banks were initially created as special banks to finance certain industries or business 
aspects and were later transformed to commercial banks. 
Secondly, proposals of banking regulation have considered regulation as the 
only way to return an ailing banking system to normal. However, it was not only the 
East Asian banking, but also the global banking sector including those in Europe and 
the US, that have experienced periods of 'regulation and deregulation'. Balance 
between regulation and deregulation in different areas of banking seems to be more 
desirable than trying to come up with a comprehensive regulation package. 
Moreover, banking regulation and/or deregulation needs to take into account 
different types of regulation and deregulation. 
Thirdly, another important factor affecting the modem banking system is the 
evolution of banking technology. The banking system has benefited from a series of 
9 We will discuss 'strategic industries' together with 'industrial policy' more carefully in chapter 2. 
7 
technological advances such as telephones, mobile phones and computers. These 
new technologies offered new channels of communication in banking namely 
automated teller machines (ATMs), phone banking, mobile banking and internet 
banking. Given the tech-savvy culture in Asia, the banking system and structure have 
progressed to the new generation of 'intemet banking (IB)' rather quickly compared 
to the rest of the world. In addition, one should note that this new way of banking has 
been readily adopted by both banks and customers in Korea. 10 Although this new 
way of banking has received a lot of public attention, there has been little research 
conducted into why the banking industry is adopting new technologies and why the 
customer adoption of a new banking technology is faster in certain countries. The 
notion of consumer adoption of a new technology also allows us to study banking 
structure, as we look at the customer side adoption as well as bank side adoption. 
Investigating the intermediation between banks and customers via a new technology, 
the internet, leads us to another important issue of banking, namely relationship 
banking as our next consideration and final one in the thesis. 
The final consideration of the thesis is concerned with the banking 
relationship between the real sector and the financial sector. It is a well-known fact 
that banks and their customers engage in a long-term relationship and existing 
research has tried to explain why we observe relationship banking. However, what 
we observe as the banking relationship in East Asia is not always a one-on-one 
relationship given the peculiar structure of Keiretsus and Chaebols. For example, 
10 The Bank of Korea (BOK) press release (27 Jan. 2005) on 'Domestic Use of Internet Banking 
Services as of 31 Dec. 2004' indicates 24.3 million registered internet banking users in Korea. 
8 
some companies that belong to a single Keiretsu or Chaebol network, sometimes 
establish banking relationship with an identical bank collectively (Collective 
Relationship Banking) whilst others in the network choose to deal with other banks 
independently (Independent Banking). Moreover, in some cases, these banking 
relationships change over time from 'Collective Relationship Banking (CRB)' to 
'Independent Banking (INDB)' or vice versa. Therefore, one should not consider 
relationship banking as just a one-dimensional relationship as it appears to be 
affected by the changes in the real sector structure via cross-ownership between 
holding companies and their subsidiaries through either collective relationship 
banking or independent banking. 
1.3 Overview of the Thesis 
The main purpose of this thesis is to challenge the existing research on banking 
structure and regulation and to suggest some new angles to investigate the banking 
structure and its evolution. The thesis tries to broaden the scope of study in banking 
structure and regulation by introducing other relevant issues such as industrial policy, 
banking technology, and relationship banking with the real sector. 
The main body of the thesis starts in Chapter 2 with a review of the history of 
East Asian banking which provides detailed accounts of facts and events for banking 
in Japan and Korea. In doing so, it becomes obvious that it is necessary to link the 
industrial policy in these two countries with the development of the banking system 
as they appear to evolve together. More importantly the industrial policy in both 
9 
countries had control over the banking system in order to accelerate economic 
growth. Both Japan and Korea experienced successfid economic growth after the 
World War Il and the Korean War as these countries were brought back from 
complete destruction to emerge as industrialised countries. One could argue that the 
key to this success was a centrally-led and well-thought out industrial policy. 
However, the review of their banking histories shows that the industrial policy could 
not have materialised without the appropriate banking system and its regulation. 
There have been several types of regulation in the East Asian banking for the 
purpose of industrial policy set by the Govemment but the most notable ones were: 
I/ regulation on interest rates (price-cap regulation) to keep loan rates under control 
at a reasonably low and affordable level for industrial sector, and 2/ a relaxed policy 
towards non-performing loans if the loans were engaged in the strategic industries 
according to the overall industrial policy. However, these regulations have been 
gradually relaxed due to extemal pressure or simply because the banking industry 
has become mature enough to make its own strategic decisions on rates and 
provisions instead of abiding the rules set in favour of industrial development. 
In order to investigate the impact of these changes in regulation and/or 
deregulation and the banking behaviour towards non-performing loans and their 
provisions, this thesis develops a simple banking competition model that shares some 
key features with the spatial competition model developed by Chiappori et al. (1995): 
for example we assume monopolistic competition in banking and a uniform 
distribution of customers across the market. The model developed in chapter 2 
departs from their model by taking non-performing loans and their loss provisions 
10 
into consideration. This simple model is developed to investigate how changes in 
regulation in reference to non-performing loans (NPLs) affect the banking structure 
and to explain how policy behind the loss provision of NPLs and regulation on 
interest rates influence banks' behaviour and therefore, the banking structure. 
For the consideration of NPLs, the objective function of a bank includes a 
direct loss of interest on NPLs and an indirect loss from loan loss provisions. The 
equilibrium number of banks in the market has a negative relationship with the size 
of NPLs. Large NPLs reduce the size of profits given the direct and indirect loss 
functions and create fewer incentives for a new bank to enter the market. In addition, 
more mergers or exits are encouraged for banks to cover their provisions on NPLs. 
Therefore, the market structure becomes more concentrated with larger NPLs- 
Similarly, market concentration increases with the degree of loss provisions on 
NPLs. In other words, stricter regulation on loan provisions creates a more 
concentrated market. However, it is difficult to pin down whether a general 
tightening of regulation on NPLs would eventually reduce the overall size of NPLs 
as banks become reluctant to offer loans to risky projects. 
In order to investigate the impact of industrial policy, banking behaviour is 
divided into two types: I/ whereby banks simply act as a financing arm for the 
economic development under a price-cap regulation (depositlloan rate control) and 
hence they are revenue maximising under the guided interest margins, and 2/ banks 
are profit maximising under a rate-of-return regulation (ROA andlor BIS ratio 
guideline). One must note that the East Asian banking sector has made a transition 
from a price-cap regulation to a rate-of-retum regulation. The relative dominance of 
11 
the two types of banking behaviour, revenue maximising versus profit maximising, is 
influenced by industrial policy via preferential rates on strategic policy loans and 
their loss provisions. Shifting the weight from revenue maximising behaviour under 
a price-cap regulation to profit maximising behaviour under rate-of-return regulation 
shows reduction in the equilibrium number of banks. 
An empirical analysis of Japanese and Korean banking is conducted to 
investigate market structure with respect to banking behaviour and deregulation. The 
econometric model is based on Bain's (195 1) SCP (Structure-Conduct-Performance) 
paradigm and a set of variables for Structure (concentration), Conduct (branching 
and pricing) and Performance (profitability) were chosen. Tbree dummy variables 
were used to capture the effect of various types of deregulation. The empirical results 
not only reaffirm what the simple banking competition model has suggested, but also 
explains further important aspects of banking in East Asia such as the evolution of 
banking during the economic boom, competition in branching network, and 
differences in banking structure between nationwide banks and regional banks. 
So far in our analysis, our main focus has been on the behaviour of banks 
although behaviour of banks and customers are mutually affected in any 
circumstances given the role of banks as intermediaries. As Waterson (2003) points 
out the importance of consumer behaviour in competition policy, in chapter 3, the 
focus is shifted towards consumers (banks' customers) in the event of an introduction 
of a new technology (internet banking). The chapter examines the relationship 
between banks and customers. It is natural for financial intermediaries including 
banks to improve their production (process) technology by focusing on their 
12 
distribution network. In this context, banking technology has come a long way from 
over-the-counter tellers (OTC) to intemet banking (IB). However, research on 
banking technology has been relatively neglected and research on intemet banking 
appears almost non-existent. Most common reasons for concentrated market 
structures in technology intensive industries (Farrell and Saloner, 1986; Sutton, 
1998) are network effects and standardisation and the banking sector seems to follow 
the same route with adoption of modem technology. 
As we shift our focus from the perspective of banks to the perspective of 
customers, an online customer survey was conducted for the residents in Korea. The 
determinants of consumer adoption of internet banking are characterised using the 
survey data in both static and dynamic framework based on duration analysis of the 
panel data. " 
The empirical results show that sex, age, marital status, and degree of 
exposure to internet banking as well as the characteristics of the banks they deal with 
influence adoption of internet banking. Some of the findings show that middle age 
males are more likely to adopt internet banking ahead of tech-savvy teens and 
twenties. Banking activities become more complex as people get older and it creates 
more need for internet banking to middle age males. This has an even more crucial 
implication in a dynamic framework as Koreans tend to imitate the norm set by their 
family leaders namely middle age fathers and hence motivates a faster diffusion of 
internet banking. 
11 Duration analysis and survival analysis are often used interchangeably in the literature. 
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Additionally, this thesis assesses empirical issues of banking technology 
concerning customer inertia, risk aversion and pre-emption in order to explain why 
the adoption of internet banking by Koreans has been noticeably faster than by 
anyone else. One important point to make in this context is that there has been a 
nationwide technology policy set by the Government, which explicitly encouraged 
the general public to adopt e-culture in a network society, which outweighed 
customer inertia and risk aversion. The Korean Government has undertaken large- 
scale investments to wire the entire country into a single high-speed cable network to 
provide an ultimate e-society. 12 In the wake of e-culture and e-society promotion, a 
consortium of banks together with the Korea Telecom (KT) 13 has made collective 
efforts to develop internet banking software and has been providing its technological 
service to all banks and financial institutions in Korea. As concerns over internet- 
associated risks increase, some banks have decided to further develop their own 
internet banking software but it is important that the initiative was taken centrally 
and collectively at the beginning. 
Finally, in order to test the structural change in banking with the introduction 
of internet banking, we have included first mover and market leader (the largest 
bank) dummy variables in the duration model. However, the results show no 
evidence of first mover advantage (order effects) in internet banking whilst the 
12 Korea shows the highest penetration ratio of broadband connection (23% as of June 2003 according 
to an OECD report on 13-Jan-2004: DSTI/ICCP/TIP(2003)6/FINAL). A consultation document by 
Ofcom (Office of Communications, UK) points out the Korean case of high broadband take-up rate is 
due to the high level of population density and public financing of roll-out. 
13 The Korea Telecom is the incumbent provider of fixed line telecommunications which used to be 
fully owned by the Government. 
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largest bank (rank effects) in commercial banking remains dominant in internet 
banking. When internet banking was first introduced in Korea, we expected to see 
some churning effects with the new concept of banking as internet banking provides 
extra transparency of information and allow consumers to search and switch between 
banks. However, the empirical results do not support our expectation and instead 
reinforces the position of large banks. This is a very important finding that provides 
policy makers with a valuable piece of information as internet banking technology 
may encourage further consolidation of the banking industry. 
In chapter 4, the focus was moved on to the relationship between the real 
sector (non-financiao and the banking sector structures to try to identify the 
economic principles underlying their banking relationship. The shift of focus towards 
real sector and investigating its structural changes in terms of cross-ownership opens 
up a new way of analysing relationship banking. There has been a plethora of 
literature focused on the structure of conglomerates (KeiretsulChaeboo in East Asia 
to explain the fast economic growth and/or recent crisis in the region. However, no 
research has been conducted to investigate the link between the structural changes in 
the real sector and the banking sector although relationship banking by definition 
suggests the necessary link between the two sectors. Hence, the contribution of this 
chapter is to bridge the gap between these two sectors and to investigate how 
relationship banking develops over time with respect to what is happening in the real 
sector. Traditionally, the strong vertical relationship between core companies and 
their subsidiaries in the real sector was believed to be a driving force for the 
economic success in the region. However, the degree of vertical relationship varies 
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depending upon macroeconomic fluctuations and subsequently affects their banking 
relationship. 
One important concept that is introduced in this chapter is 'collective 
relationship banking (CRB)' since firms within a same network of conglomerates 
(KeiretsulChaeboo often establish banking relationship with an identical bank 
collectively. On the other hand, 'independent banking (INDB)' forms another sub- 
concept of relationship banking established independently of conglomerates 
(KeiretsulChaeboo' relationship bank. 
Empirical evidence from the panel data constructed for the top 10 chaebols 
and their subsidiaries in Korea indicates that collective relationship banking is more 
likely when the holding company has a smaller stake in the subsidiary. The main 
implication of this result is that the banking relationship is strongly driven by 
signalling and sharing of private information. Banks should screen and monitor 
private information about their borrower's projects before and after the loan approval 
and vertical ownership structure in the real sector provides a mechanism for 
signalling and sharing of the private information. Clearly, the higher stake held by a 
holding company means that its subsidiary has better business prospects. This high 
ownership stake sends out a positive signal as public information and provides its 
subsidiaries with an opportunity to shop around for loans irrespective of whether the 
bank is already dealing with its holding company or not. By contrast, a low 
ownership stake only creates some doubts as to subsidiaries' business prospects as 
well as to strategic importance within the chaebol. Therefore, collective banking 
becomes favourable for both the borrowing subsidiary and the lending bank as the 
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bank has an information advantage having both the holding company and the 
subsidiary as borrowers together when the holding company can also provide indirect 
monitoring of its subsidiary on behalf of the bank. Koreans have paid much attention 
to corporate governance and restructuring following the recent financial crises. 
Korean chaebols have undergone many mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and 
divestitures and it is argued that this restructuring in the real sector has a significant 
impact on banking relationship in Korea. Further opportunities of investigation on 
collective relationship banking should not be overlooked. 
The second part of the chapter 4 examines the situations where the banking 
relationship has been switched from collective relationship banking to independent 
banking or vice versa. The data do not have enough cases of switching to construct a 
proper econometric model, but the case study provides interesting and valuable 
information. Most switching cases tend to appear when: I/ the subsidiary firms 
experience deterioration in their profits; 2/ there is a plan for major expansion and a 
large capital is required, and 3/ there are significant ownership changes such as 
foreign partner's involvement or departure. It is difficult to generalise the above 
outcomes from the case study, but it provides an interesting piece of information. 
This concludes the investigation of banking structure and the main analysis of the 
thesis. 
As described above, these three chapters present an investigation of how and 
why banking structure changes over time within the East Asian context: I/when 
regulation and deregulation in certain areas of banking are implemented; 2/ when a 
new banking technology is introduced, and 3/ when the real sector (borrowers) 
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experiences structural changes. Although the investigation is limited to the East 
Asian banking and focuses on the Korean experience, it provides valuable insight 
regarding banking structure and these results can be applied to other countries under 
certain conditions. The last chapter analyses some policy implications and presents 
the main conclusion of the thesis and suggests some possible extensions to the work. 
Chapter 2 
East Asian Banking Restructuring: 
Regulation and Industrial Policy 
2.1 Introduction 
Throughout the last decade, the East Asian banking industry has adopted a 
significantly more concentrated market structure. The number of banks in the region 
was substantially reduced via mergers and exits in the late 1990s as shown in Table 
2.1. Japan has authorised only one new regional bank since 1976 whilst there were 5 
large-scale mergers between nationwide banks and one revocation of the license in 
the 1990s. On the other hand, the banking structure in Korea took a slightly different 
path. Korea authorised 9 new nationwide banks and 3 transformations from specialty 
banks throughout the industrialisation in the 1980s and early 1990s. However, Korea 
took a drastic turn with 9 mergers between nationwide banks and 4 mergers between 
regional banks. This wave of mergers and exits has halved the number of nationwide 
banks in Japan and Korea from its peak, and the market share of the larger banks has 
grown. One can say that the Japanese and Korean banks made a radical move 
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towards consolidation to deal with their respective economic and financial crises 
since the consolidation seems to coincide with the post-crises period as shown in 
Figures 2.3 and 2.4. Traditionally, one of the main roles of these East Asian banks 
was a means of supporting the real sector in the process of pursuing economic 
development. 14 However, when the East Asian financial crises in 1997 triggered the 
restructuring process of many industrial sectors in the region, the banking sector 
appeared to be an industry where restructuring was most urgently and seriously 
required. The 1997 financial crisis in Asia renewed recognition of the significance of 
the banking industry and its importance to the overall economy. 
Previous literature (Cerasi et al., 2002; Chiappori et al., 1995; Dewatripont 
and Maskin, 1995; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1993) on bank structure has primarily 
focused on the impact of cxogenous change in regulation and the subsequent change 
in competition environment without any consideration of industrial policy. The 
industrial policy in East Asia, which dominated banking sector regulation, had the 
objective of encouraging industrial development in the region. Therefore, the 
competition environment in the East Asian banking should not be investigated 
independently of its industrial policy. 
Banking regulation in Japan and Korea has included entry barriers, branching 
restrictions, and deposit rate ceilings. East Asian banking regulation was designed to 
facilitate the development of strategic industries as shown in Table 2.2. Japan and 
Korea have aimed to promote certain industries, which they believed to be 
14 Kim (1999) claims one of the reasons for recent financial crisis in Korea is basic functions of the 
financial industry being neglected such as credit screening, which led to higher non performing loans. 
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strategically beneficial for the national economy. The target industries have varied 
from primary and light industries (food and textiles) in the 1950s and 1960s, to high- 
tech knowledge intensive industries in the 1990s. The deposit rate regulation, for 
instance, allowed banks to have access to cheap funding so that they could provide 
loans at lower rates to these strategic industries. With cheap funding via banks and 
with the help of government subsidies, the strategic industries could grow fast, 
generating supernormal profits and remained as high quality customers to banks. 
This kind of growth pattern continued in East Asia until they faced the recent 
economic crises. 
Not only have Japan and Korea led the economic growth in East Asia, but 
also other East Asian countries have replicated many of the development patterns set 
by Japan and Korea. 15 Moreover, the two countries have similarities in their 
industrial structure due to their strong trade networks. 16 Since the modem banking 
system in Korea was established during the Japanese occupation, it seems natural 
that Korea followed the Japanese type of banking establishments. However, there is 
some evidence of divergence as well as convergence in terms of recent restructuring 
of the banking sector, especially with respect to adopting concentrated market 
structure as in Figures 2.3 to 2.6. For instance, the Korean banking structure has 
consolidated more immediately and drastically after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. 
15 World Bank data categorise Japan, Korea, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand as East Asia. However, Japan and Korea dominated the regional economy 
and its growth representing 78-90% of East Asian GNP (constant market price 1995, in US dollars) 
over the period 1960-1997. Their contribution to the regional growth has been more than 80%, which 
fell down to 50-60% in the 1990s. 
16 Castley (1997) showed Japanese influence on Korea's industrial isation in detail. 
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On the other hand, the Japanese banking structure has reacted to the economic crisis 
in the early 1990s 17 with some delays and the major banking consolidation took place 
only after 2000 with almost a decade delay. The difference in the restructuring is 
more notable when we compare the two countries in terms of regional banking as 
Japan does not appear to have implemented any measures for their regional banks. 
The main emphasis of this chapter is to identify the determinants of banking 
structure in East Asia using empirical data from Japan and Korea. The recent 
consolidation in East Asian banking will be assessed with respect to industrial policy 
and regulation. This chapter also investigates the role of Japanese and Korean banks 
in their respective industrialisation processes and how the changes in regulation 
affected the evolution of the market structure based on the structure-performance 
relationship. 
The main method of analysis lies in the application of industrial organisation 
theory to banking. Most traditional methods used in industrial economics are 
designed to analyse non-financial firms, such as manufacturing firms that produce 
physical goods. Some economists attempt to identify factors affecting market 
structure by differentiating advertising or technology intensive industries from the 
rest. 18 However, little research has been undertaken on the service industries until 
recently. It is important to note that the banking industry has some special attributes 
17 Kanaya and Woo (2000) discusses the Japanese banking crisis in the 1990s, in particular the 
collapse of the asset bubble in the early 1990s. 
18 Cowling (1972) discusses optimal advertising policies for a variety of market structures with 
empirical evidence. Sutton (1991,1998) uses escalation mechanism in explaining the market structure 
of advertising and technology intensive industries. 
22 
due to its nature of service industry and hence an industry-specific approach is 
inevitable. 
First, the, role of East Asian banks in industrialisation is investigated by 
comparing the evolution of the banking system with the country's macroeconomic 
position. The uniqueness of this approach lies in the sense of inter-industry 
comparison between financial and non-financial industries using an industrial 
organisational framework. It is important to note that financial and non-financial 
industries have different attributes and therefore, it is interesting to investigate how 
they have evolved together. 
Second, a theoretical model of banking competition by Chiappori et al. 
(1995) is extended using Salop's circular (1979) model. We construct two objective 
functions of banks: a revenue maximising bank under regulation and a profit 
maximising bank under deregulation. We show the relative dominance of the two 
objective functions is influenced by industrial policy, thus by regulation and explain 
the banking structure in terms of the equilibrium number of banks in the market 
depending on the relative dominance of the two objective functions. 
This chapter analyses the impact of transition from a price-cap regulation 
(depositl7oan rate control) to a rate-of-return regulation (ROA andlor BIS ratio 
guideline) on banking industry structure. A simple theoretical model of banking 
competition suggests that the relative dominance of the two objective functions is 
influenced by industrial policy via preferential rates and relaxing price-cap regulation 
reduces the equilibrium number of banks. The result is supported by empirical 
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evidence from Japan and Korea, which have both undergone a substantial 
consolidation. 
Finally, we investigate empirically the consequences of the regulation and 
deregulation on entry, branching and deposit rates. The different types of regulation 
and deregulation are defined and separately analysed from a country specific 
perspective. The relationship between concentration (Structure) and the degree of 
competition (Conduct) in Japan and Korea is examined. The effects of deregulation 
on the structure of the banking industry and the profitability (Performance) of banks 
are tested. The evolution of banking industry in the two countries is compared and 
we show evidence of divergence in the restructuring process of the banking sector 
between Japan and Korea. 
The analysis is applied to a unique data set of the entire commercial banking 
sector in Japan and Korea, which covers both pre- and post- banking crisis periods. 
This chapter draws attention to the role of banking sector in the East Asian 
industrialisation and the evolution of the banking structure based on the structure- 
performance relationship. 
2.2 Review of East Asian Banking History 
In the post war period, East Asian Governments actively promoted heavy and 
chemical industries and some academics like Cho (1994) and Castley (1997) argued 
that the financial sector was lagging behind the fast-developing real sector. 
Moreover, the pattern of fast growth in the real sector and the lagging financial sector 
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was common in all East Asian countries. In particular, the similarities between Japan 
and Korea were significant due to their strong trade networks. 
It is fair to say that the Korean industrialisation process followed that of 
Japan with a time lag of almost a decade. This overlapping transfer of industrial 
structures from Japan to Korea was explained by the Japanese relocation process, 
which started in the late 1960s. In Table 2.2, we notice Korea established a general 
pattern of catching up with the Japanese industrial policy a decade after. 
Ishii (1997) claimed the reason for the high growth rate in East Asia was its 
high rate of savings. Even in the 1980s the rate of savings of the household economy 
in Japan was around 17%, which was twice as much as those in the advanced 
Western countries. It is true that the high rate of savings in East Asia is one of the 
common factors for its fast growth. However, the role of banks in the process of 
allocating the funds into appropriate industries and enterprises should not be 
overlooked. As Ishii (1997) pointed out for Japan, the main part of the funds for 
industrialisation in East Asia was not procured directly from the capital market but 
supplied indirectly through various kinds of banks, and the respective central banks 
provided these banks with funds if necessary. 
Cho (1994) explains that the East Asian Governments were heavily involved 
in the direction of savings fund to achieve development goals in the real sector. 
Industrialisation in East Asia has not only meant a transformation of an agrarian 
economy into an industrial economy, but it also means a more focused industrial 
development in strategic industries such as heavy industries. Thus, the financial 
sector has never developed independently of the real sector in East Asia. More 
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importantly, the industrial policy dominated financial sector developments leaving 
the banking sector subordinate to the real sector. 
2.2.1 Brief History of Banking in Japan'9 
It is worth looking at the formation of modem banking system in Japan as it set a 
prototype for the region. The Meiji Restoration in 1868 provided a ground for the 
modem banking system in Japan. A structural framework including operating 
principles and regulatory issues started to form and continued to develop from 1868 
up to the mid-1990s. The development phases of Japanese banking reflect three 
distinctive periods, the period from the Restoration through World War Il (WWII) 
and the Allied occupation, the high growth era of the 1950s to the 1970s, and the 
quarter-century since the oil shock of 1973. 
1868-WWII 
A modem banking system was built by adopting a variety of Western models on top 
of a legacy of indigenous financial practices between the Meiji Restoration in 1868 
and World War I (WWI). The main institutional feature of the banking evolution in 
Japan was characterised under the Bank Act 1890, which took effect in 1893. 
National banks began to change to ordinary banks in substantial numbers from the 
end of 1896, when the charters started to expire and by 1899 no national banks 
remained. This amalgamated three classes of banking institutions: I/ national; 2/ 
19 Hugh (1999) well documented the Japanese banking system in historical perspectives in Banking in 
Japan edited by Tsutsui (1999). 
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private, and 3/ quasi-bank, into one. Interestingly enough, the new bank law did not 
set any minimum bank size in favour of free competition. As a result, unit banking 20 
was predominant in Japan until WWI. 
With the development of Zaibatsu, 21 the Mitsubishi and Sumitomo Zaibatsu 
transformed their finance department into banks in 1895. This made the monetary 
crises more severe because these banks were susceptible to failure during recessions. 
The Big Five banks: I/ Mitsui; 2/ First; 3/Mitsubishi; 4/ Sumitomo, and 51 Yasuda, 
dominated the sector until WWI. 
Special banks started to emerge during this period as well, such as the 
Tokohama Special Bank, which was established in 1880 to finance foreign trade. 
Within the 5-year period between 1897 and 1902, the Government founded the 
Hypothec Bank of Japan (Nippon Kangyo Ginko), 22 46 affiliated prefectural 
Agricultural and Industrial Banks, the Hokkaido Colonial Bank (Hokkaido 
Takushoku Ginko)23 and the Industrial Bank of Japan (Nippon Kogyo Ginko). Most 
of these banks were designed to finance the transition from an agrarian economy to 
an industrial economy. 
During the 1920s and 1930s, Japanese banking underwent considerable 
adjustment in terms of the relationship between private institutions and state 
regulators. The trigger to this legislative reform was the Banking Crisis in 1927 
caused by the post WWI recession. With the intensification of official regulation, 
20 Unit banking as opposed to branch banking. 
21 Former enterprise type of Keiretsu. 22 Japanese names in italic font inside parenthesis. 23 Note that Hokkaido Takushoky Ginko, became insolvent in Nov. 1997. 
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concentration in commercial banking increased. 24 However, interactions between 
public and private sectors were dynamic and complex and the bureaucracy therefore 
could not simply dictate policy to the banks. Zaibatsu banks continued to be the 
leading institutions in the system while a new financial institution, Wartime Finance 
Corporation (WFC), was created in 1942 for the sole purpose of financing military 
production during the WWII. 
WWII-1973 
There were some institutional changes in the banking sector after the WWII as post- 
war reorganisation of the financial system was carried out by dissolving wartime 
institutions and establishing private long-term credit institutions and financial 
institutions for small-and medium-sized firms and agriculture. Development of 
government institutions began alongside the reform of capital markets. During high 
growth era between 1952 and 1973, Japanese banking established the uniqueness of 
the system. The predominant pattern of banking activities was over-lending and 
over-borrowing in indirect financing in order to facilitate the investment-led growth. 
It is worth noting that this type of over-lending and over-borrowing created typical 
Keiretsu firms in Japan with high debt-to-equity ratios. The investment-led growth 
eventually led Japan to the asset bubble in the late 1980s before it collapsed in the 
early 1990s. 
24 Higher concentration following stricter regulation during this period is the opposite of what is 
happening in Europe and East Asia lately. Recent deregulation in competition measures has made 
banking structure more concentrated. 
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Post 19 73 
During the 1970s, the oil shocks had a negative effect on the banking sector. Japan 
tried to reform the banking industry once again to cope with the difficulties in the 
real sector and the driving force of the reform was from market liberalisation with 
various deregulation measures as shown in Table 2.3. The main focus of 
liberalisation was on lifting interest rate regulation starting with short-term rates. 
Branching restriction and cross-financial sector entry restriction started to relax later. 
In the 1980s, banks were allowed to diversify their financial products and services. 
Enactment of the Financial System Reform Act of 1993 enabled banks and securities 
firms to enter each other's fields. 
One of the most significant liberalisation measures in recent Japanese 
banking history was the "Big-Bang programme , 25 initiated in 1996 by the then Prime 
Minister Hashimoto. Various reforms were scheduled to be implemented based upon 
the three guiding principles of 'freedom', 'fairness', and 'globalisation, so that the 
Tokyo financial market could attain an equal status as New York and London by 
2001.26 Restructuring has accelerated following the Asian crisis in 1997.27 The 
bank-on-bank holding companies created a new environment for financial 
institutions as they can form alliances. In April 2000, four banks: I/ Tokyo- 
Mitsubishi; 2/ Mitsubishi Trust; 3/ Nippon Trust, and 4/ Tokyo Trust, announced a 
plan for a holding company, the Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group. Mergers 
25 The "Big-Bang programme" was a general financial reform package to enhance the efficiency of 
Japanese banks, which can be summarised into two main objectives: I/ reducing bad debts, and 2/ 
relaxing foreign exchange regulation. 26 See Japanese Banks 2000 (2000), Japanese Bankers Association. 
27 Note that the restructuring after the collapse of the asset bubble in the early 1990s was very slow. 
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between banks were frequent throughout the late 1990s while the industry is 
expecting entry of new types of banks. 28 
2.2.2 Brief History of Banking in Korea 29 
The Korean banking system seems to replicate the Japanese system as the 
introduction of a modem banking system into Korea dates back to the beginning of 
Japanese domination over the country. 
18 78 - WWII 
In 1878, the First National Bank (a Japanese bank) opened in Pusan and this was 
followed by Korean banks' openings. However, most Korean banks only existed for 
a short period of time due to insufficient capital and a lack of experience. In 1909, 
the Old Bank of Korea was founded and was renamed the Bank of Chosun in 1910. 
During the early 1900s, numerous banks were established including Chosun 
Industrial Bank, Chosun Commercial Bank (later renamed the Commercial Bank of 
Korea), Cho Hung Bank, Korea First Bank (1929) and Hanil Bank (1932). In 1959, 
Bank of Seoul was established and became nationwide in 1962. Since the 
Government had owned commercial banks until government-owned stocks were sold 
in the late 1950s, these banks exercised very little autonomy. 
28 In May 200 1, Sony Corp. filed a formal application for an online bank in cooperation with Sakura 
Bank and JP Morgan. Sony Bank (www. sonybank. net) ovened for business on II June 2001. This 
ý2p e of internet banks can be also found in the UK, e. g. ýggs, Smile, and FirstDirect. 
See annual publications by the Bank of Korea, 'Financial system in Korea'. 
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WWII - 1982 
The establishment of the new banking system followed the liberation from Japan in 
1945 and the inauguration of the Republic of Korea in 1948. At that time, the Korean 
banking system was reorganised for the purpose of financing the 5-year Economic 
Development Plan more efficiently. 30 The Bank of Korea Act was amended in 1962 
and various specialised banks were introduced to facilitate financial support for 
underdeveloped or strategically important industries such as Small and Medium 
Industry Bank, Citizens National Bank, Korea Exchange Bank, The Korea Housing 
Bank. 
Post 1982 
The General Banking Act was revised in 1982 and commercial banks started to be 
privatised. These included Hanil Bank, Korea First Bank, Bank of Seoul and Trust, 
Chohung Bank. One of the main revisions was the shift from direct credit controls 
through credit ceilings on individual banks to indirect controls through management 
of bank reserves. In 1984, the preferential rates on policy loans by commercial banks 
were abolished and band system in loan rates was introduced, in which banks are 
allowed to charge different rates. The ceilings on various rates (inter-bank call rates 
and issuing rates of unsecured corporate bonds) were also lifted. 
30 Note that the 5-year Economic Development Plan determined the industrial policies with the 
strategic industries presented in Table 2.2. 
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As a measure to provide a more competitive environment in banking, 
Shinhan Bank and KorAm Bank opened in 1982 and 1983 respectively. It is 
important to note that Shinhan Bank was the first banking establishment financed by 
private capital only. In the 1980s, to encourage the domestic banks to improve their 
banking practices and managerial skills, numerous foreign bank branches were 
allowed to open. In 1988, interest rates were extensively deregulated to increase 
banking competition in the process of financial liberalisation. Entry barriers were 
fin-ther lowered in 1989, adding 3 new commercial banks: Dongwha Bank; Dongnam 
Bank, and Daedong Bank. Also, Korea Exchange Bank changed its status from a 
specialised bank to a nationwide commercial bank. Between 1991 and 1997, a four- 
stage plan for interest rates deregulation was completed (see Table 2.4). The main 
focus of liberalisation was on lifting interest rate regulation starting with short-term 
rates while branching restriction and cross-financial sector entry restriction has not 
been fully relaxed. 
Further deregulation is in the process of being implemented in the aftermath 
of the Asian financial crisis of 1997. As one of the most significant changes of 
banking regulation in Korea, the restriction on foreign ownership of domestic 
commercial banks has been lifted and now there is virtually no restriction on foreign 
ownership. As a result, there have been a couple major mergers and acquisitions by 
foreign banks 31 and we expect to see several more of the kind to happen in the future. 
31 New Bridge Capital (US) acquired 51% stake of Korea First Bank (KFB) in Jan. 2000 and Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) announced an agreement to purchase 100% stake of KFB New Bridge Holding Ltd. In Jan. 2005. 
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Also, mergers between domestic banks were encouraged to increase competitiveness. 
Quite a number of mergers of this kind took place since the Asian financial crisis in 
1997 and such merger waves are expected to continue. 
In this context, one could consider the restructuring in the Korean banking 
system as an immediate result of the Asian financial crisis. If we were to associate 
the banking restructuring directly with the financial crisis, it is worth noting that the 
restructuring takes only a narrow definition by focusing on the post-crisis structural 
changes in response to the stricter banking supervision. However, this thesis adopts a 
much broader definition of banking restructuring in the evolutionary perspectives. 
This can cover a wider spectrum of bank entry, transformation, exit (revocation) or 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) when the regulatory environment changes over 
time in either direction, a relaxation or a tightening up. 
Nonetheless, we acknowledge the significance of the recent crisis and that 
this very substantial crisis had a major impact on both the banking and the industrial 
sectors in Korea. Although the thesis have not chosen to look at this crisis in depth 
since the major interest of the thesis is in studying the long term evolution of the 
structure of the two sectors, it is worth discussing what actually happened during the 
particular period of financial crisis as it radically affected the situation in many areas 
of the Korean economy. 
As Kim and Lee (2002) and Lee et al. (2002) pointed out, the epicentre of the 
crisis in Korea was in financial troubles of the corporate sector which were deeply 
rooted in the high leverage ratio. On average, the leverage ratio of the Korean firms 
has fluctuated around 70% throughout the 1980s and the 1990s prior to the crisis. 
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One should also note that during the above period, the Korean firms traditionally 
relied on debt-financing 32 as opposed to equity-financing since the equity market was 
relatively under-developed in Korea and a large number of firms feared losing their 
management control with equity-financing. 
Another important observation to make in the context is that the increasing 
level of foreign leverage (Lee et al. 2000) in addition to the high overall leverage as 
it significantly and negatively affected their debt repayments when the currency was 
under attack during the crisis. All in all, the unsustainable debt management left 
Korean corporations together with their respective banks in a very vulnerable 
position. 
As a result, many of the Korean firms including large Chaebols experienced 
insolvency and the voices calling for corporate as well as financial restructuring 
heightened in response to bankruptcy. Hence, one could argue that the changes 
within the Korean banking structure are being propelled by the recent financial crisis 
as government officials try to implement appropriate measures to protect the Korean 
banks from similar crises. For example, to improve the banking standards, Financial 
Supervisory Service (FSS hereafter)33 enforced the new accounting standards in 
accordance with internationally accepted standards. 34 Changes in the management 
32 The history of the Korean banking sector earlier in the section explains the background for this in 
detail. 
33 The FSS was established on I Jan. 1999 by combining former supervisory bodies: the Banking 
Supervisory Authority (BSA hereafter), the Securities Supervisory Board, the Insurance Supervisory 
Board, and the Non-bank Supervisory Authority. The FSS inherited the role of the BSA. 
34 Kim (1999) discusses prudential regulation in detail in his BIS policy paper. Many of the changes in 
regulation are related to disclosure requirements on bank financial statements. One example is the 
forward-looking criteria for asset classification in Korea introduced in 1999 that incorporate the 
"Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision". 
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structure, in particular with the presence of foreign management, 35 will definitely 
affect the structure of the Korean banking industry. However, since changes of this 
kind are still on-going, the chapter does not analyse the effect in greater detail. 
2.2.3 Industrial Policy and Banking Structure under 
Threat 
With the increasing importance of East Asian economy in the global context, Japan 
and Korea have experienced significant pressure from outside on market 
liberalisation in the both real and financial sectors. Japan faced the pressure earlier 
than Korea as the Japanese presence in the global organisation predated that of 
Korea. Requests for eliminating tariff and non-tariff trade barriers were one of the 
most common pressures in the real sector, whereas the liberalisation of interest rates 
and mobility of capital were often required by global institutions such as IMF, World 
bank and OECD. For instance, the OECD entry condition for Korea included capital 
market liberalisation. 36 
Therefore, the East Asian Governments started to lose their tight control over 
industrial policy and banking operation. Large enterprises increased their activities 
overseas both in production and financing in the wake of globalisation and domestic 
economies in East Asia were left behind. Cowling and Tomlinson (2000) explain a 
35 Korea First Bank managed by New Bridge Capital and subsequently by Standard Chartered Bank as 
mentioned earlier in the section. 
36 Korea had to comply with the minimum requirements set by 'OECD Codes of Liberalisation of 
Capital Movements and Current Invisible Operations' 
35 
case of strategic failure about a hollowing out of Japanese industry caused by the 
relocation of Keiretsus and other multinationals. 37 
When the Japanese bubble burst in 1990 and the banking crisis followed a 
year after, mergers between banks were recommended. However, the Keiretsus were 
the main hurdle to both large-scale mergers and massive corporate restructuring as 
city banks in Japan were at the core of respective Keiretsus. These large business 
groups, Keiretsus, had cross-shareholdings with the group banks, which has worked 
in favour of industrial policy during the fast growing period. However, when the real 
sector started to deteriorate, the Keiretsu holdings in the city banks proved to be a 
substantial obstacle. 38 
The Korean case is somewhat different, as there is no large group bank 
publicly known, tied via cross-shareholdings. However, the strong long-term 
relationship between certain banks and Chaebols, which are the Korean version of 
Keiretsus, turned out to be a problem after the recent crisis. Despite the absence of 
group banks, the loan portfolio of Korean banks was concentrated on a small number 
of Chaebols. 39 
37 'Hollowing out' as a result of outward FDI (foreign direct investment) when the domestic cost base 
increases. 
38 Tsutsui (1999) explains the obstacles faced by Keiretsus and the group banks in detail. 
39 It appears to be bilateral oligopoly suggested by Waterson (1984) using Galbraith (1954) examples 
in American Capitalism. 
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2.3 Background Literature 
There has been much research to explain the causes of Korea's economic growth and 
many attribute Korea's growth to the strong industrial policy adopted by the 
Government. In order to finance this industrial policy, the Korean banking system 
was reorganised. 40 Cho (1994) explains that the reason the Korean banking system 
was under tight government control was to aid strategic investments to finance 
development plans. East Asian Governments promoted a group of strategic industries 
as listed in Table 2.2 and regulation was designed to direct the money flow to such 
target industrieS. 41 
On the other hand, macroeconomists often discuss the optimal mix of 
government policies to explain economic growth in a country. In particular, the 
recent crisis in Asia brought more attention to the role of monetary policy in an 
econoMy. 42 However, the economic success in East Asia may have more to do with 
the credibility of hands-on development policy in the private sector alongside 
monetary policy. The liquidity for the development was provided and the fund flows 
were carefully directed to the strategic industries. The signal of Government's 
40 The importance of the banks' role in financing this industrial policy is well documented in 
'Financial System in Korea (1998)' published by The Bank of Korea. 
41 Castley (1997) explains the industrialisation process in East Asia as a form of ladder where each 
rung has to be scaled before moving on to the next. His illustration of the ladder is simplified as I/ 
Pre-industry with primary products, 2/ Labour-intensive industries, 3/ Capital-intensive industries, and 
4/ Knowledge or technology-intensive industries. 
42 Agenor et al (1999) laid out excellent models for monetary policy and macroeconomic aspects of 
financial sector in order to explain the recent Asian financial crisis. 
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intention was clear and credible to the private sector via announced development 
plans without any policy inconsistency. 43 
Given the special attributes of banking industry, the theory of financial 
intermediation indicates measuring the both quantity output and quality of banks is 
not as straightforward as for non-financial firms. In addition to the intangible nature 
of banking output, it is difficult to account for quality in banking service. 44 Heffernan 
(1996), Klein (1971) and Clark (1988) discussed the relevant concepts of bank output 
and input . 
45 Despite the importance of commercial banking as a major financial 
intermediary, there has been little consensus as to what constitutes a workable and 
productive theory of the banking firm. Klein (1971) claims that neo-classical 
microeconomic analysis is rarely used to explain bank behaviour, primarily because 
there is so little agreement concerning even the most fundamental concepts. In the 
face of conceptual difficulties in drawing the analogy between a bank and the typical 
firm of neo-classical analysis. 
Among various competition models in banking, Gehrig (1996) and Matutes 
and Vives (1996; 2000) included monopolistic competition with horizontal and 
vertical product differentiation, where the equivalent quality parameter is the degree 
of branching. However, the weakness of the monopolistic competition approach is 
the lack of empirical evidence, given the imperfect nature of the industry. There are 
information gaps among borrowers and lenders and imperfect information lies at the 
43 Castley (1997) lists suggested causes for East Asian economic success including consistent 
macroeconomic policies, high rates of investment, command economy through government 
intervention, total commitment of regime to economic growth. 
44 See Gordon (1990) for hedonic price adjustment. 
45 They define loans and deposits as output and input respectively. 
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centre of banking sector dynamics. Freixas and Rochet (1997) explain that 
intermediaries in the brokerage market, including banking, can affect their trading 
probabilities by establishing an information and communication network. As 
communication possibilities across potential traders are imperfect, Freixas and 
Rochet (1997) claim that, several firms, not one, will offer similar or identical 
intermediary services. Gehrig (1996) shows that the structure of financial markets is 
usually fairly concentrated with a few large firms and monopolistic competition 
market conditions will not be present. 
On the other hand, Klein (1971) assumed that banks maximise profits in the 
course of the intermediation activity and thus, the microeconomic analysis of banks 
has been influenced by industrial organisation theory. This led to the development of 
banking competition models and to empirical studies based on methods developed 
for industrial economics. Klein (1971) and Monti (1972) considered a bank as a firm 
maximising its net present value of assets and established a landmark model of 
banking. 
Among other competition models in banking, Repullo (1995) and Chiappori 
et al. (1995) applied horizontal differentiation to banking. In these models, the main 
difference between banks and non-financial firms is that banks compete in two 
ma rkets instead of one, i. e. deposits and loans markets. However, they assume that 
under perfectly competitive interbank market conditions complete independence of 
the two activities of the bank can be obtained. The predictions of these models are 
that banking industries should be fragmented, and market shares should be 
symmetrically distributed. On the other hand, Gehrig (1996) and Matutes and Vives 
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(1996; 2000), introduce network externalities to explain how asymmetric 
configurations in market share could arise in banking. This asymmetric information 
paradigm has emerged as a mainstream approach for recent banking analyses. 
The traditional approach to early empirical studies of banking was based on 
the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm. 46 Bain (1951) supposed a one- 
way linear relationship of causality, which runs from structure (the level of 
concentration) to conduct (the degree of collusion or competition), and then to 
performance (profitability). Therefore the structure of an industry is important to the 
understanding of its performance. However, the application of SCP paradigm has 
been subject to considerable criticism as it neglected feedback. Cowling (1976) 
suggests the structure-performance relationship be a recursive system of feedback 
with substantial lags. Berger (1995) also questioned the results obtained following 
the SCP paradigm. Despite the criticism, the SCP paradigm provided the foundation 
for the study of market structure. 
In general, the banking industry is highly concentrated. Kolari and Zardkoohi 
(1987) and Clark (1988) explained the concentration in banking industry with 
economies of scale and scope. Economies of scale in banking and financial 
intermediation allow banks to exercise market power or to pre-empt potential rivals' 
entry. Although banking systems tend to be quite concentrated, in some developed 
countries, the United States shows a fragmented structure. 47 However, this 
46 Baltensperger (1972), Gilbert (1984) and Hannan (199 1) used the SCP paradigm. 
47 See Macey (200 1) and Calomiris (1997). 
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fragmentation exists primarily as a result of regulation on inter-state branching 
designed to deal with their concern about financial power. 
Game theory provides another useful approach for analysing banking 
competition. When banks are to maximise their profits under SCP paradigm, the 
market structure can be investigated under a two stage game theoretic model. Banks 
can play two different games, competing in prices or quantities. As an example of 
price competition, banks enter the market with sunk costs. The exogenous sunk cost 
such as capital requirement to open a bank is a fixed set-up cost as it is fixed by an 
entry regulation and only varies in the presence of change in regulation. The 
endogenous sunk cost of branching is a variable set-up cost, which is considered to 
be a parameter for an escalation mechanism in vertical product differentiation in 
banking. 48 A similar application to internet bank networks is feasible. 
Chiappori et al. (1995) derived the equilibrium number of banks under 
various regulatory conditions and suggested the equilibrium number of banks under 
regulation is larger than that under free market condition but none of them is socially 
optimal. Cerasi et al. (2002) also looked at the impact of deregulation on 
concentration and branch networks in European banking. Since deregulation reduces 
profits for a given branching network, fewer firms find it profitable to enter the 
industry and therefore the degree of concentration rises. On the other hand when the 
banks collude, they establish a smaller network compared with competition as 
opening new branches damages rivals by stealing their clients. By coordination, they 
48 Sutton (1991,1998) laid out a model of sunk cost and market structure and discusses extensively on 
escalation mechanism and the market structure. 
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will avoid this damage. However, her empirical analysis shows the weakness in 
explaining the feedback process of structure-performance relation. 
2.4 Simple Model for Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) 
As per bank-specific attributes, banks are considered to produce loan products by 
taking deposits as funding sources. Deposits might appear as one of the products that 
banks offer but the role of deposits in banking operation lies in the cost function. 
Since the interest rates are determined not entirely by market competition '49 it is 
worth being cautious in using interest rates as a proxy for price variable in banking. 
The model consists of banks (creditors) and customers (borrowers). Money market 
activities or government intervention in the banking is allowed. 
In the absence of industry-specific assumptions, microeconomic theory 
assumes banks maximise their profits subject to constraints. However, Asian banks 
showed evidence of maximising lending during the regulated period as their interest 
margins were protected by the deposit rate ceilings and the minimum lending rate 
guaranteed for strategic industries . 
50 Asian banks started to focus more on profit 
maximisation as their objectives following market deregulation. This recent 
49 Monetary policy can affect the benchmark inter-bank rates and therefore can shift the overall level 
of deposit and loan rates. 
50 The Banking Supervisory Authority (BSA) in Korea claims the financial crisis was rooted in this 
peculiar objective of banks, i. e. revenue maximising rather profit maximising. Thus, one of the most 
significant changes in the banking supervision in Korea was to guide banks to focus more on profits 
via published performance measure of return on asset (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and Bank for 
International Settlement (BIS) ratio instead of publishing deposit per employee and deposit per 
branch. This new guideline has only been effective from 1998 following the recent financial crisis. 
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transformation in the Asian bank objectives is in part due to the increasing number of 
non-performing loans following the economic crisis. The banks realised revenue 
maximising does not protect them from losses due to non-performing loans (NPLs). 
Considering lending as equivalent to revenues of non-financial firms, our 
model is built to incorporate both revenue maximisation and profit maximisation. A 
parameter 0 is used for the weight on revenue maximisation, which varies with the 
degree of regulation. Banks are assumed to make an optimal choice between revenue 
maximisation and profit maximisation by changing 0 for a given regulatory 
environment. Equilibrium numbers of banks are derived under various market 
conditions and show how regulation affects market structure. 
The usual assumptions for Salop's model adopted in Chiappori et al. (1995) 
are applied as they assume banks are engaged in spatial competition providing 
differentiated products. This notion of monopolistic competition is often challenged 
as some people argue that banks offer homogeneous products, i. e. non-differentiated 
loans/deposits. However, even if there is no physical differentiation in banking 
products, we argue that there is product differentiation in terms of location, perceived 
quality differences in terms of after service and fringe benefits. 
Although Chiappori's model is suitable in explaining banking competition 
and its market structure, it does not capture the fundamental issues of banking 
operation regarding NPLs and their loss provision nor the regulatory impacts on the 
banking. Hence, we depart from their model in the following respects: I/ asymmetric 
information between the lender and the borrower i. e. lenders do not have full 
information about the quality of the project they are financing; therefore 2/ loss 
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provision associated to NPLs is taken into consideration, and finally 3/ banks are 
51 
considered not to be always profit maximising. 
A continuum of customers, both borrowers and depositors, is assumed to be 
uniformly located around a unit circle with a unit density in an economy. There are N 
banks located on the circle and each installation has a fixed cost of C. Banks are 
assumed to be identical and can freely enter or exit. For simplicity, each customer on 
the circle has one unit of cash that must be deposited in a bank. The typical bank will 
pay an interest rate t. The depositors are supposed to incur a transportation cost a 
per unit length. In other words, a depositor has to incur extra costs of travelling to a 
bank ftirther away from its vicinity. 52 
Each bank can now make loans to customers using the collected funds. The 
lending rate is r and 8 is the unit transportation cost for loans. Inequality is allowed 
in the respective price elasticities of loans and deposits, i. e. the transportation costs 
of a and 8 are not necessarily the same. The transportation costs of a and jS 
include the costs of gathering relevant information in searching appropriated banking 
services. A fraction A of the total population is supposed to borrow and these 
borrowers are uniformly distributed around the unit circle. A crucial assumption here 
is that borrowers are also depositors as banking is usually established in a bundled 
form of loans and deposits. The size of each loan is L and the surplus generated by 
the loan is supposed to be large enough to justify borrowing at the prevailing rate. 
51 Imperfect information and non-performing loans are very important issues in banking and they 
naturally provide another crucial topic to investigate in banking in chapter 4. 
52 There are many other conventional ways to interpret the transportation cost and this chapter adopts 
most of them e. g. information cost, search cost, cost of inconvenience, and etc. 
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The prevailing technology is assumed linear. The money market rate p is 
exogenously set by monetary authorities. 53 
Aggregate net demand of the banking sector on the money market is equal to 
AL -1 considering a unit circle of deposits. If aggregate net demand on the money 
market is zero, the total volume of loans made by banks is equal to the total volume 
of deposits, V= AL =I 
It is important to note that each bank has a proportion 0 of the total loans in 
NPLs, on which the banks have to build provisions. Using the provision rate 8 on 
NPLs, the loss function related to NPLs becomes (8 + r) ý of loans. 
The objective function of profit maximisation was derived based on the 
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Klein-Monti (Klein, 1971; Monti, 1972) type of approach. However, given the 
deposit rate regulation and due to the industrial policy which was common 
knowledge for the public, banks behaved as revenue maximising firms subject to 
minimum requirement on the rate of return. As a majority of economic growth came 
from the strategic industries, banks were bound to provide more credits to them and 
this led banks to become revenue maximisers rather than profit maximisers. In my 
model, a convex combination of the two, a weighted average of revenue 
maximisation and profit maximisation, is used for the objective function while 
maintaining interest rates (price) as a strategic variable for competition. 
53 The parameter p is considered to be a weighted average of non-banking rates which include any 
exogenously set rates such as the money market rate, the rate on government bonds and etc. 
54 Klein and Monti consider a monopolistic bank, a purely competitive model. 
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Banks enter the market when profits cover their fixed costs of entry. A typical 
customer will search between bank i and P and then the marginal depositor 
condition (x distance away from the bank) for the bank is: 
ax-t, =a 
! 
-x to 
(n 
Hence, the supply of deposits for the bank is: 
2x =I+ 
tj -to (2.2) 
na 
Therefore, as the market becomes more fragmented with a larger number of 
banks (n), the supply of deposits per banks becomes smaller under competition. On 
the other hand, the higher deposit rates ( t, ) offered, the bank can attract more 
depositors. However, the supply of deposits would decline as the transportation cost 
increases. 
Equivalently, the marginal borrower condition (y distance away from the bank) for 
the bank is: 
fly+r, L=fl i-Y +roL (2.3) 
(n 
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Hence, the total volume of demand for loans for the bank is: 
2y-V= 
I-r, -ro -L V (2.4) 
(n 
p 
The interpretation for the equilibrium condition for the loans is much the 
same as in the deposit market condition. As the market becomes more fragmented 
with a larger number of banks (n), the demand of loans per banks becomes smaller 
under competition. On the other hand, the higher loan rates (r, ) offered, the bank 
attracts less number of borrowers. However, as in the deposit market case, the 
demand for loans would decline as the transportation cost increases. 
2.4.1 Profit Maximising Free Competition 
NPLs enter the loss function and thus affect the profit function in the model. Assume 
a proportion 0 of the total loans are NPLs, on which the banks have to build 
provisions of (J + r) 0 proportion on loans at a provision rate 5.55 Then, the profit 
function of bank i becomes 
55 Assume 0<8<1,0 <ý<I as neither provisions nor NPLs can be larger than the total volume of 
loans. 
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V r, -ro ti t 0) 
VL 
(2.5) 
-C-(8+r,. )0 n 
Differentiating the profit function with respect to ti and ri and applying a symmetry 
by substituting to tj =e and ri = ro into the first-order conditions leads to the 
following symmetric equilibrium condition: 
Proposition 1. At the symmetric equilibrium, unregulated short-term rates with 
consideration ofNPLs are given by 
p-a and r,, = 
P+0 J+Lý (2.6) 
n 1-0 1-0 nL 
Under thefree-entry condition (; r = 0), the number of banks in the market n,, and the 
long-run equilibrium valuesfor t and r are: 
n. = 
la +, 6(1 - O)V /L (2.7) 
c 
p -a T+ flac O)V /1 
(2.8) 
rL 
P0 
15+i (2.9) 1-0 1-0 L 
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The notation is as follows. A subscript m (market) indicates free competition 
values without NPL consideration, whereas n refers to free competition with NPL 
consideration. A subscript w (weighted) indicates mixed competition with NPL 
consideration. A superscript S was used for short-term values obtained for a given 
number of n banks. A superscript L refers to long-term values in the case that the 
number of banks is endogenous. 
First, the NPL ratio does not affect the deposit rates, but affects the loan rates 
positively. The provision rate is also positively related to the loan rates. Higher loan 
rates can be interpreted as the banks' reaction towards risky assets to offset the 
potential loss in non-accrual interest payments and the loan provisions. 
Second, the deposit and loan rates are positively related to the money market 
rates. The mark-down and mark-up are not simple any more. The margin is also 
positively related to the NPL ratio. It is important to note that any change in p due 
to some monetary policy will be passed on to rates offered by banks, but the 
magnitude of impact on the loan rates is larger as NPL ratio increases. Even if banks 
do not participate in the money market (V = AL = I), p still remains as a dominant 
factor for the equilibrium rates offered by banks. 
Finally, the endogenous number of banks in the long-run is positively related 
to the short-term profits, thus negatively related to NPL ratio. 
A market where the Government imposes a deposit rate ceiling is considered 
as most East Asian countries used to have some sort of regulation on deposit rates to 
promote their industrial policy. Let us consider a revenue maximising bank with 
initial capital of A. 
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2.4.2 Revenue Maximising Competition under Regulation 
Banks in Asia tried to maximise revenue only under regulation prior to the recent 
restructuring and the objective function of revenue becomes: 
R, =A+ (I+ r, ) 
V VL C-(, 5+ri)o V-r, -ro VL (2.10) 
(n(n 
fl 
Differentiating the revenue function with respect to ri and applying a 
symmetry by substituting to ri = ro into the first-order conditions leads to the 
following symmetric equilibrium condition: 
Proposition 2. At the symmetric equilibrium for revenue maximising banks, 
unregulated short-term loan rates with consideration ofNPLs are given by 
rs = 
go -I +. 
1 8 
1-0 nL 
Again, the loan rates are positively related to the NPL ratio and the provision 
rate. We were able to derive the loan rate for revenue maximising banks but the 
number of banks for a given market size was indeterminate. The market can support 
infinitely many banks when the banks are revenue maximising. There are some 
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examples of unnecessarily high number of banks in the market, particularly in 
developing countries. 
2.4.3 Mixed Competition 
Now we introduce the parameter 0 into the objective function as a weight for 
revenue maximisation so that we can incorporate both revenue and profit 
maximisation under regulation, using the weight 0 for revenue maximisation and the 
residual weight 1-0 for profit maximisation. 
We assume that banks are more likely to revenue maximise under a price-cap 
regulation whereby interest rates on loans and deposits are predetermined by the 
regulator (depositlloan rate controb and hence, these interest rates are no longer their 
strategic variables. By contrast, under a rate-of-return regulation, banks are more 
likely to profit maximise in order to meet the guideline for return on asset (ROA) 
and/or capital adequacy ratio (BIS ratio). 
; r, w = O*R, +(I-O)*; r,, where 0 <0 <1 (2.12) 
Differentiating the new profit function with respect to tj and ri and applying a 
symmetry. by substituting to ti =e and ri = ro into the first-order conditions leads to 
the following symmetric equilibrium condition: 
51 
Proposition 3. At the symmetric equilibrium, short-term rates are given by 
ts =P- 
a and r-= 
P +80-(I+P)o + 
1,8 (2.13) 
nw 1-0 1-0 nL 
Deposit rates are same as previous cases but the loan rates are now negatively related 
to 0. This can be interpreted as banks offering lower loan rates to increase the 
revenue via a larger volume of loans. 
Under the free-entry condition (; r = 0), the number of banks in the market n. and 
the long-run equilibrium valuesfor t and r are: 56 
n,, = 
ja(1-0)+, 8(1-0)V1L, (2.14) 
C-O(A+C) 
L tw =p-a (2.15) 
LP 80 - (I + P)O '8 C O(A + C) +, +U, rw- 7-0 1-0 L WO-0 
ý+ 
fl(I - O)v /L 
(2.16) 
where 0<0<C : 51 (condition for non - negative capital) A+C 
56 Recall the subscript m represents usual monopolistic competition outcome without considering 
NPL factor whereas the subscript n is for the outcome with NPL consideration and the subscript W is 
mixed competition of revenue and profit maximisation. 
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First, the initial capital A is positively related to the number of banks as it 
provides a lower bound in the profit function and this increases incentives for new 
banks to enter the market. 
Second, the effect of 0 parameter is not independent of the size of capital A. 
If A is large enough, then 0 is positively related to the number of banks. Therefore, 
for a reasonably capitalised market for banks, the number of banks increases with the 
regulation, while deposit and loan rate spread becomes smaller. 
Finally, the NPL ratio affects the number of banks negatively whereas the 
provision rate has no impact on the number of banks. However, the loan rate rises 
with the NPL and provisions. 
2.4.4 Comparison 
n. > n,, 
n. = n, if 0=0 (2.17) 
n. > n,,, if 0<0< 
c 
<1 
A+C 
As shown in the previous section, the equilibrium number of banks in the market is 
smaller if we take NPLs into consideration ( n. > n,, ). On the other hand, when 
banks behave more like a profit maximiser i. e. focusing more on their performance 
measures such as ROA and BIS ratios, the market equilibrium would support a 
smaller number of banks as shown in the equations 2.17. 
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In summary, as banks focus more on revenue maximisation, the equilibrium 
number of banks tends to be unnecessarily large compared to the profit maximising 
case. A higher capital base, A, decreases the upper bound for 0 implying the sound 
capital base encourages banks to profit maximise more than to revenue maximise. 
Figures 2.16 illustrates the simulation results for the upper bound of 0 when the 
paid-in-capital size, A, is increased from 0.01 to 0.1 ceteris paribus. Figure 2.17 
summarises the inverse relationship between the paid-in-capital size (A) and the 
relative weight assigned to revenue maximisation (0). Thus, the probability of 
profit-maximisation increases for banks with larger paid-in-capital. When 0 is equal 
to zero, the results are identical to the case of unregulated competition. 
The figures suggest that the equilibrium number of banks increases with the 
parameter 0 but there is a upper bound for 0 as n grows exponentially after a 
certain point, which may not be feasible. Higher paid-in-capital (A) sets this upper 
bound at a lower level as well as the level of equilibrium number of banks. In an 
extreme case, where banks have no paid-in-capital, i. e. A=O, the upper bound is equal 
to 1. On the other hand, if banks have extremely large amount of paid-in-capital 
(A->oo), the upper bound converges to zero asymptotically. Thus, a better-capitalised 
banking sector tends to have a smaller number of banks, i. e. more concentrated. This 
could explain the reason why stricter BIS ratio induced more mergers or exits and 
therefore created a more concentrated banking environment in East Asia. 57 
57 The current guideline for BIS ratio is 8% minimum set by Basel Accord 1988. Most G7 countries 
show 9-10% BIS ratio. Redrafting of the BIS Capital Accord was announced in Jan. 200 1. A revised 
framework for the New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) was published in June 2004, which suggests 
stricter regulation on risky assets (http: //www. bis. Orp-/Vubl/bcbsIO7. htm). 
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2.5 Empirical Analyses of the Banking Structure in 
Japan and Korea 
In this section, we attempt to prove the results of the theoretical model with empirical 
data using an econometric specification based on structure-performance relationship. 
In a concentrated industry, there exist economies of scale and thus higher profits are 
expected under a concentrated market structure. The rationale behind this prediction 
is that in a concentrated industry, firms behave as oligopolists, earning high profits. 
However, the SCP paradigm is not always justified if we take into account the 
strategic behaviour of firms. For instance, there are barriers to entry where banks can 
act together collusively against new entries. One other point, which is missed out in 
the SCP paradigm is the feedback that the higher the profits, the greater the number 
of firms that enter the industry and thus lower the level of concentration. This 
feedback is exemplified within the regulatory framework. Tougher competition leads 
to lower profits and thus many firms are driven out of the industry and hence raises 
concentration. 
There have been studies on the impact of deregulation on the structure of the 
banking industry, but most of them focused on EEC banking industries and there are 
no studies on East Asian banking. Given the peculiarity of industrial policy and the 
role of banks in East Asia, it is worth trying to estimate the impact of deregulation on 
concentration and the structure of banking industry in Japan and Korea. The process 
of deregulation since 1979 in Japan and since 1988 in Korea provides the natural 
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framework to assess this impact, especially when the process accelerated following 
the Asian financial crisis in 1997. 
2.5.1 The Data 
In order to test the predictions of SCP paradigm with modification for feedback, a set 
of variables for Structure (concentration), Conduct (branching and pricing) and 
Performance (profitability) were chosen and the relevant indices computed with 
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respect to the strategic variable, deposits. The number of branches per bank 
measured the size of the branch network. Finally, three dummy variables were used 
to capture the effect of different types of deregulation: I/ deregulation of deposit 
interest rates; 2/ deregulation of branching restriction, and 3/deregulation of cross- 
financial sector entry. 
The time-series data in aggregate for both Japan and Korea were constructed 
using 22 nationwide banks and 64 regional banks in Japan (86 banks) and 18 
nationwide banks and 10 regional banks in Korea (28 banks). Hence the panel of all 
114 commercial banks in the two countries over the 28 year period from 1976 to 
2003 were used in the calculation of the time-series data for the analyses. However, 
one should note that this data set has only time-series features as we lost panel 
attributes when calculating the market structure variables in aggregate. When a bank 
changes its name after restructuring, it was recorded as a new entry in the data set. 
58 We assume the strategic objective of a bank is to compete for deposits in the market. Hence, we use 
deposits as the strategic variable. 
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Changes in the number of commercial banks in Japan and Korea are shown in Table 
2.1 with a substantial number of mergers. 
These two countries are chosen for several reasons: I/ the times series data 
are not readily available for the entire set of commercial banks in other countries in 
the region; 2/ the available data are more reliable compared to those of other 
countries' banks; 3/ the banking sector in Japan and Korea have undergone a 
substantial consolidation; 4/ both countries have implemented progressive 
deregulation in the banking sector, and finally 51 the industry restructuring in Japan 
and Korea are often replicated in other newly industrialised countries (NIEs) and the 
restructuring of the banking sector is no exception. 
For both countries, the data for all commercial banks were aggregated into 
time-series instead of panel. The Japanese data were collected from the Bank of 
Japan (BOJ hereafter) and Japanese Bankers Association (Zenginkyo hereafter) 
publications and the Korean data came from the Bank of Korea (BOK), Financial 
Supervisory Services (FSS) and Maekyung-Annual Corporation reports. 
We have followed the classification of deposit institutions set by the 
respective central banks. The econometric model is tested on commercial banks (i. e. 
nationwide city banks and regional banks), as foreign bank branches and specialised 
banks do not participate in the majority of competitive activities given the prevailing 
regulation. Moreover, city and regional banks represent nearly 50% of the deposit 
market and they are the ones that compete in the more realistic sense. 
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2.5.2 Description of Variables 
We classified variables into three groups following the SCP paradigm. The level of 
concentration, market size and branch concentration were included in Structure as 
shown in the dependent variable section in Table 2.5. Deposit and loan rates are 
taken as a proxy for price and the average branching as a proxy for quantity. 59 These 
price and quantity proxy variables were included in Conduct. Return on deposits was 
included in Performance. The conduct and performance measures are shown as 
independent variables in Table 2.5. Variables included in the 3 groups are discussed 
in further details hereunder. 
There are various ways to measure concentration (CNCt). However, we have 
chosen to use a logit transformation of C51 (n-firm concentration ratio of top 5 banks 
in year t) to avoid the problem of an upper limit of C51=1 and to maintain an identical 
distribution of residuals at all values of market size. 60 We calculate CR for an n-firm 
concentration ratio of top 5 banks 61 by aggregating market shares of top five banks in 
the deposit market for year t. 62 Sutton (1991) has been using the logit transformation 
for some time, which was subsequently adopted by others like Cerasi and Daltung 
(2000). For those who are not familiar with this type of transformation, the 
conventional Hirschman Herfindal Indices (HHIt) were also used for comparison, 
59 Banks expand their branch networks to gain market share in both deposits and loans. 60 Here, the deposit market size follows the same definition as used for the variable MKS,, i. e. all the 
local currency deposits in cuff ent, savings and time deposit accounts at city and regional banks. 
5 
61 C5, Sit where s,, = market share of bank i in year t 
62 For multi-market conglomerate mergers and market shares, see Mueller (1985). 
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although we do not expect to find much difference in results as shown in Figure 2.3 
and 2.4. 
CNC, = In 
C' (I 
c5l, 
ý 
The deposit market size (MKSt) was computed in index form in order to 
deflate for changes in prices and currency devaluation. The total deposit size includes 
local currency deposits in current, savings and time deposit accounts at city and 
regional banks, i. e. ordinary banks. 63 
MKS, = In 
Total Deposit Size, 
GNP, 
The size of the branch network is also calculated in index form for the whole 
market taking the number of branches per bank. 
A VB, =In 
Total number of branches, (2.20) 
Number of banks, 
Branch concentration (BCNCt) is computed in index forrn as well taking a 
logarithmic ratio of the number of branches operated by top five banks over total 
number of branches (BC,, ). 64 
63 The deposit size data were taken from 'Bank Management Statistics' published by FSS for Korea 
and 'Analysis of Financial Statement of All Banks' published by Zenginkyo for Japan. 
5 No. of branches operated by bank i in year t BC5, b,, where b,, = Total No. of bank branches in the market in year t 
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BCNC, = In 
BC5, ) 
(2.21) 
(I 
- BC5,. ý 
Interest rates on deposits (IRD t)65 and loans (IRL t) 
66 were directly taken 
without transformation as IRDt and IRLt are already normalised with respect to the 
size of deposits by taking the weighted average of market interest rates. 67 Forthe 
performance measure, Return on deposits (RODt) was computed as a ratio of net 
profits over total deposits. 68 It is important to note that the performance measure 
cannot be simply the interest margin. Return on deposits (RODt) is a measure of 
banks' soundness as non-accrual interests and provisions for non-performing loans 
were taken into account. Therefore, return on deposits (RODt) should definitely be 
distinguished from interest margins. 
In addition to 3 groups of variables, 3 deregulation dummy variables used in 
the analysis: DIt for deregulation on deposit interest rates, D2t for deregulation of 
branching restriction, and DR for deregulation on cross-financial sector entry. 
65 For Korea, indicative interest rate on time deposits for more than I year and less than 2 years (but 
effective for I year or more before Dec. 5,1988) published by BOK is used, where the rate is an 
average weighted by amount from 1996. For Japan, the rate is an average weighted by amount for 
total deposits published by Zenginkyo. 66 For Korea, indicative interest rate on loans of general funds up to I year for general enterprises at 
the end of period, where the rate is an average weighted by loan of banking funds from 1996. For 
Japan, the rate is an average weighted by amount for total loans published by Zenginkyo. 67 IRDt and IRLt are taken from 'Money and Banking' published by BOK for Korea 
(http: //ecos. bok. or. kr/) and 'Analysis of Financial Statement of All Banks' published by Zenginkyo 
for Japan. 
68 No logarithmic transformation is taken, as the distribution of residuals is normal with the simple 
ratio form. 
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Banking licenses in East Asia were initially given out for banking operations only 
exclusively. However, the deregulation of cross-financial sector entry allowed banks 
to enter other financial business areas such as securities trading and insurance sales. 
These dummy variables take a progressive form based on the gradual 
deregulation processes, between 0 and 1, with 0 being complete regulation versus I 
being complete deregulation. As deregulation on interest rates in Japan and Korea 
was carried out in a progressive way as shown in Table 2.3 and 2.4, the relative 
magnitude of deregulation impact was determined according to local authorities 
statements, which imply the first stage of deregulation has more weight than the rest. 
For instance, Dit =1 means complete deregulation on interest rates in 1995 for Korea, 
whereas Dli=0.5 represents deregulation is only half way through the process as 
described in Table 2.5. Figure 2.13 illustrates the progressive deregulation on deposit 
interest rates whilst Figures 2.14 shows a one-off deregulation of branch restriction 
in Japan in contrast to the full restriction on branching in Korea. For the deregulation 
of cross-financial sector entry, Figure 2.15 illustrates a one off deregulation in Korea 
and a two-stage deregulation in Japan. 
Finally, in order to investigate the impact of size distribution of market 
concentration and compare the results from nationwide banking with those from 
regional banking, the Hirschman Herfindal Indices (HHIt) were calculated and scaled 
by 100 for: 69 1/ all commercial banks (HHIt); 2/ nationwide banks (HHINt), and 3/ 
6 9 All three HHI,, HHIN, and HHI& are obtained by e. g. HHI, 
100 
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regional banks (FIHIRt). One could argue that the HHIt is more effective measures 
for market concentration as it intrinsically gives weight to both number of firms in 
the market and their market share distribution. 
2.5.3 The Econometric Model 
An econometric model is tested in a SCP paradigm framework using two-stage least 
squares (TSLS) of a system of simultaneous equations: 
CNC, =ao +aMKý +a2IRD, _, +a3IRL, -, 
+a4AVB, 
+aROD +aCNC, 
3 (2.22) 
5 1-1 6 -1 
+ 1: 8k, Dk, + cl, 
k-I 
BCNC, = flo +AMKS, + fl2IRD, -, +AIRLj-, 
+ fl4 A VB, 
3 (2.23) 
+ fl5ROD, 
-, 
+ fl6BCNC, -, 
+ 1: vk, Dk, + 62, 
k-I 
3 
A VB, = yo +, vMKSý +, v2BCNC, +, v3ROD, -, +, v4AVB, -2+lAktDkt+E3t (2.24) 
k-I 
, where k=1,2,3 for three deregulation dummy variables. 
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Equations 2.22 and 2.23 use one of the most general forms of specification. They are 
designed to detect the effects of deposit market size (MKSt), lagged interest rates on 
70 All three equations are identified as they pass both order and rank conditions. Deregulation on 
branching restriction (D2) is excluded for Korea, as the restriction has not yet been relaxed in Korea. 
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deposits and loans (HZDt-i and IRLt-1), average branch network size (AVBt), lagged 
return on deposit (ROD t-1), lagged concentration (CNCt-I in eqn. 2.22; BCNCt-I in 
eqn. 2.23), and three types of deregulation (Dit , 
132t, and DR) on the banking 
concentration (CNCt in eqn. 2.22; BCNCt in eqn. 2.23). 
On the other hand, equation 2.24 takes a form that is simplified by dropping 
lagged interest rate variables as banks do not consider the level of market interest 
rates as strategic reasons to expand their branch network size. Equation 2.24 
explains the effects of deposit market size (MICS), branch concentration (BCNCt), 
lagged return on deposit (ROD t- 1), lagged average branch network size (AVBt- 1), and 
three types of deregulation (DIt , 
D2t, and D30 on average branch network size 
(AVBt). One should note that we use two-stage least squares (TSLS) given the 
endogeneity between AVBt, CNCt, and BCNCt. 
This is a dynamic model, which corrects the weakness of the traditional SCP 
paradigm assumption of a one-way flow of causality. 71 In order to incorporate a 
feedback feature, interest rates on deposits and loans were taken in lagged forms of 
one year (IRDt., and IRLt. 1). Effective business plans of most East Asian banks are 
made on an annual basis reflecting the performance of the previous year. Hence, 
return on deposit (RODt) also takes a lagged form (RODt. 1) together with the overall 
feedback via the lagged dependent variables (CNCt_j in eqn. 2.22; BCNCt_j in eqn. 
71 Cowling (1976), Strickland & Weiss (1976) and Sutton (199 1) pointed out this weakness of SCP 
paradigm and suggested various alternative methods. Cowling suggested a recursive model and 
Strickland and Weiss suggested a system of simultaneous equations while Sutton claims there is no 
single specification explains all industries. 
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2.23). These one-year lagged variables are verified by interviews with banks such as 
Korea Housing Bank (KHB), Korea First Bank (KFB), and Kookmin Bank (KB) as 
well as FSS in Korea and Zenginkyo in Japan. 72 All lagged dependent variables were 
taken to be with one-year lag except for the average branch network size (AVBt) 
where we use two-year lags given the nature of data. 73 
Market size (MKSt) was also assumed exogenous in the model as deposit size 
is not endogenously determined in relation to the market structure measured in 
concentration. Deregulation dummy variables were considered to be exogenous since 
the reason for deregulation in East Asia lies in the outside pressure from the 
international organisations such as G7, OECD, IMF and World Bank. 
Concentration (CNCt), branch concentration (BCNCt) and average branch 
network (AVBt) are the variables determined endogenously as well as 
contemporaneously based on the number of banks, the number of branches and the 
concentrations in the market. 
So far we have examined whether the relationships between the variables in 
the model are contemporaneous or have lagged features in constructing the 
simultaneous equations and have shown exogeneity and endogeneity. This model 
enables the testing of the following propositions drawn from the literature within the 
SCP framework: 
72 The interview with Zenginkyo, took place during the visit to its office in Tokyo between 18-20 Dec. 
2000 and the interviews with KHB, KFB, KB, and FSS took place in Seoul between 26-30 Dec. 2000. 7' The Phillips-Perron test of unit roots were conducted for all the dependent variables on their lags 
and the number of lags were determined accordingly: one-year lag for CNCt and BCNCt and two-year 
lag for AVB,. 
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Structure (Concentration: CNCI, Branch Concentration: BCNCI) 
1. The degree of concentration decreases as the market size increases with given 
set-up costs: 74 
This proposition follows the theory put forward by Sutton's (1991) 
exogenous sunk cost model. He explains that a growing market size would 
attract more entrants and hence has a more fragmented market structure at 
equilibrium for a given level of sunk costs. 
2. The degree of concentration in the industry is positively related to the degree of 
concentration in branching: 
This proposition is directly related to the literature by Cerasi et al. (2002) 
which showed a positive relationship between the market concentration and 
the branch networks in European banking. This also follows the school of 
thoughts (Kolari and Zardkoohi, 1987; Clark, 1988) that banking 
concentration is positively associated with economies of scale and scope. 
3. The average branch network size is positively related to the degree of branch 
concentration: 
This proposition aims to test the feedback process between a Conduct 
variable (AVBI) and a Structure variable (BCNCI) within the SCP 
framework. The literature by Cerasi et al. (2002) provides a useful insight 
for the proposition. 
74 Traditionally, the SCP paradigm with feedback predicts higher profit levels as the market size 
grows and therefore it attracts more entrants and a fragmented market structure is established as a 
result. 
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Conduct (Deposit and loan rates: IRD, -j and IRLj-j, Branch network: A YBI) 
1. The interest rate on deposits is negatively related to the degree of concentration: 
Sutton (1991) argues that the degree of price competition in the market 
affects the market concentration. For example, a monopoly bank can abuse its 
market power and offer only very low deposit rates to its customers. On the 
other hand, in a perfectly competitive market structure, banks offer more 
competitive deposit rates, i. e. higher rates. The basic framework is to test the 
feedback process between a Conduct variable (IRD, I) and a Structure 
variable (CNCI) in the SCP paradigm. 
2. The interest rate on loans is positively related to the degree of concentration: 
The argument of this proposition follows the same principle laid out in the 
above proposition I on the deposit rates but in the opposite direction as a 
monopoly bank now charges its highest possible interest rates for its loans. 
3. The average branch network size is positively related to the degree of 
concentration: 
This proposition aims to test the feedback process between a Conduct 
variable (A VBI) and a Structure variable (CNCI) within the SCP framework. 
Cerasi et al. (2002) argue that considering branching as a strategic variable in 
banking competition, more concentrated market structure would have a larger 
average network size per bank as banks more aggressively open up new 
branches under more threats of competition. 
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Performance (Return on deposits: RODt-1) 
1. The return on deposits is positively related to the degree of concentration: 
This proposition aims to test the feedback process between a Performance 
variable (ROD, -, 
) and a Structure variable (CNC, ) within the SCP pardigm. 
The argument of the proposition is straightforward since firms with more 
market power within a concentrated market structure can charge prices close 
to a monopoly price and therefore the profitability of these firms would be 
higher. 
Deregulation (Different types ofderegulation: DII, D21, and D3d 
1. Relaxed regulation leads to a higher degree of concentration: 
This proposition aims to test the impact of regulation on market structure put 
forward by Chiappori et al. (1995). Their model suggests that the equilibrium 
number of banks in the market is higher under deposit and loan rate 
regulation than under free-market competition. 
2. Deregulation leads to higher degree of concentration in branching: 
This proposition also follows the same principle set out above by 
Chiappori et al. (1995) but the only difference is to look at branch 
concentration (BCNCI) instead of market concentration (CNCI). 
3. Deregulation leads to banks with larger branch networks 
Considering the feedback process between Structure and Conduct in the SCP 
paradigm, this proposition aims to test the indirect impact of deregulation on 
a Conduct variable (A VBI) 
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Traditional literature suggested that the degree of concentration would be negatively 
related to the size of the market to sunk costs ratio, assuming that the sunk costs are 
similar across the market. For example, Sutton (1991) explains, for a wide class of 
homogeneous goods models, including the Cournot and joint profit maximisation 
models, the industry converges to a fragmented structure, as the ratio of the size of 
the market to sunk costs becomes large. The larger the market size is, the more room 
there is for new entries, which leads the market to a more fragmented structure. 
However, Cerasi et al. (2002) showed some evidence of a negative relationship 
between concentration and market size in the banking industries in Europe. They 
suggest that set-up costs for the first branch are mainly due to entry regulation, i. e. 
the requirement a bank has to meet in order to become operative and the access costs 
to funds, given by the interbank market. In a single country case like in Japan or 
Korea, this assumption simplifies the empirical test allowing one to ignore the 
problem of finding a proxy for set-up costs. 
The results from estimating the 3-equation system are reported in Table 2.6. 
For the first proposition in Structure, the relationship between the degree of 
concentration (CNCt) and the market size (MKSt) is positive in Japan but negative in 
Korea. The coefficient of the market size is statistically significant in Japan but not 
significant in Korea. We would not elaborate on the contradicting results between 
two countries as the coefficient of the market size in Korea is extremely small and 
statistically significant to make any meaningful comments on it. In addition, we find 
more convincing results which indicate positive relationships between banking 
concentration and market size in both Japan and Korea when we use Hirschman 
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Herfindal Indices (HHIt) as shown in Table 2.7. These results reject the proposition 
set out earlier in the section that the degree of concentration decreases as the market 
size increases with given set-up costs. One could question the assumption of sunk 
costs in explaining the reason for the opposite signs. The proposition was initially 
based on the assumption of exogenous sunk costs, i. e. set-up costs but if we assume 
endogenous sunk costs as Sutton (1991) suggested, it is possible to observe 
escalation in concentration as market size increases (see Figure 2.3 and 2.4). Sutton's 
(1991) endogenous sunk costs model uses advertisement and R&D costs as an 
example and characterises these markets as markets with some network or learning 
effects where the sunk costs are not fixed but to increase with the intensity of 
competition and as result, the market tends to move towards a more concentrated 
structure which he denotes as escalation in concentration. 
The result for the second proposition in Structure is also interesting since the 
sign on the estimated coefficient of market size (MKSt) in branch concentration 
(BCNCt) is positive in both Japan and Korea (the coefficients are 0.34 and 0.35 
respectively) although neither is significant. The usual prediction is that when the 
market size increases, the branching network size also increases but the dominant 
banks expand their branch network even more to pre-empt new entries. Therefore the 
results are typical evidence for this type of pre-emptive and/or competitive branching 
activity and reiterates the results for the first proposition suggesting a certain degree 
of escalation in concentration if we assume the cost of branching as endogenous sunk 
costs. 
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Concerning size of average branch network, the data do support the third 
proposition in Structure showing a statistically significant positive relationship 
between the average branch network size (AVBt) and the branch concentration 
(BCNCt) in Japan. However, the coefficient of branch concentration (BCNCt) in 
Korea rejects the proposition and insignificant. One general and important 
observation to make here is that the econometric results in Korea shown in Table 2.6 
do not correspond so well with the propositions set out earlier largely because most 
coefficients are statistically insignificant. However, the results shown in Table 2.7 
using Hirschman Herfindal Indices (HHIt) look much more significant and in line 
with the propositions. This is perhaps an area that a future research should look into 
as to why the specification using Hirschman Herfindal Indices (HHIt) work better 
than that with transformed N-firm concentration ratios (CNCt or BCNCt). It may 
need some alternative model specifications when using transformed N-firm 
concentration ratios (CNCt or BCNCt) in Korea. 
The negative relationship between the average branch network size (AVBt) 
and the market size (MKSt) in Japan can be explained by the dominance of Keiretsu 
networks (the coefficient of -0.05 significant at 10% level) which does not need 
much branching to attract large size banking business as it is mostly secured with the 
Keiretsu. On the other hand there is a positive relationship between the average 
branch network size (AVBt) and the market size (MKSt) in Korea, although it is not 
significant (the coefficient is 0.03). This difference in the results suggests that the 
banking network between Keiretsus and Japanese banks is more effective than that 
between Chaebols and Korean banks. This is an important observation as it firstly 
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indicates that the banking structure should not be looked at independent of the real 
sector. 75 Secondly, it also helps us to understand why two countries show divergence 
in banking restructuring or if not divergence, in different stages of banking evolution. 
For the first proposition in Conduct regarding the deposit interest rate (IRDt- 
1), we had consistent results from Japan although it was significant only in explaining 
branch concentration (BCNCt). The initial proposition predicted a more fragmented 
market structure with new entries would raise deposit rates under competition and 
squeeze interest margins for a given level of loan rate. The results do support this 
proposition and indicates that dominant banks can afford to pay relatively lower 
deposit rates in a concentrated market structure. 
However, one could probably argue that the banking conduct in the region is 
not entirely up to the market concentration and the loose competition environment in 
East Asia where industrial policies and regulation dominated the banking. It is worth 
noting that banks' entry decision in East Asia has been less sensitive to the banking 
outlook given the industrial Policy as shown in Table 2.2 but to banking regulation as 
listed in Table 2.3 and 2.4. Therefore, this result should not be looked at 
independently of changes in regulation, which aim for free competition. On the other 
hand, the results on deposit rate in Korea are not significant for market concentration 
(CNCt) nor for branch concentration (BCNCt). 
The second proposition in Conduct deals with loan rates (IRLt. 1). Following 
the same logic as in the previous proposition, a positive relationship is predicted 
75 Chapter 4 will investigate this relationship between the banking sector and the real sector using 
borrowers' ownership structure and the monitoring mechanism of private information. 
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between the interest rate on loans (IRLt-1) and the degree of concentration (CNCt) for 
a given level of deposit rate as dominant banks can charge higher loan rates. We find 
that the results for both Japan and Korean agree with the proposition and the positive 
relationship is significant at 5% level in explaining branch concentration (BCNCt). 
Once again, as free entry condition has not been common in Korea due to 
prevailing regulation and the determination of loan rates and deposit rates were 
predominantly regulated by the Korean Government in favour of its industrial policy, 
changes in interest margins do not necessarily seem to affect new entries and hence 
the market structure. This is a very important and useful observation to justify the 
simple theoretical model illustrated in the earlier section suggesting that it is not 
appropriate to consider interest rates on loans and deposits as only strategic variables 
in banking competition without taking regulation and NPL provisions into 
consideration. 
It is clear that increasing margins allowed more market power to the 
incumbent banks in Japan to pre-empt new entries via branching. On the other hand, 
the proposition holds in the Korean case without much significance, which suggests 
that we need other explanatory variables over and above interest rates on loans and 
deposits. 
Regarding the relationship between the average branch network size (AVBt) 
and the concentration (CNCt), the initial proposition of a positive relationship holds 
only for the Korean case explaining market concentration (CNCt). The coefficients 
are negative in all other cases. This third proposition in Conduct is rooted in the idea 
that increasing network size in order to provide services to a bigger market may 
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create a concentrated market structure. However, the results in both Japan and Korea 
show more or less evidence of negative relationship (except for the market 
concentration in Korea). This may indicate a banking inefficiency in East Asia where 
branch network expansion does not increase market share. 
Finally, the last proposition reveals a relationship between Performance and 
market structure. The Japanese data show no evidence of relationship between the 
concentration (CNQ and the return on deposit (RODt-1), whereas the Korean data 
show a negative relationship between branch concentration (BCNCt) and return on 
deposit (RODt-1), which is significant at 10% level. This result in Korea rejects the 
initial proposition set out earlier in the section but suggests that banks tend to leave 
the market or merge together to restore some power in light of falling profitability. 
However, this corresponds to the proposition drawn from the simple theoretical 
model with NPLs, that indicates the larger the NPLs, i. e. less profitable or lower 
return on deposit, more concentrated the market is. However, there is a problem 
interpreting the case of high profitability attracting new entries, as a free entry 
condition has not been applicable in Japan and Korea given the strict regulation on 
licensing new banks and new branches as indicated in Table 2.3 and 2.4. These 
results are somewhat ambiguous and would need further in-depth investigation with 
alternative model specifications. 
Before we move onto the next section of results, it is worth noting that 
interest margins and return on deposits are two different concepts as the latter does 
include the risk effects of loans offered by the banks whereas the former does not 
factor in the risk returns but simply represents the interest rate strategy, i. e. pricing 
73 
strategy. This is clear when we look at the figures 2.9 to 2.12. Figure 2.9 illustrates 
the historic movement of interest rates on deposits and loans in Japan which 
translates into interest margins (solid line) in Figure 2.10 whilst the dashed line in the 
figure represents return on deposits. Similarly, Figure 2.11 shows the historic 
movement of interest rates on deposits and loans in Korea whilst Figure 2.12 
compares the Korean interest margins to its return on deposits. In Japan it seems 
difficult to conclude any relationship between interest margins and return on deposits 
in Japan. On the other hand, we observe stability of return on deposits in Korea 
(except for the 1997 financial crisis period) despite the fluctuation in the interest 
margins. 
Concerning the deregulation we need to specify which type of deregulation 
among the three (DIt, D2t and DR) is considered in each case. The first proposition 
relies on deposit rate deregulation (Dit), which is one of the most crucial types of 
deregulation in the SCP framework as it indicates a shift from price-cap regulation to 
rate-of-retum regulation. With the deregulation on deposit rate (DI), banks are 
expected to compete more vigorously and thus created more concentrated market 
structure to obtain some market power. Similarly, branch concentration (BCNCt) was 
expected to increase with deregulation in the process of mergers and exits. However, 
the results do not give any clear sign of direction in the relationship except for the 
case where we explain movements in average branch network size (AVBt) in Japan. 
All three deregulation measures here show significant evidence for smaller branch 
network size. This seems to explain adjustments in banking activity from 
unnecessary branch expansion under regulation to more rationale and efficient 
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branch expansion. This type of irrational branch expansion was not unknown when 
banks have to take advantage of granted branching licenses under strict control over 
branch licensing. 
Both the Japanese and the Korean data showed a negative relationship 
between deregulation on deposit rate (Djt) and the concentration (CNCt) although 
they are not significant. The negative relationship could be related to the inflexible 
deposit rates around zero in Japan and the moderate regulation in Korea. Ibus, the 
deposit rate deregulation (131t) leaves little room for East Asian banks to strategically 
move rates and thus affect the market structure. The feedback process of SCP 
paradigm going through the deposit rates in East Asia is somewhat disconnected for 
the above reason. 
The relationship between the deposit rate deregulation (Dit) and the branch 
concentration (BCNCt) was found to be positive in Japan whereas the Korean data 
show the opposite direction although the coefficients are not significant. The Korean 
case should be re-examined in the future since the negative relationship could be 
only temporary given the short history of deregulation. 
It is interesting to notice that the relationship between the cross-sector entry 
deregulation (DR) and the concentration (CNCt) in both Japan and Korea is positive, 
although not significant. One explanation can be that the cross-sector synergy effects 
lead banks to merge across the financial sector. The other explanation can be that the 
incumbent banks merge to act against the new entrants from neighbouring financial 
industries. The latter is an interesting result as it explains banks' entry deterrent 
activities when they face potential new entrants due to deregulation. 
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The relationship between the cross-sector entry deregulation (DR) and the 
average branch network size (AVB) was positive in Korea. The rationale behind this 
is similar to the second proposition concerning the Korean banks' entry deterrent 
activities. Banks seem to expand their size of branch network to deter new entrants. 
However, the Japanese data indicated a negative relationship between the 
cross-sector entry deregulation (DR) and the average branch network size (AVBt), 
which was also significant. These opposite results can be looked at in parallel with 
the phases of financial sector development. Korea as an example of a less developed 
banking industry enhances pre-emptive behaviour against potential new entries from 
other financial industries. On the other hand, as the Japanese banking industry is 
relatively more mature, a lifting of cross-sector entry restriction can create synergy 
effects among various financial firms rather without expanding their branch network 
size. 
The average branch network size (AVBt) in Japan show several significant 
results for some variables. First, the market size (MKSt) is negatively associated with 
the branch network size (AVBt) and the coefficient of -0.05 is significant at 10% 
level. This indicates that as market size increases, the banks tend to downsize their 
branching network in Japan (see Figure 2.8). On the other hand, branch concentration 
(BCNCt) is positively related to the average branch network size (AVBt) in Japan 
suggesting that dominant banks' branch network expansion increases the overall 
average branch network size. However, the results for the Korean average branch 
network size are showing the opposite signs. One could argue this is because Korean 
banks have not yet started downsizing branch network as shown in Figure 2.8. 
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It is also important to note that the impacts of all three deregulation dummy 
variables (Dit, D2t, and D30 on the average branch network size (AVBt) in Japan are 
significantly negative which means that the Japanese banks' reaction towards 
banking liberalisation is to cut down their branch network size to reduce their costs 
and improve efficiency. 
The lagged dependent variables are all positive and significant at 1% level as 
expected indicating the substantial path dependence in banking structure. 
From a quick overview of Figure 2.5 and 2.6, we notice that the Japanese 
banking has undergone a major consolidation in nationwide banking throughout the 
last 3 decades with acceleration whilst the regional banks pursued a more fragmented 
market structure since 1990s. This is not so obvious in Figure 2.1. By contrast, we 
notice that the number of Japanese banks declined substantially in the nationwide 
banking whereas the regional banking actually had a new entrant during the sample 
period. 
On the other hand, the Korean banks have experienced a similar 
concentration path in both the nationwide and the regional banking heading towards 
a more fragmented market structure until the early-mid 1990s and a more 
concentrated market structure since the late 1990s. One interesting observation to 
make here is that the banking consolidation is achieved across both nationwide and 
regional banking in Korea whilst the Japanese banking consolidation is solely due to 
the nationwide banking. 
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The results of the Hirschman Herfindal Index measures presented in Table 
2.7 also suggest that there are differences in the market structure and the banking 
behaviour in the SCP paradigm between nationwide banks and regional banks. 
One noticeable difference between the results from the concentration index 
estimation in Table 2.6 and the Hirschman Herfindal Index (HHI) estimations in 
Table 2.7 is that the market size variables (MKSt) are more noticeably significant and 
all positive in Table 2.7 which uses HHL This positive relationship between 
concentration and market size variables clearly supports Sutton's (1991) argument of 
escalation in concentration with endogenous sunk costs, which are associated with 
the expansion of branch network in banking. 
We have noticed from Table 2.1 that Korea is in a different pace and stage of 
banking evolution, which indicates a large number of new entries as well as M&As 
in Korea in contrast to no new entry in Japan during the sample period. We can draw 
a similar conclusion from Figure 2.4 where Korean banking concentration moves 
from a highly concentrated market (HHI > 18) to an unconcentrated market (HHI < 
10) and is moving back up to a moderately concentrated market (10 < HHI < 18). By 
contrast, the Japanese banking remains unconcentrated (HHI < 10) even after the 
significant consolidation in the nationwide banking. 76 This is mainly due to the 
fragmented regional banking in Japan. 
76 The European Commission and the US Department of Justice classify market conditions according 
to HHI (unscaled): I/ less than 1000 (i. e. 10 in scaled HHI in this chapter) as unconcentrated; 2/ 
between 1000 and 1800 as moderately concentrated, and 3/ over 1800 as highly concentrated. 
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Therefore it is crucial to note that the two countries adopted different 
strategies for their regional banks whereby Japan took more fragmented banking 
structure for its regional banks whilst Korea took a same policy of consolidation for 
both nationwide and regional banks as presented in Table 2.1, Figure 2.5 and 2.6. 
Perhaps the overall market size covered by regional banks differ since Japanese 
regional banks tend to be larger compared to Korean regional banks and they tend to 
have more geographical monopoly as Japan is formed as a group of islands. On the 
other hand, Korean regional banks operate in a relatively smaller scale and are less 
geographically differentiated from one another. 
Another interesting result is that the Japanese nationwide banks show a 
significantly negative relationship between market concentration (HHINt) and 
deposit interest rates (IRDt-1), whilst regional banks show positive relationship for 
the same pair (HHIRt and IRDt. 1). 
On the other hand, the signs are reversed for the loan rates (IRLt-1) whereby 
higher loan rates suggests more concentrated nationwide banking whilst lower loan 
rates are associated with more concentrated regional-banking in Japan, which is 
significant at 5% level. In other words, dominant Japanese nationwide banks seem to 
be able to stretch their interest margins under a more concentrated market structure 
as opposed to those in the regional banks cannot. Perhaps one explanation for the 
reversed sign for the Japanese regional banks is that they operate more or less as a 
regional monopoly and therefore even under fragmented market their interest 
margins can be stretched further within their respective geographical markets. 
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On the Korean banking side, the results look more significant in the regional 
banking, especially the return on deposit (RODt) effects are well captured and 
supports the proposition on performance whereby lower returns i. e. larger non- 
performing loans are associated with a more concentrated market structure. 
2.5.4 Comparison between Japan and Korea 
Although many economists showed similarities between Japan and Korea during the 
industrialisation period after World War II, very few people tried to explain 
differences between the two countries. This empirical analysis on the banking sector 
adds some value in this context. Despite the close interdependency with respect to 
trade and industrial structure, the banking sector has shown evidence that they were 
taking fundamentally different steps towards restructuring, although the overall path 
of restructuring looks similar at first sight. 
Japan seemed to have taken a prolonged plan for restructuring compared to 
Korea where banking deregulation and restructuring has only just begun. Table 2.3 
on Japanese banking liberalisation dates back to 1978 whereas Table 2.4 indicates 
the Korean banking liberalisation has only begun since 1991. One important point to 
make regarding interest rates is the Japanese banks cannot truly compete in interest 
rates as they are more or less bounded around zero currently. By contrast, Korea 
seemed to have moved faster towards restructuring within a short period. In this 
context, one could argue the divergence in their restructuring mainly due to the pace 
of restructuring and/or the respective stages in the restructuring time horizon where 
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two countries stand. In Figure 2.7, branch concentration (BCNCt) in both countries 
follows a similar path of aU shape, i. e. a move towards branch fragmentation until 
late 1980s in Japan and until later 1990s in Korea followed by a series of 
consolidation. However, the Japanese banking seems to have taken a longer time 
horizon whilst Korean banking took a drastic adjustment over a short period. 
On the other hand, average branch network size has taken a rather similar 
path until early 1990s and then diverged as the Japanese banking started downsizing 
their network size alongside the ongoing M&As (see Figure 2.8). It is an important 
point to make that the Korean banking has not downsized its branch network size 
although its general move towards concentration are revealed on the surface. This 
suggests that the drastic consolidation in Korea did not seem to have really triggered 
banking efficiency. 
2.6 Conclusions 
The role of East Asian banking in industrialisation was carefully discussed. To help 
understand the East Asian banking structure, the determinants of the industry 
concentration were analysed. Concentration depends on the market size for given set 
up costs as well as banks' conduct and their performance. This recursive process is 
affected by regulation to some degree. Some of the predictions suggested by the 
simple theoretical model are also tested on a time-series sample of Japanese and 
Korean commercial banking industry. 
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In East Asia, we conclude that concentration rises when deposit market size 
increases as a consequence of deregulation process in banking industry. Although we 
have not found a convincing pattern of events in East Asia supporting the prediction 
of the deregulation on interest rates, other types of deregulation such as relaxing 
branching restrictions and cross-financial sector entry restrictions have shown 
positive relationship with the banking concentration with an increasing pattern of 
concentration in the time path. This reaffirms that banking industry structure does not 
conform to standard convergence theory in concentration with a given sunk cost. The 
evolution of banking concentration has been non-monotonic in East Asia. 
The econometric model also predicts average branch network size to increase 
as market size increases, whereas deregulation leads to an expansion of the average 
size of branch network. The data support that deregulation increases the average size 
of branch network. However, we did not find convincing evidence of a positive 
relation between average branch network size and degree of concentration in the 
industry in the presence of deregulation. 
The relationship between the loan rates and the concentration was 
significantly positive in Korea. However, a more important result we found is that 
Japan and Korea are not going through an identical path in terms of banking 
restructuring. This overturns most academic claims about similarities between Korea 
and Japan in their economic development. They might just have started a diverging 
path in financial sector development. This divergence path needs further studies. 
The impact of deregulation is measured in terms of deregulation on deposit 
rates, branching restriction, and cross-sector entry restriction. The data show that 
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deregulation of deposit rates has a direct impact on concentration and branch 
concentration. It is also important to note that the Korean banks are using 
unambiguous entry deterrent tactics when they face new entrants following the 
deregulation on cross-sector entry within the financial industry. 
There are several limitations in this analysis. First of all, some of the 
conclusions are based on weak evidence due to the limited number of observations 
available. Another limitation is that the restructuring process has short history and 
long-term effects have to be finther studied. However, we still believe that this 
exercise is useful in discussing the short-term impact of deregulation on the structure 
of banking system. The other limitation is that there are differences in entry costs and 
therefore, the impact of entry costs on the banking structure can vary, when Japan 
and Korea are compared. We tried to explain the banking sector and the real sector 
coherently by linking the industrial policy development with the evolution of 
banking sector in East Asia. However, there is scope for future research regarding 
this link between the real sector and the financial sector. 
In this chapter, we have investigated what has already happened with respect 
to the structure of banking in East Asia in relation to concentration and deregulation. 
Many of the propositions were supported by the test results both theoretically and 
empirically. We do, however, believe it is worth having a closer look at the on-going 
process of deregulation in order to predict the future banking structure in East Asia. 
For instance, alongside the mergers between domestic commercial banks, M&A 
activity by foreign banks has just started to become politically socially acceptable in 
rescuing distressed Korean commercial banks. On the other hand, Japan is expecting 
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a significant consolidation not only among commercial banks but also across all the 
financial institutions. The impact of different types of consolidation will definitely be 
an interesting area for future investigation. 
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Appendix 
Table 2.1 Changes in the Number of Commercial Banks 
Dec-76 M&A R T A Peak Dec-03 
Japanese Banks Dec-85 
(Total No. = 86) 
Nationwide (22) 13 -5 -1 0 0 13 7 
Regional (64) 63 0 0 0 +1 64 64 
Korean Banks Dec-97 
(Total No. = 28) 
Nationwide (18) 5 -9 0 +3 +9 16 8 
Regional (10) 10 -4 0 0 0 10 6 
Source: Japanese Banks - Principal Financial Institutions by Zenginkyo, and Korean Bank Management 
Statistics by Financial Supervisory Service (M). 
N. B.: 
1) M&A: mergers and acquisition; R: revocations; T, transformations; A: authorisation ofnew entities. 
2) In case ofM&As and a subsequent change ofbank namefor a newly merged one, it has been counted as 
only one M&A instead ofcounting as two M&As and an authorisation ofa new entity. 
3) When a bank changed its name, the data set recorded as a new bank although it is not counted as an 
authorisation ofnew entity in the above table. 
Table 2.2 Evolution of Industrial Policies in Japan and Korea 
Approximate period Japan Korea 
1990S High-tech and service industries Knowledge-intensive industries 
1980s Knowledge-intensive (or high- Heavy industries 
tech) industries 
1970s Knowledge industries and heavy Heavy industries (steel, 
industries chemicals, ships, electronics) 
1960s Heavy industries(steel and Light industries (textiles) 
ships) 
1950s Light industries (textiles) Primary products (food 
products) 
. 3uurce., tasrtey p YY1J, Korea -s tconomic miracie 
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Table 2.3 Japanese Banking Liberalisation: post-1978 
Liberalisation measure Date efLective 
Short-term interest rates liberalised 1978 
Issuance of CD started May 1979 
FX control eased by amending the Law Dec 1980 
Regulation on conversion of foreign currency into the yen abolished Jun 1984 
Money market certificate created Apr 1985 
Interest rates of large amount time-deposits liberalised Oct 1985 
Investment business law enacted Nov 1986 
Overseas deposits by residents liberalised Jul 1989 
Financial System Reform Act allowed banks to enter securities business Apr 1993 
Interest rates of Time deposits liberalised completely Jun 1993 
Interest rate on demand deposits liberalised (ex. current account) Oct 1994 
Restrictions on the number of a bank's new branches removed Jun 1995 
Regulation on deposit products relaxed Oct. 1995 
'Big Bang' reform announced - PM Hashimoto's idea of 
Iffireedom 
2/fairness 
3/globalisation 
Nov 1996 
Ban on financial holding companies lifted Dec 1997 
Amended FX and Foreign Trade Law making FX transactions free from 
governmental authorisation 
Apr 1998 
Bank allowed to sell investment trust over-the-counter Dec 1998 
Restriction on trust bank subs idiaries/securities company subsidiaries 
abolished 
Oct 1999 
Bank allowed to issue straight bonds Oct 1999 
Banks, securities companies to be allowed to enter insurance business 
A new Financial Services Law to be enacted 
End 2000 
Source: Japanese Banks 2000 (Zenginkyo,, ZUUU) 
Table 2.4 Korean Banking Liberalisation: post-1990 
Liberalisation measure Date effective 
Short-term interest rates and interest rates on time deposits with maturity over 
3 years liberalised 
Nov 1991 
Liberalised interest rates on time deposits with maturity over 2 years Nov 1993 
Rates on strategic loans (BOK induced) were partially liberalised as the band 
of preferred rates for this category was guided by the Government 
Dec 1994 
Liberalised interest rates on time deposits with maturity over I years Dec 1994 
Liberalised interest rates on time deposits with maturity over 6 months Jul 1995 
Fully liberalised interest rates on strategic loans Jul 1995 
Liberalised interest rates on time deposits with maturity below 6 months 
(completed 4 stage deregulation on interest rates: 1991-1997, earlier than 
planned) 
Nov 1995 
Allowing cross-sectoral entries within financial sector 
Banks' securities business 
Banks' insurance business 
Early 1970s 
Not Applicable 
1 Branching restriction still remains I Not Applicable 
Source: Korean Financial System (BUK, 1996) 
N. B.: 
1) Nofurther announcement ofallowing banks to conduct insurance business as ofDec. 2004. 
2) No indicationfor liberalising branching restriction as ofDec. 2004 
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Table 2.5 Description of Variables 
Variables Type Operational Definition 
Dependent Variables 
CNq C Banking concentration ratio indexed as ln[C5t/1-Cst 
BCNC, C Branch concentration ratio indexed as ln[BC5, /I -BC5j 
AVBt C Log of average branch network size 
HHlt C Banking concentration rescaled by HHI/I 00 
HHIN, C Concentration in nationwide banking rescaled by HHIN/100 
HHITý C Concentration in regional banking rescaled by HHIR/l 00 
Independent Variables 
MKS, c Log of total deposit market size rescaled and deflated by GNP 
IRDt-I c Market average interest rates on deposits (1 -2 year time & savings) 
IRLt., c Market average interest rates on loans (3 year fixed term) 
ROD t., c Average return on deposits 
Lagged Dependent Variables 
CNCt., C I year lagged banking concentration ratio of CNCt 
BCNCt-I C I year lagged branch concentration ration of BCNCt 
AVB t-2 C 2 year lagged average branch network size of AVB, 
HHI t-I C I year lagged banking concentration of HHIt 
HHINt., C I year lagged nationwide banking concentration of HHINt 
HHIF,., C I year lagged regional banking concentration of HHIF, 
Deregulation Dummy Variables 
Dit L/D Deregulation on deposit interest rates measured between 0 and 1: 
I =completely deregulated; 0.5: halfway through in the deregulation 
process; O=fully regulated 
D2t UD Deregulation of branching restriction measured between 0 and 1: 
I =completely deregulated; 0.5: halfway through in the deregulation 
process; O=fully regulated 
DR LA: ) Deregulation of cross-financial sector entry measured between 0 and 1: 
I =completely deregulated; 0.5: halfway through in the deregulation 
process; O=fully regulated 
N. B.: Binary (B), Likert (L), Continuous (C), and Discrete (D) 
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Table 2.6 Structure of Japanese and Korean Banks by TSLS 
Country 
Dependent 
Variables 
CNCt 
Coeff. 
(sx) 
Japan 
BCNCt A VBt 
Coeff. Coeff. 
(sx) (S-e) 
CNCt 
Coeff 
(sx) 
Korea 
BCNCt 
Coeff. 
(s. e) 
A VB, 
Coeff. 
(S. e) 
Independent Variables 
MKS, . 56* . 34 -. 05* -. 09 . 35 . 03 (30) (23) (03) (87) (40) (16) 
BCNCt 
. 06*** -. 08 (02) (05) 
IRDt., -7.94 -10.28** . 03 -. 03 (6.52) (5.23) (. 01) (. 04) 
IRL 6.98 12.51 . 00 . 05 (6.73) (5.50) (11) (. 05) 
AVB -. 49 -. 80 . 32 -. 02 (82) (65) (65) (27) 
ROD -. 02 -. 01 -. 01 -. 04 -. 06* . 02 (09) (. 07) (. 01) (. 07) (. 03) (02) 
Lagged Dependent Variables 
CNCt-j 0.68*** . 97*** (22) (18) 
BCNCt., 
. 55*** (. 22) (. 17) 
AVB t-2 1,31*** . 93*** (11) 
Deregulation Dummy Variables 
Dit -. 32 . 29 -. 14*** -. 19 -. 11 . 07 (42) (34) (. 04) (47) (21) (. 08) 
D2t 
. 07 . 05 -. 04*** (. 12) (. 10) (01) 
DR 
. 27 . 12 -. 06*** . 26 -. 82 . 31 (18) (15) (. 02) (1.57) (74) (28) 
Constant 
. 27 2.28 (3.56) (2.84) 
-1.22*** -2.05 
(. 45) (3.59 9 
-. 28 
(1.50) . 
31 
(60) 
Obs. No. 27 27 26 27 27 26 
Adj. R2 . 689 . 682 . 995 . 895 . 878 . 99 DW-h 
. 003 . 138 . 027 3.249 . 619 . 076 Z, (1) 
Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
*, * *, *** I-values significant at the JOYS, 5% and I% levels respectively N. B. Observation numbers vary due to the missing tagged dependent variables for years 1976 gag 1) and 1977 
(7ag 2). 
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Table 2.7 Comparison between Nationwide and Regional Banking Structure 
Country 
Dependent 
Variables 
11111, 
Coeff. 
(s. e) 
Japan 
HHINt HHIRt 
Coeff. Coeff. 
(s. e. ) (s. e) 
HH1t 
Coeff 
(s. e) 
Korea 
JIMINt 
Co eff. 
(s. e. ) 
H111Rt 
Coeff. 
(sx) 
Independent Variables 
MKS, 2.23*** 4.50* . 13 4.42 5.42 5.10*** (96) (2.69) (10) (4.09) (4.60) (1.86) 
1RDt-j -30.86 -102.75* 3.05 . 26 . 24 . 00 (21.39) (61.74) (2.14) (. 47) (. 52) (. 26) 
IRL, 1 30.42 95.61 4.12** -. 11 -. 06 . 24 (22.30) (64.74) (2.00) (53) (. 59) (. 30) 
AVBt -2.87 -2.69 . 03 -2.50 -2.31 . 48 (2.66) (7.93) (. 24) (2.94) (3.30) (1.29) 
ROD -. 07 -. 53 . 02 -. 21 -. 16 -1.25*** (28) (. 82) (02) (37) (. 41) (21) 
LaggedDependent Variables 
HH1 . 72*** . 69*** (20) (21) 
HHIN t-1 . 82*** . 82*** (. 20) (. 19) 
HHIRt., . 21 . 72*** (. 24) (. 05) 
Deregulation Dummy Variables 
Dit -. 64 -3.30 -. 07 . 25 . 50 -. 70 (1.36) (4.00) (. 13) (2.22) (2.49) (1.28) 
D2t . 28 . 63 -. 04 - - - (40) (1.16) (04) 
DR 
. 91 2.87 -. 17** 4.93 6.27 2.35 (60) (1.81) (. 07) (8.00) (9-01) (4.30) 
Constant 12.19 9.59 1.73* 15.87 13.00 2.81 
(11.78) (35.17) (1.03) (1761) (19.51) (7.13) 
Obs. No. 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Adj. R2 
. 682 . 858 . 920 . 842 . 882 . 962 DW-h 
. 001 . 241 . 411 . 157 1.173 . 078 Z2 (1) 
Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
*, * *, *** t-valu es significant at the IOX 5% and I% levels respectively 
N. B. Observation numbers vary due to the missing lagged dependent variablesforyears1976 (lag I)) 
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Figure 2.1 Japanese Commercial Banks 
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Figure 2.2 Korean Commercial Banks 
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Figure 2.3 Banking Concentration (lnjCi; t/(I-C, st )1) in Korea and. lapan 
ln[C5/(l-C5)]of All Commercial Banks (CNC) 
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Figure 2.4 Banking Concentration (HHII) in Korea and. lapan 
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Figure 2.5. Nationwide Banking Concentration (IIIIINI) 
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Figure 2.6 Regional Banking Concentration (HIIIRI) 
HHI of Regional Banks Only( HHIR) 
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Figure 2.7 Branch Concentration (B(N(', ) 
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Figure 2.8 Average Branch Network (A VBt) 
Log of Average Branch Network Size (AVB) 
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Figure 2.9 Interest Rates in Japan 
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Figure 2.10 Banking Margins and Returns in Japan 
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Figure 2.11 Interest Rates in Korea 
Interest Rates in Korea 
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Figure 2.12 Banking Margins and Returns in Korea 
Banking Margins and Returns in Korea 
IT 
a 
c 
2 
0 U) 
ch 
C'4 
d) 
2 
C: 
(D 
C) 
CN 
'D 
V) 
(D 
cu 
C 
M 
0 
-i 
2010 
z 
c 
, C) 
4) 
ýc 'n 
m 
70 
Ch 
0 
CL 
(L) 
0 
c 
0 
c 
(D 
ft 
c) 
1970 1980 1990 2000 
Year 
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Year 
95 
Figure 2.13 Deregulation on Deposit Interest Rates (D,, ) 
Deregulation on Deposit Rate (D1) 
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Figure 2.14 Deregulation of Branching Restriction (D-, j) 
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Figure 2.15 Deregulation of Cross-financial Sector Entry (1)3t) 
Deregulation of Cross-financial Sector Entry (D3) 
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Figure 2.16 Equilibrium Number of Banks(n)vs. Regulation on Interest 
Rates (0) 
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Chapter 3 
Dynamics of Banking Technology 
Adoption: An Application to Internet 
Banking 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with examining the behaviour of firms (banks) and 
consumers (banks' customers) in the event of a new technology (internet banking) 
introduction. The banking industry has been significantly influenced by evolution of 
technology. 77 The growing applications of computerised networks to banking 
reduced the cost of transaction and increased the speed of service substantially. For 
instance, Table 3.2 shows that a banking transaction using a branch teller costs 100 
times more than that via internet. In addition, the speed of service is improved as 
customers do not have to physically travel to a branch. The nature of financial 
intermediaries made banks improve their production technology by focusing on 
distribution of products. In other words, the evolution of banking technology has 
77 See Hannan and McDowell (1984), Haynes and Thompson (2000), Gourlay and Pentecost (2002). 
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been mainly driven by changes in distribution channels as we see evidence from 
over-the-counter (OTC), automated-teller-machine (ATM), phone-banking, tele- 
banking, pc-banking and most recently internet banking (IB). 78 
Network effects and standardisation have become topical research subjects 
with the growing number of networked industries. The application of new 
technologies, including the internet, has created new ways of doing business. For 
instance, internet application to e-commerce and finance has certainly changed the 
business environment. In the presence of network effects and standardisation, 
technology intensive industries seem to establish concentrated market structure. 79 
Hence, it seems natural to consider progress in banking technology as a reason for 
market consolidation, given the nature of the network in banking. However, there are 
only a few studies on consumer behaviour relative to the vast amount of literature on 
firms' behaviour regarding technology adoption and market structure. We argue that 
customer inertia and risk aversion in characterising internet banking users (IBU) 
suggest that aggressive expansion in internet banking is simply a pre-emptive action 
by banks with little impact on the market structure. 
78 The FSS in Korea defines the internet banking as computer network based banking, which includes 
automated transfer of money, settlement of bills, and realisation of general financial service network. 
On the other hand, Cave and Mason (2001) define internet as a global network of networks. Their 
? aper elaborates the mechanism of internet 
9 For example, the internet browser industry has two leading technologies Netscape and Microsoft 
Internet Explorer. VHS vs. Beta Max in the 70s can also be a good example. On the other hand, 
Hannan and McDowell (1984) investigate a concentrated market structure in banking with respect to 
the diffusion of ATM machines. Sutton (1999) also illustrates network effects and standardisation in 
detail with respect to market structure. 
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This chapter uses online survey data from Korea on internet banking to 
analyse the adoption pattern of banking technology diffusion across customers. so 
Firstly, we characterise the determinants for consumer adoption of a new banking 
technology (internet banking). We examine the internet banking adoption process in 
both a static and dynamic framework to explain why new banking technologies are 
not always taken up by the mass-market. Subsequently we identify different 
characteristics between early adopters and late (i. e. delayed) adopters using 
parametric and semi-parametric duration models and show how the results differ 
between different model specifications. 
We investigate empirical issues of banking technology concerning customer 
inertia, risk aversion and pre-emption. We find evidence that given the possibility of 
multiple equilibria when the bank products are incompatible, the reputation of the 
bank becomes important. The new banking technology can also face excess inertia as 
bank customers are somewhat tied to old technologies. More importantly, risk 
aversion plays an important role in determining the probability of adoption. 
Furthermore, we show these empirical issues related to internet banking provide 
grounds for incumbent banks to take pre-emptive actions. 
On the other hand, with continuous introduction of new technologies in 
banking, additional concerns were raised regarding new ways of banking. As the 
survey by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS, 2000) pointed out, most 
Governments believe that new supervisory or regulatory measures are necessary for 
so Recall Korea refers to South Korea throughout this thesis. 
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internet banking although it will take time for them to prepare prudential regulatory 
guidelines. On the basis of my results, we show the relevant banking regulation has 
an important implication for adoption of a new banking technology. 
We find evidence that adoption of internet banking is influenced by sex, age, 
marital status, and degree of exposure to internet banking as well as the 
characteristics of the banks. We also find the adoption is dominated by social norm 
effects. Using a duration analysis, we find no evidence of first mover advantage 
(order effects) in internet banking whilst the largest bank (rank effects) in 
commercial banking remains dominant in internet banking. 
In section 3.2, we describe the new banking technology (internet banking) 
and factors likely to affect its diffusion. Section 3.3 investigates theoretical and 
empirical literature related to technology diffusion. We develop and compare 
econometric models of adoption in Section 3.4 and report estimates from these 
models and discuss the analysis in Section 3.5 to 3.7. Finally, Section 3.8 concludes. 
3.2 Overview of Internet Banking 
One might remember the days when a person had to go to a bank branch to deposit or 
withdraw money and get a bank statement book manually updated by a teller over 
the counter (OTC). With the introduction of computer networks, a networked 
printing machine started replacing the manual update of statements. Then, cash 
dispensers (CDs) and automated teller machines (ATMs) were introduced to 
facilitate withdrawals, deposits and even transfers accommodating mobility in much 
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wider geographical areas. Phone banking was a revolutionary concept in banking 
since it made banking accessible from anywhere as long as phones were available. 
With the successful diffusion of mobile phones, phone banking is moving into a next 
phase of development. However, one of the most substantial changes in banking 
technology is the recent introduction of internet banking. 
Table 3.1 Comparison of Banking Delivery Channels in Korea 
Internet Banking Mobile Banking Phone Banking CDIA TM 
Delivery Channel PC, Intemet 
Diffusion of 
technology 
Information type 
Cash transaction 
Location 
Visual 
Manual 
Mobility 
Information 
search/memory 
Terminalfee 
Networkfee 
PC: 
I Om(O. 23/pers) 
Internet: 
16m(37%) 
Text, Audio- 
visual 
N/A 
Home, work 
Good 
Wide-screen 
Need to use 
keyboard 
low 
Available 
Mobile Phone Phone 
23.4m (54%) 
Text 
20.8m (48%) 
Audio 
N/A N/A 
No restriction No restriction 
Limited None 
Small-screen 
Uneasy with small Push button 
button 
high low 
N/A N/A 
CD/ATM 
terminal 
0.04 m 
(0.9/1000pers) 
Text, Audio- 
visual 
Available 
Main streets 
Good 
Wide-screen 
Touch panel 
N/A 
N/A 
High on customer Low on customer Low on customer High on banks 
On customer On customer On banks On banks 
Source: Bank ofKorea 2001 
From the comparison of banking delivery channels presented in Table 3.1, we 
first notice that the evolution of banking technology from CD and ATM to internet 
makes banking transaction more mobile (or less locational restriction) at a lower fee 
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at the terminal. In addition, internet added a new feature of information search in 
banking when it retains the advantage of various information types, e. g. in text and 
audio-visual, which are provided by CD and ATM. However, despite the benefits of 
internet banking, this medium has not yet replaced traditional banking channels and 
the banking industry seems to maintain the multi-channel distribution approach. 
Innovation: 
As illustrated above, banking technology has focused on reducing cost of distribution. 
In Table 3.2 we notice a transaction via phone banking costs less than a half of the 
cost via branch banking. This cost per transaction halves for banks when the 
customer switches from phone banking to using ATMs. However, the reduction in 
cost of distribution is much more significant when the customer switches to PC or 
internet banking, which is nearly hundred times less costly. 
Table 3.2 Cost per Transaction in the US: Money Transfer Unit: US dollars 
Type Branch Cheque Phone A TM PC Internet 
Costper 1.07 0.95 0.45 0.27 0.015 0.01 
transaction 
Source: Furst, Lang & Nolle (1998), Booz-Allen & Hamilton (Apr. 1997) 
In this context, we consider internet banking as a process innovation that 
makes customers handle their banking without going to bank tellers at a lower price 
given the lower cost to the bank. In addition, it allows new customers to visit virtual 
banks via public web-network whilst phone-banking and PC-banking provide only 
closed network limited to the existing clients. Considering new products and services 
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specifically designed and offered on the internet given the new technology feature, 
one might also argue that internet banking has an aspect of product innovation as 
well. 
81 
Products and Services: 
Regarding product innovation tied to internet banking, increasing competition 
amongst the leading banks also promotes product and service differentiation. For 
example, despite the Internet Banking System (www. banktown. com) developed in 
1999 by the consortium led by Korea Telecom and several banks, most leading 
internet banking providers are now using their own system to differentiate their 
service products rather than using Banktown. Moreover, banks offer comprehensive 
asset management packages on the internet putting together non-traditional banking 
products (bundling). 
Table 3.3 Services Available on Internet Banking in Korea 
Information Balance Check Fund 
Transfer 
Loans Other 
Type -Financial -Account -Transfer -Loan limit -Open accounts 
products balance -Loan -Application -Live time 
Of -Stockmarket -Credit/ repayment -Approval financial advice 
-Exchange rate DebitCard -Direct debits -Loan delivery -Accident report 
Service balance -Card payments -Personal 
-Personal check -Cash finance 
balance withdrawal management 
-Other financial 
Droduct sales 
Source: Bank ofKorea 2002 
81 Most banks offer comprehensive personal financial management packages on the internet. For 
example, the package is tailor made for each client combining commercial banking, investment in 
stockmarket, bondmarket, and mutual funds and sales of insurance products and pension schemes. 
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Currently all 17 commercial banks in Korea are providing internet banking 
although their range of services may vary. Table 3.3 summarises the services 
available on internet banking into 4 main areas: I/ information search engine; 2/ 
balance check; 3/ fund transfer, and 4/ activities related to loans, in addition to the 
basic services such as opening an account, financial product sales and etc. Although 
internet banking does not have the same capacity as CDs and ATMs in delivering 
cash, there are many more informational features which enable customers to search 
for appropriate products and services; make a decision, and act on it over the 
internet. One important observation to make is that customers need to become more 
proactive in their information search in the absence of bank tellers or financial 
advisors on the phone. 
Competition: 
Banking competition is assessed in three different ways, price (interest rate), 
quantity (deposit and loan size) and quality (reputation-relationship). Traditionally 
banks have competed in branch network (quantity) to increase the number of clients, 
i. e. the deposit and loan size. However, with the benefit of new technologies, the 
quantity competition seems to be replaced by the network competition in ATM or 
internet banking. Internet creates a potentially competitive market outcome in the 
presence of both internal and external threats. Threats within the industry increase as 
product and service information becomes more transparent on the internet. On the 
other hand, there are external threats with lower entry barriers for those with 
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advanced technology in internet. It would be interesting to see if changing 
competition environment would have an impact on market structure. 
Diffusion: 
"While the dot-com party may be over, U. S. retail bankers are just 
beginning to celebrate their online banking accomplishments. With 
national adoption rates reaching 20% in North America, online 
banking is becoming a mainstream phenomenon. Twenty percent, 
however, is just the tip of the iceberg. Banks in Nordic countries and 
South Korea have pushed adoption beyond 35%, " (Alenka Grealish 
from Celent Report 14 Nov. 2002) 
Korea has been quoted as a country with one of the highest internet banking 
penetration ratios per head alongside Scandi-Nordic countries and Canada. The 
internet banking user map (Figure 3.11) produced by BOK in 2002 illustrates that 
60% of the population use internet and 35% internet banking users. This high 
penetration ratio is realised as a result of the infrastructure of the internet network in 
Korea, the high-speed network in particular. According to Mom's (2004) Strategic 
Review of Telecommunications Phase I Consultation, Annex H23, the broadband 
take-up in Korea is increasing significantly faster than in other countries. This 
consultation report also points out the public financing in the network infrastructure 
as one of the reasons for the high rate of broadband take-up. Given the network 
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infrastructure, currently almost a half of the population is using the internet banking, 
e. g. 24.3 million out of 47.9 million (BOK, 2004). 
"As of December, 2004, the number of users of internet banking 
services in twenty domestic banks (excluding the Korea 
Development Bank (KDB) and the Export-Import Bank of Korea), 
Citibank and post offices amounted to 24.3million. This 
represented a 6.7 percent increase from 22.8 million at the end of 
December 2003. " (Bank of Korea 2005, Press Release 2005-1-38, 
P. 1) 
Internet banking was first introduced by Chohung Bank in Korea at the 
beginning of 1998, which was followed by rival banks throughout 1998. The number 
of banks which offer internet banking reached 13 by the end of 1999 and 
continuously increased to 20 by the end of 2000 and currently all 14 commercial 
banks offer internet banking alongside four specialty banks (cooperatives), two 
82 foreign banks, postal savings, and district banking corporation (Saemaul Geum-ko). 
Not only the speed of internet banking adoption by banks has been extraordinary but 
also the adoption by customers has been extremely fast. The number of registered 
internet banking users has nearly doubled every quarter until the end of 2000, since 
82 The information is as of Dec. 2004. 
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when the speed of adoption has slowed down. It is worth identifying why so many 
people adopted internet banking at such an extraordinary speed. 
3.3 Background Literature and Facts 
The importance of technological progress in economic growth and social welfare has 
long been recognised by many economists. Schumpeter (1934,1943) pioneered 
studies on technology, which was subsequently emphasised by Solow (1957) in his 
economic growth literature. Schumpeter's view on technology rejected the anti-trust 
orthodox and argued large firms operating in a concentrated market structure would 
encourage technological progress, whilst Solow claimed that a good proportion of 
growth residual might be explained by changes in technology. On the other hand 
Davies (1979) argued that society fully benefits from a process or product innovation 
only when the innovation is diffused enough to enhance the firm's productivity or the 
consumer's utility. However, most of the earlier literature on technological progress 
focused on the firm's behaviour analysing how process innovation would influence 
its productivity. On the other hand, the consumer behaviour in relation to product 
innovation has been less frequently discussed. 83 
Gourlay and Pentecost (2002) points out that research into the inter-firm 
diffusion of new technology has paid relatively little attention to the determinants of 
83 In the same context, Waterson (2003) draws attention to consumers' reluctance to search and switch 
suppliers in relation to competition and competition policy analysis. 
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innovation diffusion in the financial sector compared to other industries. In addition, 
study on consumer behaviour of financial technology adoption is almost next to none. 
Amongst various approaches in analysing technology-intensive industries, 
network effects have recently become important topics with the growing applications 
of internet network. 84 Katz and Shapiro (1985) examines network compatibility as an 
element of competition and shows consumers' expectations on externalities play an 
important role in determining an equilibrium, in other words, firms' reputations are 
important. They also claim that consumers' benefit from the use of a product 
increases when there is a large number of other consumers purchasing compatible 
items (Katz and Shapiro, 1986). In internet banking, the installed base should also 
increase customer utilities via physical network. Another important contribution of 
their work is intertemporal substitution in technology adoption. Some consumers 
may choose to wait for cost and demand uncertainty to be resolved before they 
commit themselves to a specific technology. This aspect is yet to be proved 
empirically in banking technology. 
Farrell and Saloner (1986) also investigate installed base and compatibility. 85 
They claim a new standard can face excess inertia as installed-base users are 
somewhat tied to the old technology, which explains why new technologies are not 
always taken up by the mass-market. More recently, Mason and Weeds (2001) 
identify three different inefficiencies of premature adoption in the presence of 
84 Saloner and Shepard (1995) acknowledge the importance of networks with the recent proliferation 
of information technology. 
85 Installed base represents the number of users who are networked via a technology. 
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network externalities and examine the effects of uncertainty, network effects and pre- 
emPtion on inefficiencies. 
Early epidemic models of diffusion use an analogy between the contact 
among firms or consumers and the spread of disease (Mansfield, 1968). For example, 
some consumers adopt a new technology before others because they happen to 
become infected first. Similarly, some technologies diffuse faster than others, as they 
are more contagious due to its profitability and risk factors. In contrast, Karshenas 
and Stoneman (1993) point out that contemporary approaches have put less emphasis 
on information spreading as the key explanatory variable of innovation diffusion. 
Then, they summarise the recent approach into three different mechanisms: 
I lRank effects, suggest that only finns with sufficiently high ranking will adopt when 
an innovation first becomes available. However, as the cost of adoption falls over 
time, lower ranked firms will adopt as well. 86 
21Stock effects, result from the assumption that are early movers obtain higher returns 
on the new technology and the marginal return of adoption decreases with an 
increase in the number of adopters. 87 
86 See Davies (1979) and Ireland and Stoneman (1986) for further examples of rank effects. 87 Reinganum (1981b) discusses the strategic behaviour of firms in this context. 
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310rder effects, are applicable when there is a fixed amount of critical input into 
production. In such situations, only early movers who secure access to the critical 
input will find it profitable to adopt. The order of adoption clearly matters. 
Hannan and McDowell (1990) examine the impact of bank adoptions of 
automated teller machines (ATMs) on subsequent levels of concentration in local 
banking markets. They find strong support for the existence of rank effects in the 
diffusion of ATMs, while rejecting the existence of epidemic effects. However, their 
approach has to be further tested as they left out the aspects of consumer adoption, 
which we believe plays an important role in banking industry structure. They propose 
if larger banks adopt ATMs, markets tend to be more concentrated and vice versa. 
However, the diffusion of a new banking technology is relatively fast across large 
and small banks nowadays and sometimes a governrnent consortium leads the market 
toward a new technology simultaneously. 88 Therefore, it is difficult to justify that 
market concentration is due to early adoption by larger banks. 
Waterson (2003) suggests consumer search behaviour is sub-competitive in 
current account banking compared to motor car insurance and therefore the market 
structure tends to be more concentrated in banking than in motor car insurance. One 
of the main differences between the two industries lies in credit rating system. Bank- 
specific credit rating builds up over time whereas credit rating for motor insurance is 
transferable between insurance companies. Thus, long-term aspects of credit rating in 
88 In Korea, the Korea Telecom consortium introduced the Internet Banking technology to most banks 
(www. banktown. com). 
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banking may explain why consumers are reluctant to switch their banks. This 
coincides with my pilot test results where the majority did not switch their banks 
despite more favourable internet banking offers from rival banks. 
Following Gilbert and Newbery's (1982) approach, we consider product 
differentiation on internet banking as a preemptive invention. We argue internet 
banking creates a new dimension of banking competition where banks compete in 
different networks via product diversification and differentiation. Fudenberg and 
Tirole (1985) also use a similar approach using the adoption of a new technology to 
illustrate the effects of pre-emption in games. However, they argue that threat of pre- 
emption equalises rents in a duopoly but does not extend to the general oligopoly. If 
the gain to pre-emption is sufficiently small, the optimal symmetric outcome (late 
adoption) is an equilibrium. This contrasts with Reinganum's (1981b) result in pre- 
commitment equilibria, which leads to diffusion. In other words, despite the small 
gain, the adoption of new technology prevails in oligopoly, especially when the 
information lags are short and firms can observe and respond to their rivals' actions. 
Reinganurn (1981b) applies game theoretic approach to market structure to 
investigate firms' strategic behaviour in adoption of new technologies. 
More recently, Akhavein et al. (2001) point out few quantitative studies on 
the diffusion of new financial technologies and the weakness where the technology is 
limited to ATMs. In the hazard model analysis, they suggest large banks innovate 
earlier (pre-emption) and the tobit model also suggests banks with fewer separately 
chartered, but with more branches, innovate earlier. 
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Probably, it is most common to use duration model for analysis of technology 
diffusion whilst a game theoretic approach forms another group investigating 
diffusion of technology as a strategic reaction in games (Rose and Joskow, 1990; 
Karshenas and Stoneman, 1993; Saloner and Shepard, 1995; Gourlay and Pentecost, 
2002). On the other hand, Stoneman and Battisti (2000) use Deaton and 
Muellbauer's (1980) model, which reflects the diversity of factors that impact the 
diffusion process. They assume a Weibull underlying distribution of diffusion, 89 
while drawing attention to the weakness of the epidemic model, which assumes 
underlying hazard rate is constant over time and all individuals have equal chance of 
getting the disease. 
With internet banking, innovation certainly improves productivity via cost 
cutting in distribution but diffusion pattern amongst consumers is equally important. 
In order to link the firm behaviour and the consumer behaviour, we take some insight 
from behavioural. studies on adoption. 
Diffusion research did not develop from a single discipline. Different 
disciplines led to the development of this theory and the history goes back to Tarde's 
Laws of Imitation (1890,1903), which conceptualised imitating behaviour using a 
selectionist rationale. Throughout the last century, his laws of imitation have 
influenced a substantial amount of diffusion studies across many disciplines, 
including sociology, anthropology, general economics and many others. Since Tarde, 
there have been a plethora of studies that have tried to link imitation within a social 
89 Discussion on Weibull distribution will be later in section 3.4. 
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structure, consumer behaviour, industrial structure and welfare economics. However, 
the effort to link the above sociological aspects of economics were somewhat 
neglected recently with an increasing focus on technological development. 
Technological development could be one of the main factors for economic growth 
since the 20th century. However, without identifying why and how consumers adopt 
new technologies in the social context, the research on technology is incomplete. 
A similar example can be found as the Asian crisis has added new impetus to 
the quest for comprehending relationships between economy and culture whilst most 
research on Asia prior to the crisis focused on conventional macroeconomic 
variables, such as human capital and investment. Janelli and Yim (1997) criticise that 
a Western intellectual tradition has sought to dichotomise explanation of human 
actions into the ideal and the material and suggested the rational choice theory must 
be considered in the social context. It is important to recognise the existence of 
mutually supportive relationships between cultural understandings and the pursuit of 
development goal (materiao in Korea. Greif (1994) uses a similar approach and 
argues that a path of economic growth is not a mere function of endowment, 
technology, and preferences but a complex process in which the organisation of 
society plays a significant role. The organisation of society reflects historical, 
cultural, social, political and economic processes. 
According to Tarde (1903), consumers imitate from their immediate social 
contacts or networks. In this context, it is necessary to look at idiosyncratic Korean 
society and culture. Macdonald (1990) points out strong family ties and importance 
of community life in Korea. For example, Koreans tend to place the concept of "We" 
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ahead of "I" and this leads the society to conformity and collectivity rather than 
individualism. Hence, it looks natural to see such a fast diffusion of internet banking 
in Korea whilst most developed countries are not yet ready to adopt internet banking 
as their main channels for banking. Koreans are known to conform to their social 
norm and the adoption of internet banking in this case is certainly perceived as their 
social norm which narrowed the socio-economic gaps by the conformity. 
For diffusion, one of the most common approaches is applying social leader 
concept. Becker (1970) finds substantial correlation between an individual's 
adoption timing of an innovation and both his/her relative position in sociometric 
network and his/her most valued source of information and suggests that early 
adopters are opinion leaders. Rogers (1995) overviewed a vast amount of 
publications related to innovation diffusion and summarises socio-economic 
characteristics of adopter categories: early adopters to laggards. He also claims that 
opinion leaders are at the core of respective networks. 
Another approach adopts rational decision process. Rosenberg (1976) argues 
that in many markets prospective buyers for an innovation are strongly influenced by 
expectations concerning the timing and significance of future improvements. In other 
words, the optimal decision process of innovation adoption depends on technological 
expectations and learning. As a similar approach of rational decision process, 
McFadden and Train (1996) explain when a new product with unknown attributes 
are offered, customers determine whether they like the product by trying it 
themselves or wait to observe the experience of other customers who try the product. 
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They investigate the implications of learning from others on the sales of new 
products and the impact of advertising. 
Rational decision approach can be useful for analysing early adopters of new 
technology as they are usually tech-savvy users. According to International Data 
Corporation report (IDC, 2002), early adopters of wireless internet are usually young 
(28 years old on average) and male (64%) tech-savvy users. This report categorises 
consumers into 4 adoption stages along the S-shaped diffusion curve: I/early 
adopters are dominated by male tech-savvy group, 2/early majority are young 
working group, 3/ late majority are young working group with larger female group, 
and 4/laggards are predominantly older group. 
On the other hand, Stoneman and Diederen (1994) raise another important 
issue of public policy for technology diffusion. They explain diffusion may be too 
fast if firms adopt a technology before it is profitable to do so, or if firms adopt a new 
technology today that effectively preempts the adoption of a superior technology in 
the future. For instance, when customers are exposed to unidentifiable amount of 
risks via internet banking, the important role of public policy is to mitigate the risks 
in early adoption. 
Rogers (1995) points out that a common problem in diffusion research is the 
individual-blame bias, i. e. the tendency to hold an individual responsible for his or 
her problems, rather than the system of which the individual is a part. Following the 
criticism, he suggested five main variables determining the rate of adoption. Table 
3.4 presents his five variables, to which we link the potential attributes associated 
with internet banking, and which are: I/ perceived attributes of innovations; 2/ type 
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of innovation decision; 3/ communication channels; 4/ nature of the social system, 
and 5/extent of change by agents' promotion efforts. 
Furthermore, it is worth sketching out some cultural aspects of Korean 
society as diffusion is considered to be a social phenomenon and in doing so, the 
Confucian tradition and its impact on education would be the key elements. 
Table 3.4 Adoption Variables and Attributes in Internet Banking 
Variables (Rogers, 1995) Attributes in Internet Banking 
1. Perceived Attributes of Innovations * Internet communication as a channel of 
banking 
* Flexible services in terms of time and 
location 
2. Type of innovation-decision 
(optional, collective, authority) 
Optional 
Collective considering Korean culture 
Multi-channels: the survey suggests 
3. Communication channels interpersonal, mass-media, internet and 
(mass media, interpersonal, etc. ) many others 
4. Nature of the social system Internet adoption as a social norm 
High degree of technological network 
interconnection 
High degree of social network: strong 
family tie, peer group and social clubs in 
a broader sense 
5. Extent of change by agents' promotion e High effort level of promotion with 
efforts special offers on interest rates, fees, etc. 
0 Supported by Government institutions 
Macdonald (1990) claims that the enormous importance attached to education in 
Korea is a principal reason for the nation's rapid development. This general attitude 
towards education is rooted in the Confucian tradition, where entry into government 
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service was obtained through years of study of the Confucian classics, 90 proven by 
examination. Among the traditional 4 classes of Caste; Sa (Scholar-official), Nong 
(farmers), Gong (Artisans, Engineers), Sang (Businessmen), the social ideal was the 
Sa (scholar-official) group. Back then, government positions were the only way to 
rise in the world and thus, education was the key to fame and fortune. Education is 
still regarded as the key to success by modem Koreans. 
With the official adoption of Confucian philosophy and the examination 
system, education became a major social activity throughout the Choson Dynasty 
(13 92-19 10). These social activities of learning evolved around state schools such as 
the Confucian University (songgyungwan) or private academies (sowon) run by 
individual scholars and ex-officials. Hence, Koreans often consider formal schooling 
and education to be interchangeable. On the other hand, any vocational education 
related to three other Castes (Nong, Gong, Sang) are not regarded as high as formal 
schooling. Even the Ministry of Education and Human Resources Development 
(former Ministry of Education) refers education as formal schooling in most cases. 
Another driving force towards formal education in Korea is the community 
sense, i. e. conformity society. Macdonald (1990) points out that part of the role of 
the Korean family and community has been taken over by groupings based on 
common local origin, common school experience, and common workplace. People 
within such groups have a strong sense of shared identity and mutual responsibility. 
Hence, a certain level of formal education is essential for Koreans to remain in such 
90 The Confucian classics lay out rules of life and those who follow these rules are highly regarded as 
the educated group. One can say that it is somewhat analogous to the Bible for Christians. 
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groups. Another useful approach is a model of observational behaviour by 
Bikhchandani et al. (1998), which agrees with most conformity research results. 
They claim people learn from the behaviour of others and therefore conform. Naylor 
(1989) also uses a similar approach of individual behaviour of a social custom to 
explain the reason why workers strike. Hence, the education in Korea cannot be 
explained without the influence of Confucianism (culture) as well as conformity 
(society), which made Koreans place high value on education and respect the 
educated, considering adoption of a new technology as a part of education for new 
skills. 
Rogers (1995) considers the nature of the social system as one of the five 
variables determining the rate of adoption. For instance, the Korean Government 
clearly signalled the network technology as the key for the future via various stages 
of Government-led technology projects. 91 Table 3.5 illustrates the 4 stage technology 
projects since 1987. The first Korean Backbone Computer Network project (1987- 
1992) facilitated the distribution and use of personal computers followed by the 
second project (1992-1996), which promoted more powerful personal computers and 
versatile applications including internet communications. This second project 
benefited from a parallel project launched in 1995, called the High-speed National 
Information Infrastructure project as it established a public high-speed cable 
network. This parallel project was designed to provide a favourable environment in 
91 The Ministry of Information and Communication has been in charge of these projects since 1987. 
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delivering multimedia services across the nation. Currently, Korea is undergoing the 
second stage of this parallel project, namely the Cyber-Korea 21 project (1998- 
2002). The Government has been reinforcing the nationwide communication network 
system and its applications to build a knowledge-based information society. The 
Government budget of 28 trillion won (approx. 20 billion US dollars) was set for the 
Cyber-Korea 21 project to increase the information infrastructure by 100 times and 
educate people across the nation. 
Table 3.5 Technology Projects in Korea since 1987 
Year Project Objective 
1987-1992 1" Korean Backbone Computer To establish the basic infrastructure 
Network project for computer network focusing on 
distribution and use of personal 
computers. 
1992-1996 2"dKorean Backbone Computer To promote more powerful computers 
Network project and diverse applications. 
1995-1998 1"' High-speed National To build a high-speed cable network 
Information Infrastructure project nationwide to facilitate the network 
communication. 
1998-2002 Cyber-Korea 21 project To build a knowledge-based 
(2nd High-speed National information society facilitating the 
Information Infrastructure project) 
100 times of information 
infrastructure within the 5 years. 
The pro-technology policy by the Goverment certainly encouraged general 
public to adopt new technologies including the internet. 92 Not only the Goverment 
campaign set a clear social objective regarding the new technology of internet, but 
92 The Times (I Dec. 2004 UK) reported, "South Korea is the most geeky, tech-savvy country almost 
anywhere and about 73% households have high-speed broadband. " 
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also it took the initiative in adopting and implementing the internet technology 
nationwide. For instance, most civil service documents have been distributed and 
communicated via the internet since July 2000. Over two decades, the Government 
technology projects have established a new social norm, computer and internet- 
literacy. It seems natural that Koreans worry about being left behind in the 
information society and that therefore adopt the new technology sooner rather than 
later to remain in the respective groups. 
3.4 Econometric Models 
In order to test the following propositions, a set of econometric models in both static 
and dynamic set-up are used and compared. For a static version of maximum 
likelihood estimation, we apply a logistic distribution to test the probability of 
internet banking adoption as a point estimate at the end of 2001. On the other hand, 
we use a duration model in order to detect the dynamics of IB adoption process. 93 
The latter approach is useful in identifying the determinants of early adopters versus 
delayed adopters as the data now contain the sequential information of adoption time. 
93 Duration analysis is often called as Survival analysis or failure time analysis. 
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Proposition 1: individual characteristics affect their behaviour of internet banking 
adoption (static). 
Finn characteristics have often been used for determining firms' technology adoption 
behaviour in the literature (Gourlay and Pentecost, 2002; Katz and Shapiro, 1985). 
For similar reasons, we suggest individual characteristics would affect their internet 
banking adoption. This proposition follows the argument brought forward by Rogers 
(1995) that characterises the different types of individuals according to their adoption 
timing, e. g. early adopters to laggards. 
Proposition I. I: males are more likely to adopt internet banking thanfemales. 
Internet banking requires a minimum level of proficiency in computer skills and 
internet communication. Thus, we expect that males are more likely to adopt internet 
banking given that they tend to be more tech-savvy as the International Data 
Corporation report (IDC, 2002) suggested in the literature review section. 94 
94 IDC has an extensive global network of consultancy on technology information and reports up-to- 
date facts in the industry. Their report (2002) about adoption of wireless communication confirmed 
that young (average 28 years old) male group are more likely to adopt earlier. 
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Proposition 1.2: younger generations are more likely to adopt internet banking than 
older generations. 
One way to look at the age factor is younger generations are more likely to adopt 
internet banking due to their familiarity with contemporary network technology. 
Some might argue otherwise that Asian countries, including Korea, are obsessed with 
learning of new technologies and thus, the age factor might not be significant. 
According to Rogers' (1995) survey on diffusion publications show that more than 
half of the publications find the age factor as not significant but in the cases where 
significance is apparent, younger generations are more likely to adopt a new 
technology. -. 
Proposition 1.3: people with higher education (university or above) are more likely 
to adopt IB than those with less education. 
Having said that the proficiency in computer technology and network 
communications would have a positive impact on internet banking adoption, 
education would enhance the proficiency in network technology and thus would 
increase the probability of 1B adoption. University or above level of education is 
critical as universities in Korea are heavily relying on internet communication for 
their foundation of educational system. This argument applies to across different 
degree majors regardless of art or music degrees. Exposure to a university network 
system is more important than anything else. 
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Proposition 1.4: marriedpeople are less likely to adopt internet banking than single 
individuals or those with alternative marital status e. g. separated or divorced 
We consider that married people are relatively conservative compared to those who 
choose alternative marital status, e. g. divorced, separated, co-habit, or single. Choice 
of alternative marital status would have a positive effect on their tendency to try out 
new technologies as they tend to be less risk-adverse. 95 This proposition is also 
rooted in the characteristics set out by Rogers (1995) who points out that adopters of 
a new technology would be less likely to be risk-adverse. 
Proposition 1.5: High-income group is more likely to adopt internet banking than 
low-income group. 
We expect that banking intensity of high-income group would be higher than low- 
income group would and hence expect the incentive of IB adoption is larger for high- 
income group. This once again follows Rogers (1995) adoption characteristics and 
we expect to see some significant results given the cost of adopting internet banking. 
95 One could argue that single individuals are also risk adverse by postponing or opting out of 
marriage but in trying out new technologies, we expect them to be more open-minded. 
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Proposition 1.6: residential property owners are less likely to adopt internet 
banking. 
Outright owners of residential properties are less likely to have complex banking 
than those who are in key money or monthly rental schemes as they do not have to 
deal with mortgages or monthly payments and therefore, would have less incentive to 
adopt internet banking. Becker (1970) points out substantial correlation between an 
individual's adoption timing of an innovation and his/her relative position in 
sociometric network. 
Proposition 1.7. - residents in Seoul and Kyungki metropolitan area are more likely to 
adopt internet hanking than those who reside in regional provinces. 
This proposition is based on stronger epidemic effects (Mansfield, 1968; Karshenas 
and Stoneman, 1993) in the metropolitan area than the remote regions. We also 
expect that the easier access to computers and internet facilities in the metropolitan 
area, which would provide better grounds for people to adopt internet banking. 
Proposition 1.8: those who were exposed to internet banking recommendations are 
more likely to adopt internet hanking. 
This proposition is also applying epidemic effects (Mansfield, 1968; Karshenas and 
Stoneman, 1993) as we argue those who are exposed to the risk of internet banking 
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via recommendation are more likely to adopt than those who are not yet exposed to 
recommendation. 
Proposition 1.9: those who are aware of interest rate information in the market are 
more likely to adopt internet banking. 
The reasoning for this proposition is that those who are active information seekers 
would benefit more from internet banking as they can search around for the best 
services and products without going to individual bank branches. Hence, they have 
more incentive to adopt internet banking. This is related to the principle brought 
forward by Becker (1970) which characterises early adopters value source of 
information and more likely opinion leaders. 
Proposition 1.10: ftequent visitors to bank branches are more likely to adopt internet 
hanking. 
Those who visit bank branches (OTC) frequently are considered to be keen 
customers and have more incentive to adopt internet banking as they can save the 
time travelling to the branches. There might be some customers who prefer more 
human contact but we expect this preference can be outweighed by substantially 
lower transaction fees and new services, e. g. enhanced information search facility 
and live-time financial portfolio management services, offered via the internet when 
banks aim to substitute most of branch activities with internet banking. Consumer 
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search behaviour provides the base of this proposition and Waterson (2003) discusses 
consumer search and switching behaviour to a certain degree that we find useful for 
this proposition. 
Proposition 1.11: ftequent visitors to banks' websites are more likely to adopt 
internet banking. 
The more visits to banks' websites customers make, the greater the chance they 
would adopt internet banking as the banks advertise various services and benefits of 
internet banking on the web. Once again, the epidemic effects presented in the 
literature earlier (Mansfield, 1968; Karshenas and Stoneman, 1993) can be applied in 
explaining this proposition. The more customers exposed to internet banking 
information, via websites in this case, the higher the probability they would adopt it. 
Proposition 2: the determinants of IB adoption timing (dynamic) would differ from 
those ofIB adoption probability (static). 
Although we expect that the overall level of IB adoption would vary depending upon 
individual characteristics, we claim that the adoption timing would also vary among 
individuals with different characteristics. For instance, not only do we expect males 
to be more likely IB adopters, but we believe they are more likely early adopters. 
This proposition adopts the theories set out by Becker (1970) and Rogers (1995). 
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Proposition 3: the first mover (bank) would not increase its market share, i. e. no 
order effects. 
Since the technology of internet banking is not exclusive to the first mover, we are 
bound to see some spillovers within the industry and would not see significant 
impact on the first mover's market position. Consumers being cautious about their 
banking, the first mover would not necessarily capture early adopters. Mason and 
Weeds (2001) explains the inefficiencies of premature adoption in the presence of 
network effects. 
Proposition 4: the largest bank would increase its market share via internet 
banking, i. e. rank effects. 
We expect customers to prefer banking with a larger bank, which has a wide 
customer network as they believe the larger the better, i. e. network effects. 
Traditionally, large banks have been perceived as better banks in Korea and in 
addition, the network effects of internet banking would reinforce the perception of 
bank size. Therefore, the largest bank is expected to benefit more from internet 
banking by capturing early adopters. This proposition aims to test the rank effects 
(Karshenas and Stoneman, 1993) directly. 
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Proposition 5: the duration dependence is likely to be positive. 
The hazard associated with internet banking adoption is expected to increase with 
time since customers are exposed to more IB adopters. The epidemic effects can be 
applied to this proposition. In the same context, the law of imitation can be also 
borrowed from sociology to support the argument. The forefather of the diffusion 
studies, Tarde (1903) observed certain patterns of innovation diffusion called the 
laws of imitation (Les Lois de 17mitation), which we today call the adoption of an 
innovation. People are more likely to adopt internet banking with the increasing 
number of IB users as they have more chance to imitate other users as time goes by. 
Proposition 6: the determinants of non-users'Juture IB adoption would differfrom 
those of IB users'. 
For IB non-users who have delayed the adoption of internet banking, we assume that 
their individual characteristics differ from those of IB adopters. We argue that factors 
affect non-IB users to adopt IB in the future would differ from those for the current 
IB users. This proposition reiterates the argument brought forward by Becker (1970) 
and Rogers (1995). 
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First, we use the fully non-parametric duration model to determine the shape 
of the survival function as well as the hazard function. 96 The Kaplan-Meier (1958)97 
survival estimate indicates the IB adoption follows a S-shaped curve considering the 
98 data are right censored for non-113 users. This agrees with the results from most 
technology diffusion literature. 99 On the other hand, the hazard function shows a 
non-linear monotonic increase in time, more precisely increasing with oscillation. In 
order to capture this increasing hazard over time, we chose a Weibull distribution, as 
shown in Figure 3.6 and 3.8, for the underlying hazard function of duration analysis 
and compared three different specifications: I/continuous time Weibull model 
(parametric), 2/discrete time proportional hazard (PH) model with Weibull baseline 
hazard (parametric) and 3/ discrete time proportional hazard (PH) model with 
flexible baseline hazard (semi-parametric with non-parametric baseline hazard). 
The Weibull distribution is one of the most widely used survival distribution. 
It is a versatile distribution that can take on the characteristics of other types of 
distributions, based on the value of the shape parameter p. The Weibull probability 
density function can be written with one to three parameters (e. g- scale parameter 17, 
shape parameter p, location parameter y) and the density function can have a 
96 Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980) suggest a non-parametric duration analysis has an advantage of not 
imposing any restriction on the underlying hazard but there are theoretic difficulties in interpreting 
non-parametric maximum likelihood estimate. Thus, alternative specifications were chosen for the 
analysis. 
97 Despite the incompleteness of the data, Kaplan-Meier (1958) use the product-limit estimate to 
derive the proportion of events in the population whose lifetime would exceed t, without making any 
assumption about the form of the probability function. 
98 Figure 3.5 illustrates the S-shaped diffUsion path from the Kaplan-Meier estimation. 
99 The evidence of a S-shaped diffusion of technology can be found in Davis (1976), Stoneman and 
Battisti (2000) and many others. 
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flexible form depending on these parameters. 100 The most commonly used density 
function for duration model takes the two parameter form with scale and shape, but 
y= 
p(t-, v 
P-1 
(t) 
17 77 
) 
where most duration literature denotes the hazard rate A=1 
77 
Therefore, the hazard function with Weibull distribution is 
A (t) = Ap (At)'-' 
(3.2) 
and the survival function is 
S(t) = e-(")p 
(3.3) 
The Weibull distribution is suitable for a model where hazard rate increases or 
decreases monotonically since it parameterises the exponential term with p- 1 where 
p> I can be used for increasing hazard rate, whilst p< I can be used for decreasing 
hazard rate. The special case ofp =1 converges to an exponential model in which the 
hazard rate is constant over time. 
100 For further details of the probability distribution, see Kiefer (1988), Spiegel (1992) and Greene 
(2003). 
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3.4.1 Logit Specification 
With respect to individual characteristics, it is relatively simple to apply a logit 
specification to the probability of IB adoption as well as to interpret the estimates. 
Binary choice model has a non-linear probability distribution. Hence we rewrite the 
cumulative probability function in a logistic form as shown in equation (3.4). 
Cumulative probability: P, = F(z, ) =1 
(3.4) 
1+ e--*, 
where Z =, 8'X +u 
Probability at Zj: f (z) = 
dP 
= 
e-z 
)2 dz (I + e-z (3.5) 
Marginal Effects: 
op 
= 
ap 
. 
az 
= 
e-' 
)2 
A 
ax, az U, + e--' (3.6) 
This logit model specification is used for adoption probability for the pooled sample 
and for non-users' future adoption behaviour. The future adoption behaviour of non- 
adopters was also investigated by using logit and conditional logit specifications. 
Equation (3.4) is the cumulative probability distribution where Z is the individual 
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characteristics fanction. 101 As Z tends to infinity, e' tends to 0 and the cumulative 
probability has a limiting upper bound of 1. As Z tends to minus infinity, e' tends to 
infinity and the cumulative probability has a limiting lower bound of 0. Hence the 
equation (3.4) is bounded between 0 and 1. The marginal effect of Z on the 
probability which will be denotedf(Z) is given by the derivative of F(Z) with respect 
to Z (equation 3.5). Equation (3.6) indicates the marginal effects for each variable. 
3.4.2 Duration Model Specification 
We are interested in the length of time that elapses before customers adopt a new 
banking technology (internet banking). We estimate a hazard rate i. e. the conditional 
probability of an adoption in each month given that the customer has not adopted IB 
by that time. 
The duration to adoption of internet banking was defined as follows: we set 
the time origin at Jan. 1998 and thereafter, a monthly time scale was set in sequence. 
The choice of a monthly time scale is due to the nature of survey data. We define the 
event ending the duration as the first use of internet banking, i. e. IB adoption. 
Different individuals may have different time origins but my specification assumes 
everyone was already exposed to the news of IB introduction prior to the actual 
introduction of IB. 102 
101 Note Z function for individual characteristics here has nothing to do with the z-statistics reported in 
logit and duration model estimations. 
102 Davies (1979) claims no potential adopter is prevented from adopting by total ignorance or patent 
restrictions when potential adopters in the industry are assumed to know of the existence of the 
innovation once it is first commercially available. 
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3.4.2.1 Continuous Time Parametric Duration Model (Weibull) 
Parametric specification assigns a certain type of distribution on the hazard function, 
a Weibull distribution in this chapter. It is relatively easy and straightforward to 
apply this specification but the choice of hazard function is extremely important. 
Various distributions including exponential, lognormal and log-logistics were tested 
and the Weibull distribution was chosen, as its log-likelihood is higher than those of 
other specifications as shown in the table below. 
Table 3.6 Survival Distributions: log-likelihood'03 
Distribution Hazard Function, AM Survival Function, S(f) Log 
Likelihood 
Exponential S(t) = CA' -313.63 
Weibull AP (At) P-1 S (t) = e-(A4)p -263.55 
Lognormal'04 f (t) (p / t) 0 [p in (At)] S (t) =0 [-p In (At)] -337.76 
Log-logistic'o' A (t) AP (Aty-1 / [I + (Aty S (t) =1/ 
[I 
+ (Aty] -312.11 
In addition, the survival function and hazard function seem to fit the non-parametric 
specification results best. Finally, the time interval is assumed to be small enough to 
apply continuous time. The Weibull model is specified as: 106 
103 For further details of each distribution, see Kiefer (1988) and Greene (2003). 
104 ln(t) is normally distributed with mean -ln(A ) and standard deviation Up. 
103 ln(t) has a log-logistic distribution with mean An( A) and variance R2/(3 P). 106 Let T be the length of a complete spell and t is a random time variable with a cumulative 
distribution function of F(t) and probability density function off(t). Therefore, the diffusion of IB 
adoption is represented in the failure function, which is I-S(t). If the ancillary parameter, p>I, the 
hazard rate rises monotonically with time and falls ifp<I. 
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Hazard function(Weibull): 
A (t) = lim 
Pr ob(t: 5 T: 5 t +, dj T ý: t) 
= lim 
F(t + A) -F (t) 
J-+0 A J-40 ds 
(t) 
f (t) 
= AP(At)p-l 
(3.7) 
s (t) 
Probability density function: (3.8) 
f (t) = Ap(At)P-' -S (t) = Ap(At)P-' - 
Survivor function: S (t) = Pr (T > t) =I-F (t) = e-('u)p 
(3.9) 
Failure function: F (t) = Pr (T: ý t) =I-S (t) (3.10) 
where A =- exp (, 6'X) 
The hazard rate, A (t) is the conditional probability of having a spell length exactly t, 
i. e. adopting IB in interval [t, t+ At], conditional on survival up to time t. The 
equation (3.7) shows the hazard function is a limiting case of conditional probability 
of event. But the hazard rate is not a probability in a pure sense since it can be greater 
than 1. The Weibull distribution allows the hazard rate for an individual to change 
monotonically. In the case of IB diffusion, we expect to see positive duration 
dependence (pl). We derive the hazard function by conditioning on survival up to 
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time t and write the survival function as in equation (3.9). Then, the failure function 
takes the foxm, I -S(t) as in equation (3.10). 
3.4.2.2 Discrete Time Proportional Hazard (PH) duration Model (with 
parametric baseline hazard) 
A discrete time duration model is appropriate as my data set observations are made 
in discrete time, i. e. adoption in monthly intervals, although the intrinsic nature of the 
IB adoption is in continuous time. We chose a complementary log-logistic (cloglog) 
hazard function over a logistic one as the adoption process of internet banking is 
intrinsically continuous but only the observations are in discrete time. In principle 
this specification is an extended version of Cox proportional hazard model as 
illustrated in Kiefer (198 8) for discrete data analysis. 107 
Hazard Function: A,, = AO (t) - exp (X,, ', 8) (3.11) 
S(t; X,, )=exp[-f A (r; Xi, ) dr] = expf-exp[X,, ', 8 +log (H, )]l (3.12) 
where H, =-f 20 (r) dr and 4 (t) is the baseline hazard at t 
107 Kiefer (1988) provides a comprehensive list of survivor, probability distribution and hazard 
functions, which is useful at a starting point of duration analysis. However, Lancaster (1990) discusses 
transition data most thoroughly with a focus on duration data analysis. 
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The hazard function (equation 3.11) takes a proportional form assuming that for 
some unknown 8 and some nonnegative measurable function ý (t), the baseline 
hazard at time t. Subject to a complementary log-logistic transformation for the 
discrete time, the survival function can be written as equation (3.12). 
With censoring ci =0 for those who are not yet adopters, the log-likelihood 
can be written as: 
R (3.13) logL(ß, 8) = lic, log[S(t, -1, X) -S(t,; X)]-(1-C, )logS(t,; X)l 
where 9= log(H), 
logL= + (I - C, ) log 
t 
A, (XI, )]Ij ý 
ýC, 
log 
f 
"i, (X") uP-A, (XJI 19 
1=1 5=1 
I 
S-1 
where the discrete time hazard is 
,ý (Xj, ) =I- exp 
[- exp (X,, ', 8 + r, )] 
with y, = log 
£, '-, 
0 
(r)dr 
The log likelihood function in equation (3.13) shows the weighted average fonn of 
maximum likelihood from both censored and uncensored groups. The first half of the 
equation represents the likelihood of an exit (i. e. IB adoption) at time t, thus a 
product of all the previous periods' survival likelihood, whereas the second half of 
the equation illustrates the case of non-exit. The equation is simply weighted by ci 
and I- ci for that matter: ci =0 for censored group and ci =1 for uncensored group. 
The hazard function with a complementary log-logistic transformation for the 
discrete time is shown in equation (3.15). 
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3.4.2.3 Discrete Time Proportional Hazard (PH) Duration Model (semi- 
parametric with flexible baseline hazard) 
By adding duration dummy variables for each interval to the above specification, a 
semi-parametric estimation is also feasible. The advantage of using a semi- 
parametric specification is that we do not impose any assumption on the baseline 
hazard ftinction and allow it to be fully flexible. In principle, this model calculates 
hazard rate for each interval under no restriction. Given the advantage of flexible 
baseline hazard function and the nature of my data being discrete in time, this model 
specification is preferred to others. However, we expect to see similar results from all 
three specifications despite the different underlying assumptions. 
3.4.2.4 Unobserved heterogeneity in duration Model 
The estimation in the presence of unobserved individual specific effects (i. e. 
heterogeneity) without control causes misleading inferences due to inconsistent 
parameter estimators (Lancaster, 1990). If there are other (unobserved) 
characteristics that influence the hazard function, such omitted heterogeneity 
generally leads to a downward biased estimate of duration dependence (Kiefer, 1988). 
The above duration models can be extended for this purpose by including a random 
error term along with the vector of individual characteristics X (i. e. use X, 6 +v). A 
most commonly used correction model is based on the gamma distribution with 
mcan I and variancc 0. The gamma distribution and the invcrse Gaussian 
distribution are often used for the heterogeneity distribution in parametric duration 
models since they give a closed form expression for the likelihood, avoiding 
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numerical integration. However, other distributions could in principle be used (see 
Meyer, 1990). By incorporating heterogeneity into the distribution, we get the 
conditional survival function for the Weibull model specified as 
s(tlv) = V-e (-AI)P 
Thus, the unconditional survival function is 
(I +0(, It)p)-"o 
and the hazard function is 
A (t) = Ap (Aty-l - (S (t))e 
where 0 =0 corresponds to the model without unobserved heterogeneity and the 
ftirther 0 deviates from zero, the greater is the effect of heterogeneity. For simplicity 
of the estimation, a normal distribution of heterogeneity for the complementary log- 
logistic model is used for the proportional hazard models. However, we fail to reject 
the null hypothesis of no heterogeneity for all three duration models. Tberefore, the 
mixed models with unobservables converge to the models without unobservables. 
Only the results from models without unobservables are presented. 
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3.4.3 The Data 
Yahoo Members' Directory 108 was used to collect email addresses of Korean 
residents with age 13 or above, applying a systematic and stratified sampling. 109 The 
online survey forms were sent out via email requests to 3200 addresses, of which 407 
responded after two follow-ups. 110 In total, 393 replies were used in the analysis 
having discarded duplicates or incomplete replies. A random sampling of the 
population was not used as our research focus lies in those who already have access 
to the internet. However, one should note that the above systematic and stratified 
sampling of the internet users would capture more meaningful results for our 
research purpose. More importantly, a significantly large proportion of the 
population in Korea uses internet. A recent survey conducted by the National Internet 
Development Agency (NIDA) commissioned by the Ministry of Information and 
Communications (MIC) indicates that 31.6 million people are using the internet more 
than once a month (i. e. 70.2% of the population). Considering the under age and 
elderly groups who are not able to and do not want to use the internet, this is a 
substantially large proportion of the population. 
108 www. yahoo. co. kr is one of the largest digital media companies in Korea, which provides a variety 
of information through the internet. Yahoo also offers free email accounts for their members. 
109 The 3200 email addresses were collected across 107 different cities throughout II provinces (see 
Table 7 for the details of stratified sampling). Every P person from Yahoo Members' Directory was 
selected in proportion to the population density data from the Korea National Statistical Office 
(systematic sampling). The response rate was at 12.7%, which was below the expected rate of 20%. 
The expected rate of reply was initially drawn from interviews with local online survey companies in 
Korea (e. g. www. koreanclick. com and www. intemetmetrix. co. k . The lower response rate seems to be due to the sensitivity of survey questions, e. g. personal banking. 
110 The sampling period is between 13 November, 2001 - 13 February, 2002 
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A cross-sectional data set of 393 individuals was used in the static analysis of 
internet banking adoption and the data were expanded into panel data by assigning 
binary choice dummies for each monthly interval for the dynamic analysis (duration 
analysis). The last event was observed in the 48 th month (December 2001) from the 
introduction of Internet Banking (IB) in January 1998. Thus, an unbalanced data set 
of 6407 observations were obtained, with 246 individuals responding as internet 
banking users and 147 identified themselves as non-users (right-censored). 
Questionnaire: 
Following a pilot survey, an online survey form is constructed. "' The questionnaire 
on internet banking consists of 37 questions. The first section contains 10 questions 
on demographics. The second section has two parts, I/aimed at those who used 
internet banking at least once, identified as a user group (IBU) and 2/for those who 
have not yet used internet banking, identified as a non-user group (NU). The user 
group is questioned on IB adoption timing, their banks, internet banking details in 
terms of average amount of transaction and the frequency. Also commonly used IB 
services are asked alongside their IB selection criteria. Equivalently, the non-user 
group is questioned on their reasons for no-adoption and adoption criteria if they plan 
to use IB in the future. The final section includes questions on information seeking 
behaviour in banking and their general banking pattern such as length of long-term 
"'The pilot survey was conducted between 7-28 Mar. 2001 targeting 120 residents in Seoul. Out of 
120 target residents, 99 responded and these were used in the preliminary analysis. However, the 
online survey allowed me to reach 3200 Korean residents over the internet without any geographical 
distance. 
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relationship with the bank, frequency of visit to OTC and banks' web pages. Table 
3.10 shows the outline of the survey questions. 
Variables: 
The non-parametric log-rank inequality test and the Wilcoxon test are conducted on 
potential explanatory variables and the test results are presented in Table 3.11 for the 
variables. For example, the Wilcoxon test divides the sample into subgroups and 
tests the null hypothesis of identical survival function across the subgroups, i. e. S, (t) = 
Sj(t). As the Wilcoxon test gives higher weights to earlier failure times, it is more 
likely to detect early differences in failure times. On the other hand, the log-rank test 
is based on scores assigned to the observations, which are functions of the logarithm 
of survival function. The test statistic is the sum of scores over all observations 
standardised by standard deviation in this case. The log-rank test gives equal weights 
to all failures and therefore is more powerful in detecting failures in proportional 
hazard models, which is the case of this chapter. The explanatory variables included 
in the model are described in Table 3.9, which are classified in: I/ demographics; 
2/exposure to internet banking; 3/awareness; 4/banking behaviour, and 5/first mover 
and largest bank dummies. The summary statistics of the variables are presented in 
Table 3.11. 
143 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Sample 
Before presenting results from the probability and duration models of the adoption 
process, we examine some simple descriptive statistics. Table 3.11 reports means and 
standard deviations of the key variables used in the analysis. It is worth noting that 
the research interest of this chapter does not lie in the entire population in Korea but 
in those who have access to the internet. Considering the nature of technology 
involved with internet banking itself and the random online survey of the internet 
user population, the high proportion of male group (i. e. 69.2% is Sex=]) responses 
seems to be right and this coincides with the report by the International Data 
Corporation (IDC, 2002) on web users in Asia, of which the 64% are male. 
The survey takes 7 different levels of final educational attaimnent. However, 
only a grouped dummy for higher education (Edu), i. e. university or above is used in 
the analysis in order to minimise the loss in degree of freedom by having too many 
insignificant variables suggested by the non-parametric tests (log-rank and 
Wilcoxon). A very high proportion (84.7%) indicated educational attainment of 
university or above with little variation. However, it is not surprising since more than 
70% of the population between 18 and 21 are involved in some form of higher 
education (end of 2001) with a growing tendency according to the statistical report 
by the Ministry of Education and Human Resources Development (MOE, 2001). 1 12 
112 See http: //www. moe. go. k for more details. 
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Given the conditioning on internet access and the banking related questions would 
possibly explain the relatively high level of education compared to that of the 
MOE's. One important observation to make is Korea has traditionally favoured 
higher education in the belief that investment in human capital is the only way to 
rebuild the country from the aftermath of Korean war. Hence, university education in 
Korea has become more or less an essential certificate for employment. 
Therefore, the education variable needs to be explained by the influence of 
Confucianism (culture) as well as conformity (society), which made Koreans place 
high value on education and respect the educated. Education is given a high priority 
by Koreans from all backgrounds and this has been a major driving force behind 
Korea's economic development. For instance, the student population is about a 
quarter of the total population and the average length of schooling is now over 12 
years, which means more than high school graduation. This is also reflected in my 
sample data where we find a high proportion of university graduate or equivalent. 
Culturally driven efforts into education set higher education as a social norm in 
Korea. A high proportion with higher education is not because of the sample bias but 
because of the country specific characteristics regarding education. 
The age variable was grouped into three, I/ young (Agel=13-24), 2/ middle 
(Age2=25-44), and 3/ old (Age3=45 or above). The majority of people are 
categorised in 25-44 years old (74.8%) whereas 15.5% is in the young group between 
13 and 24 years old and 9.7% is above 45 years old. Although we have classified 
groups into three for simplicity to obtain more meaningful estimation results, a 
detailed age breakdown (I 0-year interval) is compared to the internet user profile of 
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the Korea National Statistical Office (KNSO) data 2000 in Table 3.8. We notice that 
the general internet user profile has a more weight on the young teenage group 
compared to the internet banking survey profile. We expected to see such difference 
given the nature of the survey on the banking activity. Otherwise, the age profile of 
the survey sample represents more or less the Korean internet user profile. 
More than half of the respondents are married (Marm) whereas 44.5% 
indicates as single (Mars) and only 2.5% indicates as divorced or separated (Maro). 
Given the cultural background being still conservative, it is not surprising to see no 
respondents in the co-habit category. On the other hand 2.5% of non-traditional 
marital status suggests the society is changing as well. According to the census 2000 
data of the Korea National Statistical Office (KNSO), 50% of the population are 
married, 23% are single, 1.8% are divorced and the rest take other alternative marital 
status such as separated or co-habiting. The over-representation of the single group 
was expected given the survey sample focused on the internet users only 113 and 
covering from the age 13 instead of the KNSO census's 15 and above. 
Regarding income levels (IncO, Incl and Inc2), we set the middle range 
incomers (Incl) around the average personal income of 3 million won per month 
suggested by the census 2000 data of the KNSO. A small proportion of 4.8% 
indicated the income category below 2 million won per month. The majority (66.2%) 
was in the category between 2 million -4 million won per month while 29% 
indicated their income above 4 million won per month. 
113 The Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC) 2000 report on internet users indicates a 
higher proportion of singles in the internet user profile. 
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The housing type dummy (Hsel) shows 61.1 % of the respondents own their 
housing outright, which closely reflects the KNSO data (61.87%) as of 1999. The 
residential area dummy indicates (Areal) the 61.6% of the sample is drawn from the 
Seoul and Kyungki metropolitan area. This figure is higher than the KNSO data of 
46.7% as of 2001 end based on the district registrar. This can only be explained by 
the metropolitan population's more favourable attitude towards online surveys since 
the survey forms were sent out to each province in proportion. 
Most respondents had received recommendation (Rc) of internet banking 
(78.6%) and a high proportion (62.6%), responded as current internet banking users 
(IB). 114 Almost half (47.6%) of non-users (NUs) consider security reasons (risk- 
aversion)' 15 as one of the main obstacles in using internet banking and the second 
common reason not to use internet banking was because they feel happy with the 
existing banking services (37.4%, inertia). Feeling safe with the old technology once 
again supports the idea of inertia. However, 85.0% of NUs replied that they would 
use internet banking in the future (Uplan) and consider the following criteria in order 
of priority: I/ reputation of the bank, 2/ lower fees, and 3/user friendly web page. 
In terms of banking behaviour, the over-the-counter tellers at bank branches 
(Otcfr) were visited 2.582 times per month on average whilst banks websites (Ibfr) 
are visited 5.548 times per month on average. This suggests any regular internet 
users would visit respective bank websites 1.3 times per week. On the other hand, 
114 Pilot test showed most customers are internet banking with their cuff ent banks. This suggests that 
switching banks for better internet banking services rarely happens and consumer inertia exists 
115 Appropriate regulation and technology can prevent IBUs from exposing themselves to risks. 
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17.1% of the internet banking users are banking with the first mover bank (Bkl) 
while 40.2 % of the users are banking with the largest bank (M). 
3.5.2 Logit Result (Pr(y, = 1)) 
Table 3.12 looks at probability of having adopted IB and provides the results of logit 
estimation with the marginal effects. Regarding the proposition I in static 
framework, most demographic variables are insignificant whilst the age dummy for 
the young group (Age]), exposure to internet banking (Rc) and banking behaviour 
(Ibfr) are significant. The answer as to why demographic variables do not appear as 
significant as expected, is that the Korean society has a somewhat unique attitude 
towards new technology. We should probably borrow the imitation concept from 
sociology (Tarde, 1890) for the insignificant results. It draws attention to the 
importance of social structural characteristics, which might influence the amount 
and/or rate of adoption as well as any potential advantage for some segments of the 
social system in adopting the innovation. We believe this is an important aspect to 
investigate further, not only for diffusion among consumers but also among firms as 
the social structure can determine level of welfare increase with the innovation. 
For age variables, it strongly indicates the reference group of 45 years old or 
more is more likely to adopt IB than younger generations between ages 13-24. The 
age group between 13-24 (Age]) appears to adopt IB significantly less than those in 
the age group 45 or above (Age3) as banking activities grow larger and more 
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complex as people become older. 116 Its marginal effect suggests that those who 
belong to the age group of 13-24 would have the probability of IB adoption lowered 
by . 439 compared to the reference group. The middle age group 
between 25-44 also 
indicates less likely to adopt IB than those above 45 years old, although it is not 
significant. This contradicts the proposition 1.2 and suggests that the age effect on 
internet banking adoption cannot be assessed solely on tech-savvy grounds but 
should also consider active banking age groups as banking activities grow larger and 
more complex as people become older. 
We find evidence that those who have received a recommendation of internet 
banking and make frequent visits to banks' websites are more likely to adopt internet 
banking. This result confirms proposition 1.8 and 1.11. These two propositions are 
related to the epidemic theory of diffusion. More exposure to risk of adoption, i. e. 
information and advertisement on internet banking, creates higher probability of 
diffusion. 
Most demographic variables are insignificant with the exception of young age 
group dummy (Age]) but given the join significance test, the signs of the coefficients 
are noteworthy: Females are marginally more likely to adopt internet banking than 
males, which disagrees with proposition 1.1. However, given the insignificance, it is 
not right to draw any firm inference. Older generations are more likely to adopt 
internet banking unlike our initial expectation. The age effect should be seen in the 
116 The omitted group for age dummies is 45 years old or more (Age3), for marital status dummies is 
the group for divorced, separated or co-habit (Maro), for personal income dummies is high incomers 
group (Inc2) of 4 million won per month or above. 
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industry specific context since younger generations' banking activity is relatively 
limited than that of older ones' despite their tech-savvy behaviour and willingness to 
adopt new technologies. 
People with higher education (Edu) are less likely to adopt internet banking 
than those with less education, which indicates the cautious behaviour toward 
internet banking. The result on marital status (Mar) agrees with proposition 1.4. 
Those with alternative marital status rather than single or married are more likely to 
adopt the internet banking. Proposition 1.5 on income level (IncO, Inc], and Inc2) is 
proved to be true where high income group is more likely to adopt internet banking 
than low income group. We can suggest that banking activity tends to increase with 
income level and thus it creates more incentive to adopt internet banking. 
Regarding housing type dummy, the result shows that outright house owners 
are less likely to adopt internet banking as in proposition 1.6. This might be 
explained by the fact that outright ownership would actually reduce the complexity 
of banking. Those who lease the property tend to have more complex financial 
management in order to arrange loans tied in the key money scheme. 117 
The result on the area dummy contradicts proposition 1.7. This can be 
explained by higher incentives to adopt internet banking for those who are in remote 
117 The key money scheme in Korea is a unique mechanism. An owner retains his/her ownership 
rights while the property is leased out to a tenant by a long-term contract. The tenant should put a 
lump-sum deposit in the owners account so that the owner can earn some interest income from the 
deposit. The deposit amount varies depending upon the property market condition but usually 50%- 
90% of the actual property value has to be kept in the owner's bank account for a deposit. 
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provinces as they can save substantial amount of time when bank branches are not 
closely located. 
The proposition on information seeking behaviour (Irinfo) is supported by the 
results as well. The number of visits to OTC (Otcfr) affects the likelihood of IB 
adoption positively although it is marginal and insignificant. 
In summarising the results from the binary static model, traditional 
demographic variables; sex, education, marital status, personal income level, housing 
type and residential area are not significant for the likelihood of IB adoption with the 
exception of the age dummy variable. By contrast, the exposure to the new 
technology (Rc) and banking behaviour (Ibfr) play an important role in IB adoption 
decision. For example, those who received IB recommendation would have the 
probability of IB adoption increased by 0.265 compared to the non-recommended 
group, and each additional visit to banks' websites per month would increase the 
probability of IB adoption by 0.011. 
3.6 Duration Models 
Before we compare the results of static and dynamic specifications, it is essential to 
assess the differences in the results of the respective duration models. The results are 
similar across models. The parametric Weibull model and proportional hazard model 
with Weibull baseline are very similar. The non-parametric baseline model seems to 
detect more significant variables than other models as expected due to the non- 
parametric approach. Since the discrete-time PH model with non-parametric baseline 
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(i. e. semi-parametric) is more appropriate for our data, not to mention the advantage 
of having imposed few restrictions, we choose this as the preferred specification. 
First, the demographic variables tend to be more significant in the duration 
model (dynamic) than in the binary choice model of logit (static). The timing of IB 
adoption by male is significantly different from that by female, whereby males are 
more likely to be early adopters. The age dummy for the group between 25-44 is also 
significant in decreasing the likelihood of early adoption compared to the reference 
group of those above 45. This coincides with Rogers (1995) core group claim. Those 
who are 45 or above are more likely to be early adopters as opposed to other age 
groups and also the male group is more likely to be early adopters than the female 
group. The core of banking network in Korea tends to be middle aged or above male 
since they are the ones who make key financial decisions for the household. 
Although insignificant, education affects IB adoption negatively both in logit 
and duration models. In Table 3.14, the Weibull model suggests the predicted time of 
adoption for males is 3.245 month earlier than females at the mean or according to 
the non-parametric baseline model, the probability of adoption at each discrete time 
interval increases by 0.01 for males. Regarding the age dummies, the non-parametric 
baseline model suggests that the age group between 25-44 lowers the probability to 
adopt IB in each discrete time interval by 0.013. On the other hand, marital status 
dummies become more significant with the same negative effects. Singles or married 
people are less likely to be early adopters than either divorced or separated people. 
For instance, the probability of IB adoption for singles is lower by 0.02 and that for 
married people is lower by 0.017 than the reference group of divorced or separated at 
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each discrete time interval. However, personal income dummies remain insignificant 
in the duration models. 
Second, it is worth noting that recommendation of 1B affects the likelihood of 
early adoption negatively. Perhaps early adopters are opinion leaders who act on 
their own initiatives rather than being persuaded by bank's recommendation. 
However, information-seeking behaviour remains as a positive impact on the 
likelihood of early adoption. 
Finally, the results on general banking behaviour are substantially different 
than those from the logit specification. It is strongly suggested that those with less 
frequent visits to banks' branches and frequent visits to banks' websites are more 
likely to be early adopters. The Weibull model shows that each additional visit to 
banks' website per month makes the 113 adoption earlier by 0.18 6 month or 5.5 8 days 
while the non-parametric baseline model indicates 0.001 increase in probability for a 
discrete time interval, i. e. a month. The latter marginal effect might appear to be very 
small but it is equivalent to 2.16% increase in probability of adoption at the mean 
probability, which is 0.023. 
All in all, we can conclude that proposition 2 is strongly supported by the 
above results and say that the determinants of IB adoption timing (dynamic) differ 
from those of IB adoption probability (static). 
In order to detect order effects, whether the first mover (bank) in internet 
banking actually captures early adopters and improves the bank's market position 
(market share), a dummy variable of the first mover, Chohung Bank (Bkl) was 
included. For rank effects, a dummy variable of the largest bank in commercial 
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banking, Kookmin Bank (M) was added! 18 All three duration models show more 
or less similar results on these dununies. ' 19 The coefficient of order effect dummy is 
negligible and not significant whilst that of the rank effect dummy is not only large 
but also significant. In other words, customers of the largest bank tend to adopt 
earlier than those of smaller banks while customers of the first mover bank are not 
particularly early adopters. 
The discrete duration models suggest that those who are banking with the 
largest bank (M) increase their probability of IB adoption by 0.007 compared 
others at mean for the discrete interval as shown in Table 3.14. This confirms 
proposition 3 and 4 and suggests that consumers tend to value the size of bank's asset 
size, i. e. banks' network size measured in market share more than the first mover 
advantage in the timing of adoption decision. 
Having said that early adopters are opinion leaders, the largest bank's market 
share is expected to rise with internet banking due to the network. Figure 3.1 
supports the result, as the market share of the largest bank (M) in internet banking 
is more dominant than in commercial banking while that of the first mover (Bkl) 
remains constant. Although we fail to show order effect, significant rank effects 
provide grounds for banks to take preemptive actions since banks can reinforce their 
market dominance via internet banking. 
118 Kookmin bank (M) has been the largest bank in terms of deposit size since 1995, thus the largest 
bank over the period of analysis. 
119 Narendranathan and Stewart (1993) have a good example of comparing different duration models 
where the results are actually similar. 
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Despite the different duration model specifications, the result on duration 
dependence is identical and confirms the positive duration dependence expected in 
proposition 5. The positive parameter estimate of p in the parametric Weibull model 
suggests a positive duration dependence as p is greater than I (p=1.888). This can be 
easily detected in the proportional hazard model with parametric Weibull baseline, as 
the coefficient of log(time) is positive and significant. The non-parametric baseline 
model also suggests the same positive duration dependence as the coefficients of 
time duration dummies are increasing from more negative numbers to less negative 
numbers. 
3.7 Internet Banking Non-Users (NU) 
Finally, we analyse the characteristics of 1B non-users (NU) regarding their future IB 
adoption and see how they differ from the adoption of the current IB users. Table 
3.15 provides a static comparison of the following three specifications: I/ the 
probability of IB adoption on the full sample (Model 1); 2/ the non-users' probability 
of future IB adoption (Model 2), and 3/ the conditional probability of future IB 
adoption having not adopted (Model 3). The simple logit estimation discussed earlier 
in section 3.5.2 is used as our benchmark specification of Model 1. On the other 
hand, Model 2 characterises the probability of future IB adoption (Uplan) based on a 
simple logit estimation. We estimate Models 2 and 3 on the sub-sample of 147 
individuals who did not adopt IB as of 2001 end. Model 3 is a modification of Model 
2 using a conditional logit estimation for future IB adoption conditioning on current 
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non-adoption. The results from Model 2 and 3 are extremely similar except that the 
conditional logit (Model 3) provides less significant results given the small number 
of observations for non-113 users (NU). One noticeable difference among the three 
models is that age dummies are not significant for non-users' future adoption 
decision and the residential area is now a significant factor. It strongly suggests that 
non-users who reside in the Seoul metropolitan area are more likely to adopt internet 
banking in the future. Again, the epidemic effects can explain this result. The 
variables such as recommendation (Rc) and frequency of visits to bank's website 
(Ibfr) remain as significant for non-users as well. For instance, each additional visit 
to banks' website increases non-users' probability of future adoption by 0.014 at 
mean. 
It is difficult to test the notion of consumer inertia and risk aversion directly 
from the above 3 models. However, it can be deduced indirectly by the fact that the 
reasons not to adopt IB (i. e. delayed IB adoption) are being happy with the existing 
banking methods (inertia) and the concerns over uncertain security (risk-aversion). 
This is where public policy has to intervene to optimise the adoption path of internet 
banking. When consumers face unidentifiable amount of risks associated with 
internet banking such as human errors in inputting data on the web or security 
breakdown on personal information protection, the public policy should intervene to 
reduce the potential welfare loss associated with such inefficient early adoptions. 
We are living in a society increasingly reliant on the internet. However, 
unfortunately the internet is largely unregulated and anyone from anywhere in the 
world can set up shops and offer products and services through the internet. The 
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analyses and the discussion in this chapter only focus on the adoption of internet 
banking but the lessons from the Korean internet banking and the government 
policies regarding internet banking and general technology shed some light to 
research on new industries and markets using internet technology. 
On the other hand, when consumers are delaying their adoption simply due to 
inertia despite the substantial benefits of new technology, the public policy should 
now encourage the adoption to increase the social welfare. Hence, an appropriate 
balance between the above policies is desirable for an optimal technology adoption 
path. 
3.8 Conclusions 
The results presented in this chapter provide strong evidence that a probability of 
internet banking adoption and its duration is affected by individual characteristics. 
The individual characteristics include, demographics, the exposure to the hazard, 
information seeking behaviour and general banking behaviour. Moreover, the 
demographics are less important than banking-specific behaviour for the probability 
of a new banking technology adoption whilst they are equally important in the 
duration models. 
The results also suggest that rank effects of banks have significant impact on 
customers' adoption timing of internet banking whilst order effects of banks are 
negligible. Hence, aggressive expansion in internet banking by dominant banks may 
be justified by the notion of pre-emption. 
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By contrast, duration dependence is a significant factor when a society is 
driven by a social norm, i. e. the adoption of internet banking. The social behaviour of 
East Asian countries is often represented by conformity and imitation based on the 
Confucian tradition. This unique social structure of Korea has driven Koreans to act 
collectively rather then individually and this is why the country is experiencing such 
rapid diff-usion of internet banking across banks as well as consumers. 
In establishing the social norm of internet banking, the Goverment plays a 
significant role by narrowing the socio-economic gaps. Internet banking seems to be 
a national phenomenon in Korea where favourable behaviour towards new 
technology of a country outweighs individual characteristics. This is why we do not 
find significantly different results in the adoption process regarding many of the 
demographic variables. 
Finally, the analysis provides evidence on the possible consumer inertia and 
risk-aversion when a new banking technology is introduced as non-IB users identify 
their reasons to delay the adoption as being happy with the existing banking methods 
(inertia) and the aspects of uncertain security (risk-aversion). 
If the security issue is one of the main concerns for both adopters and non- 
adopters, appropriate public policy and regulation are required to mitigate the 
potential loss of welfare in case of financial accidents on the internet as well as to 
optimise the speed of adoption. 
This chapter focuses on Korean internet banking in particular by drawing 
attention to aspects of social structure concerning education and technology. 
However, given that Korea has the highest IB penetration ratio in the world, we 
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believe the empirical evidence of this study will add some value to those who are 
involved with internet banking in other countries. 
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Appendix 
Figure 3.1 Market Share: Commercial Banking vs. Internet Banking 120 
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Figure 3.5 Fully non-parametric estimate (Kaplan-Meier) 
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Figure 3.7 Predicted duration to IB adoption (Weibull) 
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Figure 3.9 Non-parametric cumulative hazard estimate 
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Figure 3.11 Internet Banking Users in Major Countries 
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Table 3.7 Sampling Area for Email Addresses 
Province city 
(No. of cities included) 
Seoul Metropolitan (1) Seoul 
Pusan Metropolitan (2) Pusan, Haewoondae 
Kyungki (23) Ansan, Anyang, Buchon, Dongduchon, Eujongbu, Euwang, 
Inchon, Koonpo, Koyang, Kwachon, Kwangmyung, 
Mikeun, Osan, Paju, Pyungtaek, Shihung, Sungnam, 
Suwon, Yongin, Yongj in, 11san, Icheon, Songtan 
Kangwon (14) Chuncheon, Donghae, Heonggye, Heongsung, Hongchon, 
Jeongsun, Jornunjin, Kangreung, Sarncheok, Sokcho, 
Taebaek, Wonju, Youngwol, Wondang 
Chungbuk(2) Cheongju, Jecheon 
Chungnarn (15) Deajeon, Buyeo, Cheonan, Daecheon, Daesan, Gongju, 
Hongsung, Jochiwon, Kanggyung, Kwangcheon, Nonsan, 
onyang, Seosan, Shintanjin, Sunghwan 
Kyungbuk(II) Daegu, Andong, Dalsung, Hayang, Jeomchon, Koomi, 
Kyungju, Kyungsan, Pohang, Sangju, Youngcheon 
Kyungnarn (18) Changnyung, Changwon, Choongrnoo, Geochang, 
Hamyang, Jangseungpo, Jinhae, Jinju, Kimhae, Kosung, 
Masan, Milyang, Narnhae, Sacheon, Sarncheonpo, Ulju, 
Ulsan, Yangsan 
Jeonbuk(9) Iri, Jeonju, Koori, Kunsan, Jeongju, Narnwon, Kimje, 
Buan, Kochang 
Jeonnam (11) Kwangju, Haenarn, Jangheung, Kangjin, Kwangyang, 
Mokpo, Naju, Sooncheon, Wando, Yeochon, Yeosu 
Jeju (1) Jeju 
Total 11 provinces Total 107 cities 
Table 3.8 Age Proffle Comparison 
Age Group Internet User Profile Survey Sample Profile 
Ages 6-19 38.6% 5.3% 
20's 27.3% 32.5% 
30's 20.7% 36.2% 
40's 10.0% 19.5% 
50's 2.6% 4.5% 
Over 60 0.7% 2.0% 
Total 100% 100% 
Source: KNSO & MIC 2000 (Internet User Age Profile) 
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Table 3.9 Description of Variables 
Variable Type Operational Deflnition 
Demographics 
Sex B/D I= Male; O=Otherwise 
Agel B/D I= if age group 13-24; O=otherwise 
Age2 B/D 1= if age group 2544; O=otherwise 
Age3 B/D I= if age group 45 or above; O=otherwise 
Edu B/D Education (I =university or above; O=otherwise) 
Mars B/D Marital status (I =single, O=otherwise) 
Marm B/D Marital status (I =married, O=otherwise) 
Maro B/D Marital status (I=divorced, separated, co-habit, O=otherwise) 
IncO B/D Personal Income (I= no income, O=otherwise) 
Inc I B/D Personal Income (I=up to 3 million won per month, O=otherwise) 
Inc2 B/D Personal Income (I=more than 3 million won per month, O=otherwise) 
Hsel B/D Housing Type (I= Outright owned; O=otherwise) 
Areal B/D Area of Residence (I= Seoul metropolitan area; O=otherwise) 
Erposure to Internet Banking 
Rc B/D 113 recommended (1= yes; 0= otherwise) 
Awareness of Information 
Irinfo B/D Awareness of interest rate information, information seeking behaviour (1= 
yes; O= otherwise) 
Banking behaviour 
Otcfr C Frequency of visiting bank tellers per month 
lbfr C Frequency of visiting banks' website per month 
Bank dummies: First Mover & Largest Bank 
BkI B/D First mover dummy (I =if use the first mover bank; O= otherwise) 
Bk6 B/D Market leader dummy (1= if use the largest bank; O= otherwise) 
Internet Banking Adoption 
1B B/D IB used (I =yes; O= otherwise) 
Plan to Adopt Internet Banking 
Uplan B/D Plan to use 113 (1= yes; O= otherwise) 
Duration 
Time LID Time of 1B adoption (1= Jan. 98; 2=Feb. 98; ... monthly observation hereafter) 
N. B.: Binary (B), Likert (L), Continuous (C), and Discrete (D) 
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Table 3.10 Questionnaire 
Section Category Question 
(No. of questions) 
1. Demographics Sex, Age, Nationality, Education, Marital status, Type ofjob, 
(10) Personal income, Household income, Type of housing, Area of 
residence 
2. Internet Banking I. Exposure to the internet banking recommendation 
Experience 2. Type of recommendation 
(3) 3. Have they ever used IB before? 
3. User Group (IBU) I. Timing of adoption (month/year) 
(14) 2. Banks dealt with 
3. Main reason for 113 adoption 
4. Frequency of internet banking 
5. Average amount dealt via internet banking 
6. Recently used 113 services 
7. Initial reason for 113 adoption 
8. IB selection criteria 
9. Expected fee savings by IB 
10. Actual fee savings by IB 
11. Cost increase due to IB 
12. Reason for cost increase in adopting 113 
13. Main banking method prior to 113 
14. Location of IB 
4. Non-user Group (NU) I. Reason not to use III 
(4) 2. Do they plan to use? 
3. IB selection criteria if they plan to use IB 
4. Expected fee savings 
5. General banking I. Awareness of interest rate information 
(6) 2. Awareness of banks competitiveness 
3. Banking duration (overall commercial banking) 
4. Frequency of OTC visit 
5. Frequency of visit to banks' homepages 
6. 113 location believed to be ideal 
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Table 3.11 Descriptive Statistics of Data & Inequality Tests for Duration 
Variable Obs Mean SLDev Min Max Log-rank 
Test (Z2) 
Wilcoxon 
Test (Z2) 
Demographics 
Sex 393 . 692 . 462 0 1 17.76 14.08 
(I=Male) (P-value<. 001) (P-value<. 001) 
Edu 393 . 847 . 360 0 1 . 25 . 01 
(I=Univ/College & above) (P-value=. 618) (P-value=. 910) 
Agel 393 . 155 . 363 0 1 . 21 1.80 
(I=Age 13-24) (P-value=. 650) (P-value=. 179) 
Age2 393 . 748 . 434 0 1 3.52 . 50 
(I =Age 25-44) (P-value=. 061) (P-value=. 481) 
Age3 393 . 097 . 296 0 1 9.96 4.61 
(I =Age 45 & above) (P-value=. 002) (P-value=. 032) 
Mars 393 . 445 . 498 0 1 7.28 12.78 
(I=Single) (P-value=. 007) (P-value<. 001) 
Marm 393 . 529 . 500 0 1 4.27 8.38 
(I=Married) (P-value=. 039) (P-value=. 004) 
Maro 393 . 025 . 158 0 1 5.28 3.86 
(I=Divorced/separated, ete. ) (P-value=. 022) (P-value--. 050) 
IncO 393 . 048 . 215 0 
1 1.05 2.21 
(I=No income) (P-value=. 306) (P-value=. 13 8) 
Incl 393 . 662 . 
474 0 1 8.78 12.00 
(1=<3mnKRWp. m. ) (P-value=. 003) (P-value<. 001) 
lnc2 393 . 290 . 454 0 
1 7.41 9.57 
(1= > than 3mn KRW p. m. ) (P-value=. 007) (P-value=. 002) 
Hsel 393 . 611 . 
488 0 1 1.17 1.19 
(I=Outright owned) (P-value=. 279) (P-value=. 275) 
Areal 393 . 616 . 487 
0 1 . 91 1.24 
(1=Seoul metropolitan) (P-value=. 339) (P-value=. 265) 
Exposure to Internet Banking 
Re 393 . 786 . 410 0 1 5.70 
3.68 
(1=113 recommended) (P-value=. 017) (P-value=. 055) 
Awareness of Information 
Irinfo 393 . 351 . 478 0 
1 6.45 5.08 
(1= IR awareness) (P-value=. O 11) (P-value=. 024) 
Banking Behaviour 
Otcfr 393 2.582 3.498 0 30 25.24 24.65 
(Frequency of OTC visits) (P-value=. 032) (P-value=. 038) 
Ibfr 393 5.548 8.108 0 50 73.84 58.04 
(Freq. of bank Web visits) (P-value<. 001) (P-value<. 00 1) 
Bank dummies: First Mover & Largest Bank 
Bkl 246 . 171 . 377 0 1 . 91 . 22 
(I =First mover dummy) (P-value=. 34 1) (P-value=. 638) 
Bk6 246 . 402 . 491 0 1 4.19 6.10 
(I =Market leader dummy) (P-value--. 04 1) (P-value=. 014) 
Internet Banking Adoption 
Ill 393 . 626 . 484 0 1 
Plan to Adopt Internet Banking 
Uplan 147 . 850 . 358 0 1 
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Table 3.12 Logit Estimation of 1B adoption 
Dependent Variable: Logit'21 Marginal Effects 
IB adoption (IB) (F =. 642) 
Sex (=Male) -. 019 (. 268) -. 004 (. 062) 
Edu (=Univ/College or above) -. 419 (. 443) -. 092 (. 092) 
Agel (--13-24) -1.889 (. 625)*** -. 439 (. 124)*** 
Age2 (=25-44) -. 262 (. 431) .. 059 (. 095) 
Age3 ( ý: 45: Reference age group) 
Mars (=Single) -. 1.255 (1.116) -. 286 (. 245) 
Mann (=Married) -1.362 (1.104) -. 301 (. 227) 
Maro (=Others: Reference marital status) 
IncO (--No income) -. 973 (. 633) -. 238 (. 153) 
Incl (< 3mn KRW p. m. ) -. 172 (. 303) -. 039 (. 068) 
Inc2 (ý! 3mn KRW p. m.: Reference income group) 
Hse I (=Outright owned) -. 128 (. 240) -. 029 (. 055) 
Areal (=Seoul metropolitan) -. 202 (. 252) -. 046 (. 057) 
Rc (=IB recommended) 1.105 (. 282)*** . 265 (. 067)*** 
Irinfo (=Interest rate awareness) . 204(. 250) . 047(. 057) 
Otcfr (=Frequency of OTC visits) . 015(. 033) . 004(. 008) Ibfr (=Frequency of bank web visits) . 048 (. 018)*** .0 11 (. 004)*** 
Constant 1.838 (1.270) 
z2 67.11 *** 
Log likelihood -226.25 
Pseudo R2 . 1292 
No. ofobs 122 393 
No. of adoptions 246 
Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
Z-values significant at the Pla, 2.5yo, and]% levels respectively 
Z2 -values signi(Icant at the JY6ý IYa, and 0.1% levels respectively 
121 The logit specification is a point estimate at the time of survey. Thus, the timing of internet 
banking adoption is not considered here. 
122 The Weibull baseline hazard model uses 6260 observations of the expanded panel for 48 monthly 
intervals, whereas the fully non-parametric baseline hazard model excludes the intervals with no event 
of adoption as well as the last duration interval which has only one adoption event, thus only 5610 
observations. 
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Table 3.13 Duration Analysis of IB adoption 
Dependent Variable: 
1B adoption (IB) 
Continuous Time 
Parametric 
WeibuII123 
Discrete Time PH 
model parametric 
Weibull baseline 
Discrete Time 
PH model 
Non-parametric 
baseline 
Sex (=Mate) 1.301 (. 203)* . 263 (. 156)* . 497 (. 164)*** 
Edu (ý! Univ/College) 1.011 (. 256) . 011(. 253) -. 033 (. 255) 
Agel(=13-24) . 821(. 310) -. 197 (. 377) -. 
322 (. 382) 
Age2 (=25-44) -. 807 (. 186) -. 214 (. 230) -. 494 (. 238)** 
Mars (=Single) . 533 (. 205)* -. 628 (. 384)* -. 886 (. 386)** Marm (=Married) . 
640(. 238) -. 446 (. 373) -. 737 (. 377)** 
IncO (=No income) 1.200 (. 532) . 183(. 443) 0.235 (. 449) Inc I (< 3mn KRW p. m. ) . 917(. 152) -. 086 
(. 166) -. 033 (. 168) 
Hse I (=Outright owned) . 
929(. 131) -. 074 (. 141) -. 077 (. 145) 
Areal (=Seoul metropolitan) . 
875(. 124) -. 134 (. 142) -. 132 (. 145) 
Rc (=IB recommended) . 862(. 167) -. 149 (. 194) -. 297 (. 199) Irinfo (=Interest rate awareness) 1.171 (. 164) . 158(. 140) . 229(. 144) 
Otcfr (=Frequency of OTC visits) . 975(. 019) -. 026 (. 019) -. 031(. 020) lbfr (=Frequency of bank web visits) 1.016 (. 007) .0 16 (. 007) ** . 022(. 007)*** 
BkI (=First mover dummy) 1.065 (. 193) . 063(. 181) . 121(. 185) Bk6 (=Market leader dummy) 1.262 (. 171)* . 232 (. 136)* . 291 (. 141)** 
Constant -5.000 (. 598)*** 
Log(time) . 882 (. 107)*** Parameter P 1.888 
Duration Dummies 124 Increasing (-)ve 
numbers in time 
Z2 30.08* 104.03 1783.57*** 
Log likelihood -263.55 -985.29 -846.11 
Pseudo R2 
No. ofobs 123 6260 5610 
No. of adoptions 246 246 245 
Time at risk 6260 
Unobserved N. S. N. S N. S. 
Heterogeneity 
Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
$ Z-values significant at the 5? 16ý 2.5%, and I% levels respectively 
* Z2 -values significant at the 5%, B/a, and 0.1 % levels respectively 
123 The Parametric Weibull estimation shows hazard ratios i. e. if >1, it indicates a positive effect on 
adoption and vice versa. 
124 The coefficients of the duration dummy variables, dI to d48 are non-monotonically increasing 
from a larger negative number to a smaller negative number, which confirms the baseline hazard of 
internet banking adoption is increasing over time. 
125 The Weibull baseline hazard model uses 6260 observations of the expanded panel for 48 monthly 
intervals, whereas the fully non-parametric baseline hazard model excludes the intervals with no event 
of adoption as well as the last duration interval which has only one adoption event, thus only 5610 
observations. 
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Table 3.14 Marginal Effects after the Duration Analysis 
dy/dx Continuous Discrete Time Discrete Time 
Time Duration Duration (Non- 
Duration (Weibull parametric 
(Weibull) Baseline) Baseline) 
y Predicted Time Pr(lbu)'" Pr(lbu) 
ofAdoption 
Mean 22.522 . 031 . 023 
Sex (--Male) -3.245 . 007* . 010*** (2.131) (. 004) (. 003) 
Edu (ý: Univ/College) -. 134 . 000 -. 001 (3.037) (. 008) (. 006) 
Agel(--13-24) 2.457 -. 005 -. 006 
(4.958) (. 010) (. 007) 
Age2 (=25-44) 2.476 -. 007 -. 013** 
(2.636) (. 008) (. 007) 
Mars (=Single) 7.792 -. 019* -. 020** 
(5.279) (. 011) (. 009) 
Marm (=Married) 5.260 -. 014 -. 017* 
(4.509) (. 012) (. 009) 
IncO (=No income) -2.082 . 006 . 006 (4.827) (. 016) (. 013) 
Inc I (< 3mn KRW p. m. ) 1.021 -. 003 -. 001 
(1.965) (. 005) (. 004) 
Hsel (=Outright owned) . 880 -. 002 -. 
002 
(1.678) (. 004) (. 003) 
Areal (=Seoul metropolitan) 1.581 -. 004 -. 003 
(1.695) (. 004) (. 003) 
Re (=IB recommended) 1.728 -. 005 -. 008 
(2.227) (. 007) (. 006) 
Irinfo (=Interest rate awareness) -1.868 . 005 . 005 (1.704) (. 004) (. 004) 
Otcfr (=Frequency of OTC visits) . 305 -. 001 -. 001 (. 242) (. 001) (. 000) 
lbfr (=Frequency of bank web visits) -. 186* . 000 . 001*** (. 096) (. 000) (. 000) 
Bk I (=First mover dummy) -. 741 . 002 . 003 (2.120) (. 006) (. 005) 
Bk6 (=Market leader dummy) -2.744 . 007* . 007** (1.711) (. 004) (. 004) 
Log (time) . 026*** (. 003) 
Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
t**, *** Z-values significant at the Plo, 2.5? 16ý and I% levels respectively 
126 lbu is the dependent variable for the discrete time duration models. This variable is equivalent to 
IB in the continuous time model. 
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Table 3.15 Comparison: Non Users' Future Adoption vs. Overall adoption 
(Model 1) 
Logit 
(Model 2) 
Logit 
(Model 3) 
Conditional 
Logit 
(IB=O) 
Variable: IB adoption Plan to use IB Plan to use III 
(IB) (Uplan) (Uplan) 
Sex (=Male) -. 019 (. 268) . 632(. 677) . 594(. 
757) 
Edu (ý: Univ/College) -. 419 (. 443) . 159 (1.224) 1.364 (2.133) 
Agel(=13-24) -1.889 (. 625)*** 1.799 (1.778) 1.339 (1.285) 
Age2 (=2544) -. 262 (. 431) -. 221 (1.239) -. 357 (2.498) 127 Mars (=Single) -. 1.255 (1.116) 
Marm (=Married) . 1.362 (1.104) -. 759 (. 683) -. 720 (. 682) 
IncO (=No income) -. 973 (. 633) . 582 
(1.183) 
. 
589 (2.049) 
Incl (< 3mn KRW p. m. ) -. 172 (. 303) . 537(. 777) . 
492 (1.235) 
Hse I (=Outright owned) -. 128 (. 240) 1.278 (. 571)** 1.146 (. 568)** 
Areal (=Seoul metropolitan) -. 202 (. 252) -. 420 (. 655) -. 375 (1.084) 
Rc (=IB recommended) 1.105 (. 282)*** . 986 (. 579)* . 930(. 592) Irinfo (=Interest rate awareness) . 204(. 250) -. 378 (. 659) -. 241 (1.018) 
Otcfr (=Frequency of OTC visits) . 015(. 033) . 175(. 142) . 
137(. 125) 
Ibfr (=Frequency of bank web . 048 (. 018)*** . 
227 (. 133)* . 135(. 083) 
visits) 
Constant 1.838 (1.270) -1.666 (1.987) 
z2 67.1 l*** 30.26** 30.10** 
Log likelihood -226.25 46.92 44.62 
Pseudo R2 . 1292 . 2438 . 2522 
No. of obs. 393 147 147 
No. of events 246 125 125 
Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
t**, ***Z-values significant at the 5%, 2.5%, and I% levels respectively 
z2 -values significant at the 5? 16, ]? /a, and 0.1% levels respectively 
127 The variable, Mars was omitted from Model 2 and Model 3 due to hidden collinearity, which arise 
when the independent variables are all dummy variables and/or continuous variables with multiple 
values. 
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Table 3.16 Plan to Use IB (Uplan): Marginal Effects at Mean 
Mean Pr(Uplan) dy/dx 
. 936 
Sex (=Male) . 632 . 041 (. 677) (. 049) 
Edu (ý: Univ/College) . 159 . 143 (1.224) (. 155) 
Agel(=13-24) 1.799 . 085 (1.778) (. 074) 
Age2 (=25-44) -. 221 -. 013 
(1.239) (. 071) 
Mars (=Single) - 
Marm (=Married) -. 759 -. 047 
(. 683) (. 046) 
IncO (=No income) . 582 . 028 (1.183) (. 048) 
Inc I (< 3 mn KRW p. m. ) . 537 . 036 (. 777) (. 057) 
Hsel (=Outright owned) 1.278 . 090* (. 571)** (. 050) 
Areal (=Seoul metropolitan) -. 420 -. 026 
(. 655) (. 038) 
Rc (=IB recommended) . 986 . 
070 
(. 579)* (. 051) 
Irinfo (=Interest rate awareness) -. 378 -. 024 
(. 659) (. 046) 
Otcfr (=Frequency of OTC visits) . 175 . 010 (. 142) (. 009) 
Ibfr (=Frequency of bank web visits) . 227 . 014** (. 133)* (. 006) 
Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
Z-values significant at the 5016,2.5%, and I% levels respectively 
Chapter 4 
Collective Relationship Banking: Private 
Information & Monitoring 
4.1 Introduction 
Having investigated the impact of banking regulation and the new technology 
adoption on the industry structure in the previous chapters, this chapter aims at 
explaining the economic principles underlying the relationship between the real 
sector (non-financiaý and the banking sector. Most literature has focused on either 
the structure of conglomerates (KeiretsulChaeboý in East Asia in explaining the fast 
economic growth (Cho, 1994) or the banking structure for the recent crisis in the 
region (Agenor et al., 1999). Traditionally, the vertical relationship between core 
companies and their subsidiaries in the real sector was believed to be a driving force 
for the economic success in the region. However, the degree of vertical relationship, 
often measured in cross-ownership among group companies, varies according to the 
firms' performance and subsequently affects banking relationships. I argue that 
sharing of private information via cross-ownership provides an important lending 
criterion for the banking relationship. 
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The strong vertical relationship between holding companies and their 
subsidiaries in the real sector (non-financiao was believed to be a driving force for 
the economic success in East Asia (Cho, 1994; Lee et al., 2002). Hence, throughout 
the last few decades, there has been a plethora of literature analysing the structure of 
conglomerates (KeiretsulChaeboo in East Asia in order to explain the fast economic 
growth in the region. Many of the advocates for Asian Tiger style growth claimed the 
rest of the world had much to learn from their economic success. 
However, the recent financial crisis in the region put a question mark against 
the invincible Tigers. Hence, since the turn of the new millennium much emphasis 
has been place on trying to identify what went wrong in the Asian financial system in 
the 1990s. When the regional economy is in good shape, the research focus has been 
on the real sector (non-financiao. However, when the economy started to get in 
trouble, some blamed the financial sector, namely the banking system (Agenor et al. 
1999) whilst others have focussed on the real sector in crisis (Haggard et al. 2003), 
more or less in isolation. However, I argue the real sector and the financial sector 
should not be regarded as two separate fields of investigation. 
The novelty of the chapter lies in linking the structure of the real sector and 
the banking sector using the firms' banking behaviour. This chapter empirically 
investigates the banking relationship whereby banks provide loans to borrowers 
(firms) with heterogeneous vertical relationships. A 'Relationship Banking (RB)', is 
defined as successive long-term contracts between firms and banks. In addition, 
when a group of borrowers with vertical relationship (i. e. cross-owned) have a 
banking relationship with the same principal bank of the respective holding 
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company, we denote it as 'Collective Relationship Banking (CRB). ' By contrast, 
when a subsidiary remains in relationship banking with a bank different from that of 
its holding company's, we call it as 'Independent Banking (INDB). ' 
It is worth noting that both collective relationship banking (CRB) and 
independent banking (INDB) are types of relationship banking (RB) as illustrated in 
Figure 4.1. However, the two types of relationship banking, CRB and INDB, do 
differ in how private information is shared between banks and firms. When the 
subsidiaries are heavily by the group holding companies (Chaebols), they do have an 
advantage of sharing private information at little extra costs as explained in Hart and 
Moore's (1990) transaction costs literature. The transaction costs are commonly 
believed to be lower when transactions are carried out within a firm than through the 
market. We can arguably consider a group of companies networked through holding 
company's vertical ownership structure as a broader definition of a 'firm' and 
anything outside of this cross-owned network as the market. On the other hand, the 
holding companies provide a vehicle for indirect monitoring of the business activities 
of the subsidiaries (Cerasi and Daltung, 2003). These two sub-channels of 
relationship banking (RB) will be the main focus of the analyses. 
Asymmetric private information between lenders and borrowers often creates 
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard as ex ante screening in approving 
loans and ex post monitoring of outstanding loans becomes costly for lenders. Thus, 
one of the main roles of banks is to reduce the information cost for financial 
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intermediation (Diamond, 1991; Boot, 2000) 128 and relationship banking has been 
one way to resolve problems of asymmetric information alongside credit rationing 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). In doing so, relationship banking commonly aims at the 
accumulation of soft information over time (Berger and Udell, 2002). 129 When 
dealing with small firms, which are vulnerable with less transparent information, the 
information gap between insiders and outsiders becomes larger and relationship 
banking can play an important role in narrowing this gap. 
In this context, a strong vertical relationship among borrowing firms, such as 
cross-ownership between a holding company and its subsidiaries, can mitigate the 
incentive problems by reducing the information cost via delegated monitoring 
through holding companies (Cerasi and Daltung, 2003). Moreover, risk 
diversification tied to a holding company is key to the model as the borrower's risk 
diversification can moderate banks' exposure to non-performing loans (NPLs) 
(Diamond, 1984). Collateral or guarantees by diversified holding companies are 
usually considered to be credit-worthier than those provided by their subsidiaries as 
diversified investment portfolios of holding companies allow lower risk to lenders 
(banks). 
In investigating the structure of conglomerates (KeiretsulChaebob to identify 
the engine for growth, we notice the degree of vertical relationship can vary 
depending upon the firms' performance and subsequently may affect their 
12' For the present, the term bank andfinancial intermediary are used synonymously. 
129 Soft information is not usually verifiable and relies on a credit officer's subjective judgement 
whilst hard information is based on more verifiable evidence such as firm's balance sheets, income 
statements, and so on. 
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relationship banks. Figure 4.3 illustrates some group ownerships in subsidiaries that 
fluctuate with no particular pattern over time. The extent of holding companies' 
ownership stake in their subsidiaries has been a strategic decision of the group. The 
asymmetric information sharing structure among (a) holding companies (Chaebols) 
and (b) their subsidiaries 130 often takes the form of vertical relationship via cross- 
ownership and in many cases, an identical bank is used for the group of firms who 
are in the cross-ownership network. Here, the relationship banking is not only a 
single firm-bank specific relation over time but it also appears to be a collective 
relationship banking (CRB) as illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
Research on the banking industry has so far explored the areas, such as 
regulatory regime shifts and monetary policy shocks in explaining the recent 
financial crisis (Agenor et al., 1999). However, I argue that the banking industry 
restructuring cannot be fully explained by these exogenous shocks in the financial 
sector without investigating endogenous changes in the real sector, especially 
changes in vertical relationship among borrowing firms. 
The main aim of linking the vertical relationship structure of the real sector 
and the firms' banking behaviour is to shed some light on the bilateral structure 
between the real and banking sectors. There are advantages and disadvantages of 
relationship banking in the presence of asymmetric information. When firms have 
differentiated incentives and/or disincentives to disclose full information to the banks 
130 These subsidiaries are not necessarily small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) although they are 
usually smaller in asset size terms compared to their respective holding companies. 
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in the process of loan approval, relationship banking provides an alternative channel 
for private information. 
Empirical analysis of the panel data constructed for the top 10 Korean 
holding companies and their subsidiaries between 1994-2002 provides evidence that 
firms with a weak vertical relationship in the real sector are more likely to choose 
collective relationship hanking (CRB) to reinforce the information gap. On the other 
hand, those with a strong vertical relationship can afford to have independent 
banking (INDB) due to the holding companies' indirect monitoring. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 reviews related literature. 
Section 4.3 presents an econometric specification for the choice of collective 
relationship banking. The data are explained in Section 4.4 and the variables used in 
the analyses are described in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 discusses the implications of 
the empirical results. Section 4.7 studies the cases of switching in banking 
relationship. Section 4.8 concludes. 
4.2 Literature Review 
Financial intermediaries arise from the need to overcome the consequences of 
informational asymmetries between lenders and borrowers (Hauswald and Marquez, 
2000). One way to overcome informational asymmetries is to impose strict 
monitoring and screening of borrowers. Diamond (1984), Ramakrishnan and Thakor 
(1984), and Allen (1990) have emphasized the different aspects of monitoring and 
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screening in banking, which essentially advocate the relation-specific nature of 
information sharing in financial intermediation. 131 
Most literature on relationship banking has so far referred to and explained a 
single relation between a firm and a bank with successive long-term contracts 
(Thakor, 2000). However, I argue that relationship banking should not be considered 
as a single dimensional relation especially when different degrees of vertical 
relationship among the borrowers in the real sector influence firms' banking 
behaviour collectively. 
Hence, the notion of relationship banking in this chapter refers to two kinds 
of banking relationships: (a) a successive long-term contracts between a firm and a 
bank as relationship banking (RB) commonly used in the previous literature, and (b) 
a collective long-term relationship between a group of firms and a bank as collective 
relationship banking (CRB). The primary focus of investigation in this chapter is on 
collective relationship banking (CRB) as illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
The deposit market typically takes the form of indefinite contracts without 
much restriction unless the customer specifies time-deposit terms and conditions. On 
the other hand, the loan market commonly takes a series of time-limited contracts 
according to the life of firms' investment Projects. This asymmetric length of deposit 
and loan contracts creates incentives for banks to tie the two markets together by 
131 Financial intermediation refers to all financial institutions including banks. However, financial 
intermediation and banking are often used interchangeably in this chapter. 
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offering loans to those with deposit accounts at the same bank. 132 This chapter 
assumes firms' banking relationship in both deposit and loan markets, although the 
latter is more likely to decide the banking relationship when the two markets are tied 
together. 
The benefits of tied contracts for the banks is (a) to monitor the risks 
indirectly through the firms' deposit account activities and (b) to maintain the banks' 
balance sheet more stable by having both assets and liabilities tied together. Special 
attributes of banks are believed to include having access to private or inside 
information about borrowing firms that is not available to other institutions or 
investors (Farna, 1985), whereby relationship banking has advantages for such 
private information. 
Boot and Thakor (1999) show information differentiation captures the degree 
of specialisation in relationship building. In addition, Hauswald and Marquez (2000) 
claim that there is no reason to assume that banks have equal access to information 
ex ante. Therefore, both of the literature suggest that the banking relationship 
changes in the process of accumulating information. Shin and Kolari (2003) 
investigated the hierarchy of the credit market in Japan and indicated that firms with 
information problems are more likely to carry a higher proportion of relationship 
loans from main banks than non-main banks. 
132 Due to the tied nature between deposit and loan markets, interest rates in these two markets are 
usually determined via mark-down or mark-up from the inter-bank money market rates set by the 
monetary policy. 
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Bank failures during economic downturns seem to arise because banks are 
not always in a position to obtain full information about their borrowers. Moreover, 
the information regarding the competitiveness of respective subsidiaries can be even 
less readily available due to the firm's listing type and often more complex due to the 
industry characteristics. However, the holding companies have the advantage of 
being more directly involved with these subsidiaries via cross-ownership and may 
hence, have superior knowledge of the subsidiaries compared to their banks. 
In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis in Asia, there has been a 
substantial consolidation of the banking sector as shown in Figure 4.2 and Table 4.1 
whereas in the real sector holding companies have been reducing their ownership 
within and across subsidiaries. Here, a question arises if there is any particular 
pattern in the bilateral structure between the real and the financial sectors. On the 
banking side, as Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999) claimed, more competition 
may lead to more screening under asymmetric information because banks compete 
more intensively for the most profitable and creditworthy customers that are now 
more scarce. On the other hand, firms with less favourable prospects now need to 
compete more in searching and negotiating borrowing terms. 
In firm-bank specific relationships, considering firms as buyers (borrowers) 
of loan products at certain prices (loan rates), the bargaining position of the firm 
against the banks regarding the loan products can be enhanced by forming a group of 
firms with strong vertical relationship. Hence, collective relationship banking (CRB) 
is considered to be one way for firms to enhance their market power, whilst 
horizontal mergers are a common solution for banks to raise their market power 
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(Focarelli and Panetta, 2003). Furthermore, collective relationship banking may have 
a positive impact on welfare with strong buyers (borrowers), who may force their 
suppliers (banks) to reduce prices (loan rates) as suggested in Galbraith's (1954) 
countervailing market power. 
The level of direct information disclosure may vary with a firm's true state of 
business and/or the types of the corporate listings. Even if subsidiary firms do not 
have an incentive to disclose information directly, their vertical relationship with 
holding companies can provide information indirectly. In other words, vertical 
relationship measured in cross-ownership offers delegated monitoring for banks, as 
holding companies publish consolidated financial statements. The delegated 
monitoring in this bilateral structure may eventually lead both the real (firms) and the 
banking (banks) sectors into successive oligopoly (Waterson 1984; Salinger 1988; 
Abiru et al. 1998) via the information reinforcing mechanism. 
Regarding the monitoring intensity, Carletti (2004) claims that the multiple- 
bank lending suffers from duplication of effort and sharing of monitoring benefits 
compared to single-bank lending. 133 If we apply the principles of search and 
switching cost theories to banking, borrowing from multiple banks should restore 
competition among banks and consequently improve corporate incentives (Von 
Thadden, 1992; Padilla and Pagano, 1997). On the other hand, Dewatripont and 
Maskin (1995) argue that a relationship bank may refinance unprofitable projects and 
133 Multiple-bank lending when a firm borrows from several banks for a project and single-bank 
lending when a firm borrows from a single bank instead. 
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thus reduce corporate incentives to prevent default. 134 However, the theories 
mentioned above and their predictions are not consistent with the empirical evidence. 
In a more general and legal context, Dixit (2004) claims that relation-based 
governance has the advantage of obtaining private information and therefore, state 
regulation can be supplemented by private sector monitoring. His argument can be 
suitably applied to the case of banking sector, where banks do not have full 
information of the complex and diversified real sector neither do the relevant state 
regulators of banking. Hence, the private monitoring or delegated monitoring 
through relationship banking and/or collective relationship banking can be regarded 
as delegated risk managers in order to supplement the state regulation. 
A large proportion of Japanese and Korean companies are established under 
some sort of vertical relationship with holding companies and their banking 
behaviour has been driven by either (a) collective relationship banking (CRB) or (b) 
independent relationship banking (INDB). 135 However, there has not been any 
research carried out to identify the causes of different channels in banking 
relationships. Hence, I address the issues related to collective relationship banking 
using empirical analysis of firm-level data from Korea. 
134 Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) analyse the case of a single monitoring only with endogenous 
level of monitoring. 
135 Recall both collective relationship banking (CRB) and independent banking QNDB) as used as sub- 
channels of relationship banking (RB). 
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4.3 Econometric Specification 
Traditionally, firms in Korea have maintained long-term relationships with their 
respective banks. Usually, these relationships are dominated by the banking 
behaviour set by the holding company and are expected to establish a collective 
banking relationship with the principal bank appointed by their holding companies. 
However, the evidence of the banking relationship shows collective relationship 
banking is not always the subsidiary firm's choice. For instance, Tables 4.2,4.3, and 
4.5 show an equal split between CRB and INDB. 
An immediate question to follow here is what happens to the banking 
structure when the vertical relationship among their borrowing companies changes. 
In the empirical analysis, I aim to first explain what determines the choice between 
collective relationship banking (CRB) and independent banking (INDB) and to 
discuss the further implications to the banking sector in Korea, which has 
experienced a noticeable consolidation. 
4.3.1 Discrete Binary Choice Model 
The primary objective of the investigation is to characterise the probability of 
collective relationship banking when the borrowing firms have heterogeneous 
vertical relationships. Hence, the probability of collective relationship banking 
P,, =P (y, = 1) is the binary dependent variable and the firm characteristics X, 
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represent the explanatory variables. Therefore, the model takes the following form of 
the most commonly used discrete choice probability: 136 
P,, = P(y,, = 1) = E(y,, = IIX,, ) =F 
(X""6), 
i= 
where y,, =I if collective relationship banking (CRB) 
y, =0 if independent banking (INDB) 
The observed dependent variable is binary, taking the value of one if the individual 
subsidiary chooses collective relationship banking at the time, t, and zero otherwise, 
i. e. independent banking. The sample for the model takes the individual subsidiary 
firms (N = 323) observed over a9 year period (T = 9) as an unbalanced panel of 
NxT (= 2222) with a row vector of K explanatory factors of the subsidiary flims' 
characteristics, X,, . 
The simplest structure ignoring the attributes of panel data is to pool 
observations and treat the sample as a long independent cross section of size NT : 
y=X, 8+e (4.2) 
136 A linear probability model for binary panel data has the same problem as in the cross sectional data 
analysis as it imposes an unnatural restriction on unobserved effects, X,,, 8: 5 a, :ý1- X"'B, t=I, -, T 
as the observation Y,, are bounded between 0 and 1. The probit and logit models are the standard 
normal distribution and the logistic distribution respectively, that overcome the [0,1] boundary 
constraint problem. 
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However, given the panel structure of the data, the following model is used in order 
to reduce the loss of information assuming the observed binary outcome of collective 
relationship banking y,, are independent conditional on X,, and on an unobservable 
individual subsidiary time invariant effect, a,: 
P (y,, =I JX, a, ) =F 
(aj 
+ Xi, ', 8) (4.3) 
Assuming the probability F(-) to be logistic we obtain the following standard logit 
model: 
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P (y,, =I JX, a, ) =F 
(a, 
+ xil , 6) =' =A a, + X,, 
'P) (4.3) 
I+el+x-P 
4.3.2 Random Effects Logit Model 
The main assumption of the random effects logit model with unobserved effects is: 
P (yl =I jX,, a, ) =P (yi, =I IX,,, aj) =A 
(a, 
+ X,, 'fl) (4.4) 
where a, is the unobserved effect and X, contains X,, for all t. In other words, 
P(y,, =IIX,, a, )=P(y,, =IIX,,, a, ) implies that X,, is strictly exogenous 
137 Two most commonly used binary discrete choice models are probit and logit models. However, the 
advantage of using logit model is explained in the random effects logit model section later. 
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conditional on a, and once a, is conditioned on, only X,, appears in the response 
probability at time t. This rules out lagged dependent variables in X, as well as 
certain kinds of explanatory variables whose future movements depend on current 
and past outcomes on y (see Wooldridge, 2002). 138 The second equality is a standard 
logit assumption shown in equation (4.4). 
In addition to assumption (4.4), we assume that the outcomes, y,,,..., YIT , are 
independent conditional on (X,, a, ). 
The random effects logit estimators are not as simple as in probit models 
since integrating the logit response, A 
(a, 
+ X,, ', 6) with respect to the normal density 
yields no simple functional form. However, there is one important advantage of the 
unobserved effects logit model over the probit model. Under the assumptions in 
equation (4.4) and the YJT independence conditional on (X,, a, ), it is possible to 
obtain a -, 
IN- 
-consistent estimator of 8 without any assumption about how a, is 
related to X1 . 
139 By contrast, the probit model assumes the relationship between a, 
and X, has a normal distribution: 
138 This can just end up differencing the model and getting rid of the X, as shown in Arellano and 
Bond (199 1) 
139 Wooldridge (2002) explains in detail how we allow a, and X, to be arbitrarily related to the 
unobserved effects logit models. What he suggests is to find the joint distribution of 
T 
conditional on X,, a, and n, ZI Yi ý(YW*-Iyff)l 
_1 
Y,, and claims that this conditional 
distribution does not depend on a, , so that it is also the distribution of y, given 
X, and n, . Hence, 
we can use standard conditional maximum likelihood methods to estimate, 6. This does not work for 
the probit model. 
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a, I X, - Normal (0, a"2) (4.5) 
which is a strong assumption as it implies that a, and X, are strictly independent 
and that a, has a normal distribution. 
4.3.3 Fixed Effects Logit Model 
No control for unobserved heterogeneity in the above random effects model is of 
concern when untneasured firm characteristics influence both collective relationship 
banking behaviour and firm's ownership structure. Hence, Chamberlain's (1980; 
1984) fixed effects logit model is applied as an alternative procedure using a 
conditional likelihood controlling for unobserved individual firm-sPecific 
heterogeneity. 140 
The conditional maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) is obtained by 
maximising the sum of the conditional log likelihood across i with possible outcomes 
T 
of n, Et=l yt . Then, the log likelihood function is: 
yl,..., y, 7, = yT 
IX,, a, n, = n) 
p (Yll =Y0 -9 YtT = YT 
JXI, a, ) 
(4.6) 
P (n, =n IX,, a, ) 
140 Greene (2003) explains that controlling for unobserved heterogeneity using fixed effects in a 
discrete choice model only works with logit model not with probit model. 
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Chamberlain's model (fixed effects logit) is consistent and efficient when there is 
unobserved individual firm-specific heterogeneity. However, when there is no 
unobserved heterogeneity, his model is inefficient because it does not use all the data 
and the standard random effects logit model is both consistent and efficient (Greene, 
2003). 
The basic idea of Chamberlain's (1980; 1984) model is to look at the changes 
in each individual firm's relationship banking behaviour over time. Therefore, only 
firms that change their relationship banks are included in the model. However, we 
need to note that only an extremely small proportion, 9 out of 323 firms as in Table 
4.2 and 4.3, had actually changed their relationship banks during the sample 
period. 14 1 This lack of variance over time with such small switching in banking 
relationship (SK) does indicate the fixed effects model is not appropriate. Therefore, 
the fixed effects results were chosen not to be reported. In addition, we expect to 
obtain little information from dynamic models which will be discussed later in the 
chapter. 
4.3.4 Population-averaged Logit Model 
Another consistent estimator for fl is to estimate the partial effects of the elements 
of X, on the response probability P (y, =1 jX,, a) at the average of a in the 
141 Switching of banking relationship is denoted as SW in Tables 2&3. 
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population (a =0). Then, the response probabilities are specified conditional only 
on X, and we have the following for all t: 
P(Y,, =IIX,, )=P(Y"=Ilxi), vt (4.7) 
This is called a population-average model and useful when we are interested in 
averaging across the distribution of a,. This is also often known as generalised 
estimating equations (GEE) model or GEE population-averaged model. 
Given the lack of variance in banking relationship over time, this population 
averaged logit model appears more appropriate than the fixed effects logit model. 
4.3.5 Complementary Log-log Population-average Model 
An alternative model to the above GEE population-averaged model is a 
complementary log-log population-averaged model. Complementary log-log models 
are often used when the probability of an event is very small or very large. This is 
because the model can fit an asymmetric sigmoid function to the probability between 
0 and I unlike the logit or probit models, which are symmetric. 
Therefore, if the sample data has more or less an equal probability of an 
event, i. e. collective relationship banking, we do not expect to see much difference 
between the results from GEE population averaged logit model and complementary 
log-log population-averaged model. There is a clear advantage of the latter being less 
restricted model. It would be worth checking whether the results from these two 
models differ. The log likelihood function for this model is: 
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ln(L) = 
ýý[w, 
In Ft1A ß»] (4.8) (Xi, ß) + (1 - w, ) In 
(1 
-F 
(X, 
where F (-) =I- exp (- exp (-)) 
As in GEE population-averaged model, the probability function for each firm 
is also P (yi, =1 IXu) =P (yu =I JXI), Vt while w, denotes optional weights. 
4.3.6 Dynamic Consideration 
Since the banking behaviour in the panel data is observed in both cross-sectional and 
the time series, the dynamic processes of the collective relationship banking raises an 
interest for research. 142 
As mentioned above in the fixed effects logit model, a significant proportion 
of the firms in the sample remain with the same relationship bank over the sample 
period of 1994-2002. Table 4.2 and 4.3 summarise the banking relationship by group 
holding companies and by industries, indicating 314 out of 323 firms remain with the 
same relationship bank. This naturally leads to an investigation of state dependence 
and/or persistence of banking relationship in the dynamic framework. However, the 
lack of variance in choice of banking relationship over time, T suggests that the 
dynamic model has little information to add, especially when relationship banking by 
142 There are many examples of economic persistence including labour force participation (Heckman 
and Willis, 1977); firm import and export decisions (Roberts and Tybout, 1997); the external debt 
crisis in developing countries (Hajivassiliou and McFadden, 1998); and the state dependence in 
unemployment (Arulampalam, 2002). 
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definition, means a long-term (persistent) relationship between a firm (borrower) and 
a bank (lender). 
Therefore, the results of dynamic estimation are reported only as a reference 
to how the lagged dependent variable captures all the effects due to the persistence of 
banking relationship. Subsequently, a cross-sectional logit estimation for each year is 
presented to illustrate how insignificant the differences in the estimation results are 
from one year to another. Moreover, a case study for -those firms which switched 
their banking relationship (SUO is presented in a later section. 
4.4 Data 
The data were collected from the corporate archive provided by The Korea 
Information Service (KIS), Inc.. The KIS provides comprehensive and up-to-date 
corporate information on over 310,000 Korean companies, including financial 
statements and ownership structures. The top 10 largest holding companies 
(Chaebols) between 1994 and 2002 were included in the analysis, which comprise 16 
holding companies taking the changes in rankings over time into consideration. The 
16 holding companies were selected based on "The Annual Reports on the Top 35 
Large Holding Companies' Major Banking Activities" published by the Financial 
Supervisory Service (FSS). 143 
143 By the FSS regulation, the top 35 large holding companies in Korea ought to report their main 
annual banking relationship to the FSS. 
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The assets of the companies related to top 10 chaebols represent more than 
30% of the Korean GDP and those related to top 35 chaebols would bring this figure 
up to almost 80%. Although the firm level data are available for all the companies 
related to top 35 chaebols, only the subsidiaries related to the top 10 largest chaebols 
are used in the analysis as they represent a large enough proportion of the Korean 
economy and their group behaviour is often replicated by companies related to 
relatively smaller chaebols. Another advantage of limiting the list of companies to 
the top 10 largest chaebols is to obtain more reliable time series data across the 
subsidiaries as missing data are frequently found for the smaller chaebols and their 
subsidiaries if we extend the list to top 35 chaebols. 
Having discarded incomplete sample observations, an unbalanced panel was 
constructed from 323 subsidiaries of the above 16 holding companies for the 9 year 
period and are used in the analysis. 144 
Looking across the columns of Table 4.2, one can notice that holding 
companies with larger number of subsidiaries tend to be larger in the aggregate sense 
(e. g. the correlation coefficient of 0.898 between number of subsidiaries and the total 
asset size of a holding company). Another interesting observation is the size 
distribution of the subsidiaries. The subsidiaries of the larger holding companies are 
relatively large in average asset size too (e. g. the correlation coefficient of 0.458 
between the average asset size of a subsidiary and the total asset size of a holding 
144 The Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) and the POSCO Co. LTD. (POSCO) are not 
included in the sample as they were initially established as state-owned companies for electricity 
generation and steel manufacturing respectively. 
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company). In other words, larger holding companies seem to diversify their business 
portfolio across subsidiaries which are also relatively large compared to those 
belonging to smaller holding companies. 
In Table 4.2, we notice that some groups have more subsidiaries adopting 
collective relationship banking (e. g. Hanhwa, Hanjin, and Samsung) whereas other 
groups have more subsidiaries adopting independent relationship banking (e. g. 
Daewoo, Doosan, Kohap, LG, and SK). However, it is not obvious what determines 
these group specific effects. An immediate proposition could have been the group 
size effect, i. e. the larger the group is, their subsidiaries are more likely to adopt 
collective relationship banking to benefit from economies of scale. However, there is 
no clear correlation between the size of the holding company's aggregate assets and 
the proportion of the collective relationship banking per group (correlation 
coefficient of -0.031 between the total asset size of the holding co. and the CRB 
proportion in Table 4.2). 
The 9 year period between 1994 and 2002 is long enough to cover most 
business cycles. 145 Furthermore, the sample period has the benefit of stretching over 
pre- and post-financial crisis. 
The 323 subsidiaries in the data operate their business across 13 different 
industries as listed in Table 4.3 according to the KSIC's (Standard Industrial 
145 Most business cycles in Korea fluctuate between 5 to 10 years given the 5 year strategic industrial 
and technology policies and the long-term economic cycle per decade. 
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Classification) main industry classification. 146 Subsidiary firms are widely spread 
over the 13 industries but one of the most significant industries is manufacturing 
(IND2) with 10 1 firms (31.3% of 323 companies) followed by business and research 
support and service (IND 11) with 56 firms (17.3% of 323 companies). Nearly half of 
the firms used in the analysis are accounted for by these two industries. 
The next three significant industries are: retail and wholesale (IND5); 
transportation (IND7), and financial services and insurance (IND9) with each one 
representing roughly 10% of the firms included. Regarding financial services, it is 
worth noting that the Korean holding companies do not own group banks as their 
own subsidiaries unlike in the Japanese Keiretsu system. 147 Although the banking 
ownership has been liberalised in Korea so that foreign investors can become 
shareholders of the Korean banks, the large holding companies (chaebols)' stake in 
the domestic commercial banks used to be regulated and appears still insignificant. 
4.5 Variables 
The dependent variable of collective relationship banking (CRB) and the following 
explanatory variables are included in the static binary choice models as listed in 
Table 4.4: 1/ ma or shareholding by the group company (09, W); 2/ net income to i 
asset ratio (NIAR); 3/ age of the company (AGE); 4/ industry dummies (IND] to 
IND13), which reflect individual firm characteristics and its industry environment; 51 
146 The KSIC code is similar to the 5-digit SIC Code in the US. The industry dummy here refers to the 
first digit main section classification. 
147 In Japan, Keiretsus often has their own designated banks within the group, which makes the 
relationship banking further reinforced by the group interest. 
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holding company group dummies (G] to G16), and 6/ firm creation dummy(TM 
which indicates whether the firm is created as a result of take-over or mergers. 
The above explanatory variables are chosen because they are the most 
representative assessment measures for the credit ratings in Korea. A typical credit 
scoring exercise by lenders (banks) include: I/ repayment ability and quality of 
collateral and guarantees (reflected in OWN and GI-GI6 group dummies); 2/ firms 
profitability (reflected in NLIR); 3/ firm's general reputation (business survival in 
terms ofAGE), and 4/ overall business prospects (reflected in INDI-IND13 industry 
dummies and the firm creation dummy M). The respective proxy variables, as 
shown in the parentheses, are used in the analyses. 
The dependent variable, collective relationship banking (CRB), indicates 
whether the firm has a banking relationship with the same principal bank that deals 
with its holding company as illustrated in Figure 4.1. Firms show no particular 
preferences either way and it appears that the firm's choice on relationship banking is 
equally split between collective relationship banking (CRB) and independent banking 
(INDB). 
The vertical ownership structure (09/7V), we measure the ma or shareholding i 
in subsidiaries by the respective group companies in aggregate. It is natural for 
holding companies to increase or decrease its stake in the respective subsidiaries 
depending upon: (a) their strategic potential for the holding company group, i. e. how 
complementary it is to the overall group's business, and (b) future business 
prospects. Hence, the holding company's involvement in the respective subsidiaries 
via vertical ownership is a good indicator for the positive business potential. As 
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mentioned in the earlier sections, the vertical ownership structure naturally creates an 
indirect monitoring of the subsidiaries' business since they share the private 
information through in-house vertical contracts of buying and selling as well as the 
hard information in the consolidated financial accounts. 
As a performance indicator of each subsidiary, net income to asset ratios 
(NIAR) was used. They vary drastically from -479.26 to 372.46 over the period 
before and after the financial crisis in Asia. The age of the firms since establishment 
was included in the analysis to capture the effect of long-term reputation. Although 
the average age of the firms included is about 18 years old, the analysis covers those 
from 0 year old for newly start-up companies to 71 years old for well-established 
ones with substantial business history as shown in Table 4.5. 
Firms are widely distributed across 13 different industries. However, the 
mining (INDI) and other public and private repair services (IND13) industries have 
only one firm each in the data. Hence, the models with industry dummies exclude 
these two industries whilst the largest industry group, manufacturing (IND2) is used 
as a reference group. Dis-aggregating manufacturing (IND2) into the next level 
(second digit) of the KSIC code could have been an alternative idea but due to the 
limited observation size in the other industries, the industry dummy has been kept at 
the first digit level. 
Given the nature of sample data construction, firms are also widely 
distributed across 16 different chaebol groups as shown in Table 4.2 and 4.5. Since 
Samsung group (G14) is the largest group by far with 60 subsidiaries it is used as a 
reference group in the analysis with group dummy variables. Some groups have a 
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relatively smaller number of subsidiaries such as Hyundai Oil (G10), Kohap (G] I), 
and Dongah (G3) but all 16 groups are included in the analysis. 
The firm creation dummy variable TM is included as we expect to see some 
differences in the choice of relationship banking (CRB vs. INDB) between finns 
created as a result of take-overs or mergers (TM and those truly created as new 
finns, given the persistence of banking relationship. For instance, those taken over or 
merged into a new holding company may have independent banking as they remain 
with the previous relationship bank that is not necessarily the same as its new 
holding company's principal relationship bank. About 31% of the companies in the 
sample are established as a result of take-overs or mergers and acquisitions. 
4.6 Empirical Results 
Following the structure of the models discussed in the previous section, first we 
consider the standard binary choice models of collective relationship banking (CRB) 
without any industry or group dummy variables. The three models of binary choice 
presented in Table 4.6 are: I/random effects; 2/population averaged average, and 
3/complementary log-log population averaged, taking individual firm characteristics 
as independent variables. Due to the limited number of switching in banking 
relationship, fixed effects model is not presented in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6 presents the initial results of the three binary choice models without 
considering any dummy variables of industry (IND), group (G), and the firm creation 
via take-overs and mergers (TM. The models including these dummy variables are 
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discussed later. One of the most noticeable results across the Table 4.6 is the 
significant negative effect of holding company's ownership (OWN). 148 Subsidiaries 
with a relatively small holding company's ownership stake appear more likely to 
establish collective relationship banking (CRB). This result can be explained in two 
ways. 
First, assuming all other conditions are equal for subsidiary firms, collective 
relationship banking provides incentives to both borrowing firms as well as lending 
banks as the performance of these firms can be indirectly monitored by group 
companies, principally by the main holding company. 
Second, those with larger holding company stake informs the public that they 
are strategically important to the holding company either at present or in the future 
for the business interest of the group as a whole. Given this information about 
subsidiaries' strategic importance within the holding company's network, these firms 
have outside options for their loans other than collective relationship banking (CRB) 
since they often find more favourable borrowing terms from an independent bank 
who is looking for credit-worthy customers. In other words, it is not necessary for 
them to stick to the collective relationship banking (CRB) for bargaining loans but 
they can look for more competitive loans offered from independent banks, which are 
not in a long-term relationship with their respective holding companies. 
However, one could argue that the strategically better positioned firms within 
the group can also get a competitive deal from collective relationship banking. Then, 
148 Marginal effects at the mean are presented in Table 4.7. 
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the question is which argument is more dominant in the context. Certainly the results 
suggest that the problem of firms with less interest of holding companies' having 
limited outside options for loans and relying on an indirect monitoring via holding 
companies and therefore tagging themselves on to the existing holding companies' 
banking relationship is outweighing the strategically favourable firms' loan 
reinforcement via collective relationship banking. In other words, indirect monitoring 
via holding companies, when firms and banks share private information, plays an 
important role in subsidiaries' decision on banking relationship. 
One could also argue that strategic interests measured by the holding 
companies' vertical ownership levels represent subsidiary firms' actual performance 
at present. However, the data show no significant evidence of this argument as the 
correlation coefficient between the holding companies' ownership level in their 
subsidiaries (OWN) and the performance of their subsidiaries measured by net 
income to asset ratios (NMR) is only 0.0 159. Hence, the chapter adopts the notion of 
strategic interests of holding companies as a separate concept irrespective of the 
subsidiary firms' performance. 
As for subsidiary firms' performance, profitable subsidiaries are more likely 
to bank collectively with the holding companies. In general, lenders, banks in this 
case, provide less favourable loan terms. For instance, higher loan rates are offered 
towards borrowers with risky assets to offset their potential loss in non-accrual 
interest payments and the loan provisions in case of default. Profitable firms can 
search for the best loan contracts offered in the market. However, the reason why 
they appear to choose collective relationship banking is that banks often ask for 
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secured assets as collaterals or third party guarantees and these can be more easily 
arranged when both a holding company and its subsidiaries deal with the same bank. 
Subsidiaries' age appears to be positively associated with the collective 
relationship banking (CRB). Those managing to remain in business for long without 
exiting the market show their ability to run the business appropriately. Hence, the 
firms with the reputation of being resilient over time tend to choose collective 
relationship banking. This may be solely due to the signal of long run quality 
perceived as better or simply because of the convenience in dealing with the same 
bank since subsidiaries naturally learn the business practice set by the holding 
companies over time. Then, an immediate question arises as to why this desirable 
quality of the firm's long run survival does not provide outside options of 
independent banking (INDB). Perhaps, the notion of persistence in banking 
relationship would answer the question as it appears that the persistent firms, 
irrespective of whether strategically important to the holding group or not, appear to 
opt for a collective relationship banking. In this context, one should also make a clear 
distinction between qualities perceived via its survival in the business, i. e. AGE, 
which and via its strategic position within the holding group, i. e. OWN. The former is 
associated with the persistence whilst the latter reflects the strategic importance 
within the holding group. One may argue for the reverse causality whereby collective 
relationship banking enhances the survival of subsidiaries on average. It is plausible 
but there is no clear evidence for the argument as we do observe firms in collective 
relationship banking do go bankrupt or exit the market eventually. 
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Table 4.7 shows marginal effects at the mean after a logit estimation. 
Considering the probability of collective banking choice being more or less 50% as 
shown in Tables 4.2,4.3 and 4.5, the predicted Y at the mean around 0.49 suggests 
population averaged logit and complementary log-log population averaged models 
are more appropriate for the data than random effects model. The marginal effects 
look relatively larger in the logit model but we consider the results from the 
population averaged logit and the complementary log-log population averaged model 
as more reliable given the poor predictability of random effects logit. We also notice 
that the marginal effects are generally very small which can be explained by the 
small size coefficients. 
Having investigated the collective relationship banking in general without 
any dummy variables, the firm creation dummy for takeovers and mergers (TAI) is 
included in the analysis and the results are presented in Table 4.8. The coefficient 
signs for the three main explanatory variables do remain the same and significant. 
Moreover, the coefficient of firm creation dummy (TAI) is negative and statistically 
significant at 1% level. This result suggests that the firms became a subsidiary of the 
group via takeovers or mergers tend to be in independent banking as they may have 
remained with the relationship banking prior to becoming a group subsidiary. This 
makes us question the persistence in banking relationship. We discuss the persistence 
related results later in this section. Table 4.9 shows the marginal effects after the 
logit estimation with the firm creation dummy. 
The industry dummy variables (IND]-IND13) and the firm creation dummy 
for take-overs and mergers (TAI) are included in the analysis to detect industry 
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specific effect of collective banking behaviour and the results are presented in Table 
4.10. As we have only one observation each in the mining industry (IND]) and the 
other public and private repair services (IND13), these two observations in IND] and 
IND13 are dropped and the most representative industry of manufacturing (IND2) 
with over 30% of the firms in the sample, is used as a reference group. Since we have 
set the manufacturing sector as a reference group, the results on industry dummies 
should be interpreted in relation to the banking behaviour of the manufacturing 
sector. We also need to note that industry dummy variables are time invariant for the 
period of investigation. Therefore, only the population averaged models are 
presented in Table 4.10. 
The coefficients on utilities (IND3) and sports and entertainment (IND12) 
show most significantly different from that of manufacturing (IND2). The results 
suggest that subsidiaries in these two industries are less likely to choose collective 
relationship banking than those in manufacturing. One can explain the reason why 
these industries differ from manufacturing or any other industries is that they are the 
industries related to the holding company not because of the natural core business 
link but because of the holding company' diversification. Obviously, those industries 
linked to the core business of manufacturing and sales of goods produced, would 
easily set up their relationship banking as the respective holding company does. 
Although the coefficient of financial services and insurance (IND9) is 
insignificant in the population-averaged logit, it is significant in the complementary 
log-log population-averaged model with the take-overs and mergers (TM dummy 
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variable. 149 The marginal effect of financial services and insurance (IND9) in Table 
4.11 after the estimation of complementary log-log population-averaged model also 
shows significant. Otherwise, the results on individual subsidiary characteristics after 
including industry dummies are largely similar to what we saw in the previous 
models without the dummies. The rest of the industry dummies show no significant 
influence on the choice of collective relationship banking although most of them are 
marginally in the negative side, i. e. less likely to be in collective relationship banking 
compared to those firms in the manufacturing sector. 
Another important point to make regarding Table 4.10 is the significant 
impact of firm creation dummy (TM on the probability of collective relationship 
banking (CRB). Firms created via take-overs and mergers are less likely to have 
collective relationship banking since their previous banking relationships persist as 
discussed above for Table 4.8. 
In the estimation with group dummy variables presented in Table 4.12, we 
find several significant coefficients. As in the estimation with industry dummies, the 
signs for three main explanatory variables, OWN, NIAR, and AGE, have not changed 
and they all remain significant. One immediate observation to make is that those 
significant group dummy variables have all negative signs. In other words, 
subsidiaries of these groups are less likely to adopt collective banking compared to 
those of Samsung group (G14). We could have expected this kind of result just by 
looking at Table 4.2 as Samsung group obviously stands out with 40 subsidiaries in 
149 We do not consider a model with both industry dummies QND2-INDI2) and group dummies (GI- 
G16) since the estimation did not achieve convergence. 
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collective relationship banking (CRB) as opposed to 18 subsidiaries in independent 
banking (INDB). Perhaps, the effect of free-riding on group's reputation is more 
significant with Samsung (G14) as the subsidiaries can largely benefit from 
collective relationship banking as the group reputation is extremely high. On the 
other hand, the groups less likely to induce collective relationship banking compared 
to the reference group, are Daewoo (G2), Dongah (G3), Doosan (G4), Hyundai 
Motor (G9), Kumho (G12), LG (G13), and SK (G15). These groups seem to prefer 
full control over their subsidiaries allowing them to seek independent banking where 
it is possible. We also find the dummy variable of the firm creation via take-overs 
and mergers (TM remain significant in Table 4.12. 
As discussed earlier for the fixed effects model specification, firms seldom 
change their relationship banks whether it is collective (CRB) or independent 
(INDB). This strongly indicates that the banking relationship has persistence, i. e. 
state dependence in nature. Therefore, the three base models presented in Table 4.6 
were extended to test the persistence of relationship banking by including the lagged 
dependent variable (CRBI-1) and the results are presented in Table 4.13. 
Although the lagged dependent variable of collective relationship banking is 
considered for the dynamic model, the results are reported only as a reference in the 
chapter since the lagged dependent variable captures most effects due to the 
persistence in the banking relationship as indicated. In other words, there is little 
dynamic change in the banking relationship. Therefore, we focus on the variants of 
standard logit models and complementary log-log models, i. e. population averaged 
models without the lagged dependent variable (CRBI. 1). 
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The results shown in Table 4.13 suggest that the choice of collective 
relationship banking is explained mostly by the lagged dependent variable of 
collective relationship banking, i. e. the state dependence exists. Finns are more likely 
to remain in the same banking relationship over time once they choose either 
collective relationship banking (CRB) or independent banking (INDB). 
Although the dynamic consideration does not add much information as it is 
already clear that there is strong persistence in banking relationship with only 9 
companies that switched the banking relationship. Nonetheless, this result from 
dynamic consideration reaffirms the importance of long-run banking relationship for 
information sharing and monitoring as discussed in the previous literature review 
section (see Ramakirshnan and Thakor, 1984; Allen, 1990). The persistence of long- 
term collective banking relationship appears to be driven by the accumulation of 
private information as credit ratings for bank loans are cumulative with which long- 
tenn customers are offered preferential loan rates. It is also important to note that all 
other variables are now insignificant as the persistence variable captures all effects. 
In order to test the robustness of the results in Table 4.13, a cross-sectional 
logit estimation was conducted for each year and the results are shown in Table 4.14. 
There are marginal changes in coefficients and their significance over time. 
However, generally the signs of each coefficient remain the same except for the net 
income to asset ratio (NIAR) of which the significant coefficients coincide with the 
results from logit estimation of the panel shown in Table 4.6. This robustness test 
reaffirms no significant dynamic fluctuation but a strong persistence in relationship 
banking instead. 
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Although the results from different estimation models emphasise rather 
different aspects of banking relationship, they can be summarised into the following 
representative arguments. 
First, the level of holding companies' vertical ownership interests (OWN) in 
subsidiaries affects the respective subsidiaries' choice between collective 
relationship banking (CRB) and independent banking (INDB). Those with relatively 
smaller stake of holding companies are more likely to choose collective relationship 
banking to benefit from the group bargaining and indirect monitoring given the lack 
of outside options. 
Second, the profitability of firms (NIAR) is positively associated with the 
choice of collective relationship banking (CRB) as they are one of the most 
commonly used criteria for loan approval. 
Third, the age of firm (AGE) is also positively associated with the choice of 
collective relationship banking indicating that the reputation of firms' survival and/or 
resilience matters for collective relationship banking (CRB). 
Fourth, the industry where firms belong to has an impact on the firm's choice 
of banking relationship. Industries that are not so closely related to the core business 
of holding companies' manufacturing and sales of products tend to choose 
independent banking (INDB). 
Fifth, the banking relationship is not a subject of static investigation as most 
of the above static consideration appears to be captured by the state dependence. The 
choice of collective relationship banking (CRB) is more likely to be maintained over 
time once the firm establishes a relationship with a bank. 
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Sixth, there are group specific effects (Gl-GI6) on the choice between 
collective banking and independent banking. Some group subsidiaries are more 
likely to choose collective relationship banking (CRB) whilst other group 
subsidiaries to choose independent banking (INDB) 
Finally, the way that a firm is created matters especially when the relationship 
banking remains with the former relationship bank in case of takeovers and mergers. 
4.7 Case Study on Switching Banking Relationship 
Although the number of companies that switched their relationship banking during 
the sample period is extremely small, investigating these 9 companies out of total 
323 companies in the sample as in Table 4.2 and 4.3 appears to be an interesting and 
useful exercise. The previous analyses so far in the chapter, sufficiently explain the 
reasons why subsidiary firms choose collective relationship banking instead of 
independent banking in the static framework. However, the case studies on those 
switched the banking relationship add value in the dynamic sense and suggest future 
research opportunities as switching of banking relationship increases. 
Due to the limited number of companies that switched banking relationship, it 
is impossible to find any appropriate econometric specification to bring out the 
particular characteristics and generalise them. 150 We have already noted from the 
previous sections that neither the fixed effects logit model nor the path dependent 
150 All the econometric specifications are applied to the sub-sample of those 9 companies which 
switched banking relationship. However, none of the results show any significance as expected due to 
the small number of observations. 
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models in the dynamic sense could explain much about the banking behaviour over 
time. Therefore, the following case studies were carried out to detect any 
idiosyncratic characteristics in the firms that switched banking relationship. 
However, one should look at these studies as only individual firm specific cases are 
without making any premature generalisation. 
There were 9 companies in total who switched their banking relationship 
during the sample period: (a) 6 companies switched from independent banking 
(INDB) to collective relationship banking (CRB); whilst (b) 3 companies switched 
the other way around. Although it is difficult to find a clear pattern that separates 
those who switched from independent banking (INDB) to collective relationship 
banking (CRB) and vice versa, a descriptive summary of the 9 companies was 
produced for an overview in Table 4.15 and the individual cases are discussed further 
here. 
In attempt to find out any common factors for switching in banking 
relationship, some of the frequently used benchmark factors for credit rating are used 
as summarised in Table 4.15: (a) the historic profitability of the firm prior to the 
switch, i. e. NMR prior to the switch; (b) the average profitability of the firm prior to 
the switch, i. e. average NMR; (c) the average vertical ownership stake by the holding 
company prior to the switch, i. e. average OJW, (d) the firms age as of 2002, i. e. 
AGE; (e) the group holding company that they belong to, and (f) the industry sector 
that they belong to. These factors are based on an extension of the key explanatory 
variables used in the previous models. 
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The first thing to notice from Table 4.15 is that these firms are not running a 
profitable business given the predominantly negative net income to asset ratios 
(NIAR). Furthermore, their business environments are deteriorating or remain 
extremely bad prior to the switch in many cases as shown in their MAR movement. 
Given the persistence of banking relationship, it seems natural to observe switching 
cases when the business is deteriorating or uncertain. This is often the time when 
firms seek for more project financing and hence search around for alternatives and 
switch for the better and/or the best. 
It seems difficult to form any opinion with respect to the holding companies' 
ownership levels as they range between 2.58% and 100% without any particular 
pattern. However, the age factor seems to suggest that younger companies are more 
likely to switch as all but one are below the average firm age of 18 and they rather 
noticeably skewed towards left (younger firms) given the age range between 0 and 
71. One could also argue that firms in the early stage of business development can 
shop around for the better fit in terms of loans and project finance. 
For group and industry specific effects, it would be inappropriate to comment 
as they are only a few firms in the respective groups or industries. Although LG 
group and manufacturing sector appear to be more frequent than others, a large 
number of firms in LG group and the manufacturing sector suggest that they should 
be investigated as individual firm specific cases. 
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4.7.1 Switching from INDB to CRB 
This section briefly reviews the background of the 6 individual finns which switched 
their banking relationship from independent banking (INDB) to collective 
relationship banking (CRB). The discussion hereunder mainly focuses on the further 
finn specific factors that are not discussed in the above section such as the 
background of the firm establishment although we have already touched upon 
takeovers and mergers: (a) a new firm created; (b) a firm taken over by another firm 
via mergers and acquisitions (M&As), and (c) a firm created via spin-off or de- 
mergers. We will also discuss any other idiosyncratic firm characteristics. 
Case M: Keoyang Shipping Co., Ltd. (ID78) 
This firm is a relatively young shipping company established only in 1990 and has 
subsequently made a rapid expansion by purchasing a series of large vessels between 
1990 and 1995 but it was taken over by Hanjin group in 1995. Since the takeover, the 
company went through a substantial restructuring and consolidation by closing down 
redundant businesses. The switching into collective relationship banking (CRB) 
appears to be encouraged by the takeover. 
One can also argue that the shipping industry is the industries running at high 
setup costs, e. g. purchasing of large vessels and such heavy financial requirements 
may make collective relationship banking more favourable. Financial constraints are 
common problems for companies like Keoyang Shipping Co. as they are not big 
enough. Although this company is classified as a large company by Financial 
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Supervisory Commission (FSC) employing about 200 people, it has only about 
US$70mn equivalent of paid-in-capital in operating a revenue of US$220mn as of 
2003 end with assets worth of US$300mn approximately. 
These financial problems can get much worse especially when the company 
does not have enough internal financial resources whilst its business heavily relies 
upon what is happening in the world economy and the imports and exports in and out 
of Korea. It is an impossible task for a newly established shipping company to 
predict the world business cycle and acquire new vessels in advance at substantial 
financial costs. One could easily detect signs of problems in their financial 
statements as some of their long-term borrowings were replaced by various short- 
term borrowings. 
Casel. 2: Hyosung Ebara Environment Engineering Co., Ltd. (ID95) 
It is a reasonably young environmental engineering company that was established for 
recycling wastes and construction of related facilities in 1997. It is also classified as a 
large company (according FSC) although it only employs about 70 people with a 
paid-in-capital of US$6mn equivalent. Their asset size is relatively small at 
US$12.5mn for a firm currently generating revenues of about US$25mn. One 
concern for this company is that the financing is mostly in short-term borrowings 
when it does not make much profits or even make losses. On the other hand, its 
business is mainly in construction of waste processing facilities and pollution 
protection equipments that is considered to be a rather specialised field. 
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This firm is a joint-venture establishment between Hyosung Engineering in 
Korea and Ebara, Environment Engineering in Japan. It is not listed on the Korean 
Stock Exchange (KSE) but adopts external auditing. 
From the available information on this company, the only thing that can be 
deduced here is the joint-venture setup with a Japanese partner influencing the switch 
and the peculiarity of the business in waste processing that lenders find difficult to 
evaluate the fair value of their projects. Having emphasised the importance of 
monitoring and sharing private information in banking in the long-run, this company 
certainly does not provide enough private information in the long-run. 
Case 1.3: LG Cable Co., Ltd (ID155) 
Unlike the other switched finns listed in Table 4.15, this firm is a relatively old firm 
at 33 years, that has experienced major restructuring over time. Initially there was a 
manufacturer of basic electrical cables that was established 1962 and was taken over 
by the LG group in 1966. Since then, there has been a series of mergers within the 
group and the current form of the establishment was set in 1969. In the early 1990s 
the company started to transform into an international firm by investing in a British 
firm, Heat Trace, and setting up joint-ventures in various locations in Asia such as 
Malaysia, Vietnam, and China. It seems that a series of such major expansion led the 
company to switch relationship banking into CRB. 
In addition to the age of the firm, most of the firm characteristics differ from 
the rest of the switched firms. It is a truly large company listed on the KSE 
employing over 3,300 people. With a paid-in-capital of US$134mn, the company has 
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assets of US$1.6bn with the current revenues of US$1.6bn. It also has shown rather 
steady profits in the long-run from its basic electrical cable manufacturing and sales. 
The financial statement looks even more different from others as it has a well- 
diversified portfolio of borrowings including overseas loans, short-term and long- 
terms. Perhaps it is worth mentioning that its short-term borrowing accounts for a 
relatively small proportion. 
In spite of all the normality in business prospects and the long-term 
reputation, the only reason for switching into CRB seemed to be the major overseas 
expansion and its financing. 
Case 1.4: LG Energy Co., Ltd. (ID163) 
This firm is a power generation company involved in both electricity and gas. It was 
established in 1996 by public funding and went into joint-venture with Powergen 
(British) in 1999 but Powergen withdrew its stake in 2000 leaving LG group as a 
major shareholder whilst its expansion in Bugok Combine Cycle in Korea was in 
progress. Shortly after this event, its relationship banking has been changed in 2001 
and project financing long-term corporate bonds were issued. Withdrawal of 
Powergen's stake in little over a year appears to be a negative factor for the firm and 
did not have any other option. It seems natural to switch into collective relationship 
banking when financing projects becomes difficult after Powergen's departure as 
issuing corporate bonds need strong guarantors or collaterals. 
In terms of other firm characteristics, this firm is also classified as a large 
company by the KSC with l/ a paid-in-capital of US$99mn; 2/the current revenues 
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of about US$126,3/ its assets worth of US$340mn although it employs only 73 
people. Perhaps the reason why the firm hires a relatively small number of people for 
the given size of assets and capital is that the power generation sector is very much 
capital intensive. It is also interesting to note that the company relies only on long- 
term borrowings and avoids short-term loans. 
The above firm characteristics make the argument for the departure of foreign 
partner, Powergen, much stronger. 
Case 1.5: Dacom Multimedia Internet Co., Ltd. (ID168) 
This firm was established as a result of spun-off from LG Traffic Information Inc. in 
1999. It is an internet multimedia service company which had an extremely bad start 
as the band-wagon effect of internet business has finally started to show negative 
signs. 
It is classified as a large company by the KSC employing about 120 people 
and currently generates about US$20mn in revenues with a paid-in-capital of 
US$4mn and the assets worth of US$12.5mn. In terms of the industry where the firm 
is operating in, one should note that there was a rush into internet multimedia at the 
turn of the millennium as it was perceived as a lucrative business with little capital. 
Hence, the industry was over-crowded in no time and has experienced a bit of 
reshuffling via several takeovers and exits. 
Although no further information is available for the breakdown of the firm's 
borrowings, it must have been in trouble securing loans given the negative business 
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environment of internet multimedia services and hence seemed to have switched the 
banking relationship into CRB. 
Case 1.6: Samsung Investment Trust Management Co., Ltd. (ID238) 
There has been a series of mergers between Samsung Investment Trust, JP Morgan, 
Tongyang Investment Trust, Samsung Securities, Samsung Life Insurance since long 
and finally Samsung Investment Trust Management was named in 2000. 
Immediately after that, its banking relationship was switched to collective 
relationship banking in 2001. 
This firm is classified as a large company employing over 160 people with a 
paid-in-capital of about US$78mn. The firm currently generates about US$47mn in 
revenues and has assets worth of US$1 I Omn approximately. 
A Brief Summary of Cases 1.1 to 1.6 
Having investigated the above 6 companies that switched its banking relationship 
from independent banking (INDB) to collective relationship banking (CRB), one 
could easily draw an argument that one of the important factors which influences 
switching of banking relationship is corporate restructuring either through mergers 
and acquisitions, takeovers, or de-mergers or sales of the stake. In particular, foreign 
partners' level of stake seems to play an important role in switching the banking 
relationship. We also find that firms in the capital intensive industries are more likely 
to switch their banking relationships when faced by financial difficulties. 
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4.7.2 Switching from CRB to INDB 
This section reviews the background of the 3 individual firms which switched their 
banking relationship from collective relationship banking (CRB) to independent 
banking (INDB). As in the cases of switching from INDB to CRB, the discussion 
focuses on the further firm specific factors such as the background of the firm 
establishment. Moreover, the section tries to discuss what causes the difference in 
switching direction: (a) from INDB to CRB; and (b) from CRB to INDB. 
Case 2.1: Hyosung Ino Tech Co., Ltd. (ID87) 
The company was established as a joint-venture between Hyosung and Dryvit 
System Inc. (US) in 1987. However, the Hyosung group took over the stake from 
Dryvit System in 1994 and has subsequently changed its name from Hyosung Dryvit 
Co., Ltd. to Hyosung Ino Tech Co., Ltd.. The main business is in producing 
insulation and sound-proof panels. 
The firm is classified as a large company by the KSC employing about 40 
people with a paid-in-capital of US$1.9mn. It currently generates US$19.4mn and 
has assets worth of US$l2mn. 
A couple of points can be made as to why the banking relationship has 
changed. First, the firm made losses for two consecutive years which suggests it can 
not be the most favourite borrower for banks. Second, since the entire stake was 
taken over by the group after the departure of Dryvit System Inc. (US), there must 
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have been mixed concerns over why the US partner had to sell its stake. A positive 
scenario is that the business was too good for Hyosung to leave with the US partner. 
Therefore, the stake was bought back into the group. But a negative scenario more 
plausible that the US partner sees no prospects with the Korean partner and sells its 
stake especially when the Korean domestic construction industry is depressed. As a 
piece of evidence, the company recorded 5 consecutive years of profit decline prior 
to the switch and has been heavily relying on short-term borrowings. 
Case 2.2: Hyosung Ebara Co., Ltd. (ID94) 
This is a manufacturing company of pump related products including energy pipes 
for nuclear and hydropower generation. It was established with foreign capital in 
1989 and merged into Hyosung group in 1995. Yet again, the change in foreign 
capital seems to have triggered the switching of banking relationship. 
The firm is classified as a large company externally audited but without 
listing on the KSE. It employs over 190 people with a paid-in-capital of about 
US$15mn and generates US$55mn in revenues with assets worth of US$42mn. 
The finn has earned a reputation for its special technology in high-tech 
pumps and pipes benefiting from the expertise of its foreign partners, Ebara in Japan 
and Flowserve in the US. Given the reputation, the company has the largest market 
share in Korean pumps and pipes at over 30%. However, its profitability has not 
been as impressive as its reputation in technology and market share alternating 
between small profits and losses. 
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It is worth noting that the above two companies' switching cases seem to be 
affected by the departure of foreign partners coupled with their subsequently 
deteriorating profitability. 
Case 2.3: Care Camp. Com Co., Ltd. (ID223) 
The company provides online pharmaceutical/medicare information services and 
retail/wholesale of pharmaceutical/medical products. Two things to notice here: I/ 
for such a young company, it made a positive net income to asset ratio (NIAR) after 
only one year of establishment only to be followed by losses, and 2/ the industry is 
not a part of mainstream business of the group but a mere dotcom trial. 
It is classified as a large company by the KSC employing over 40 people with 
a paid-in-capital of about US$8mn. The firm currently generates about US$51mn in 
revenues and as assets worth of US$26mn. However, the company does not seem to 
have reached steady profits. 
A Brief Summary of Cases 2.1 to 2.3 
With only 3 firms in this case of switching from CRB to INDB, it becomes even 
more difficult to make any conclusive remarks on the switching. However, the 
changes in the foreign stake seem to definitely have an impact on the changes in 
banking relationship. With the recent liberalisation of foreign ownership in the local 
Korean companies, we expect to see more firms with a foreign stake and the degree 
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of foreign ownership will provide an interesting topic to further investigate for 
banking relationship. 
4.8 Conclusions 
This chapter identified main factors determining banking relationship between firms 
and banks which are about reducing the asymmetric information gap. Lenders are 
believed to be not always in a position to know the true state of their borrowers' 
quality of investment projects. Banks often look for this information indirectly via 
the vertical relationship between borrowers whereby holding companies undertake 
the responsibility of delegated monitoring. This indirect monitoring becomes more 
useful when the information is not fully revealed and/or uncertain. 
The results from the econometric models provide evidence that subsidiaries 
with relatively smaller stake by holding companies are more likely to choose 
collective relationship banking as it allows indirect monitoring via holding 
companies. Indirect monitoring plays a crucial role when firms do not have any 
outside option regarding whom to borrow from as it enhance information level to 
lenders with holding companies' indirect monitoring. For that reason, collective 
relationship banking seems to be a preferred choice. 
Positive scores in usual credit rating criteria such as firms' profitability and 
reputation seem to work in favour of collective relationship banking as they can only 
reinforce the bargaining for preferential rates in a collective sense. There is also 
evidence for industry specific effects on the choice of relationship banking. 
222 
However, above all, the persistence of collective relationship banking (CRB) appears 
to be one of the most significant factors suggesting that accumulation of private 
information overtime through the long term relationship matters most. 
Given the concern over further banking crises in the global context, the 
results confirm that long-term relationship banking provide advantages and 
disadvantages for both borrowing firms and lending banks. If the indirect monitoring 
mechanism is working well as suggested in the literature, banks can avoid 
unnecessary risks of relationship loans. However, if indirect monitoring is not 
working well, alternative ways are needed to compensate the ailing private 
monitoring. As attention paid to private sector corporate governance has increased 
following the recent scandals such as Enron and Worldcom, indirect monitoring 
needs finther regulatory consideration. 
On the other hand, the main results driven by monitoring borrower risks and 
accumulating private information raises additional concern with respect to small and 
medium size enterprises (SMEs) that do not belong to large holding companies' 
network. These SMEs are often in less profitable businesses and have no reputation 
due to the size and the age of the firm, as result it is difficult for them to find 
reasonable banks with appropriate loan conditions especially, when the economy is 
in a downturn. 
This chapter uses a unique approach in linking the vertical relationship in the 
real sector (non-financialfirms) and their banking behaviour in order to broaden the 
scope of relationship based monitoring in banking. From a policy perspective, there 
has been a series of debates regarding vertical integration and restraints in many 
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industries. However, the policy makers approach towards an abuse of market power 
needs careful consideration given the above idiosyncratic feature in relationship 
banking and monitoring. 
The chapter tried to shed some light on feasible ways for regulators and/or 
banks to remedy imperfect information in this context. I would not argue for major 
reform of policy but would like to provide some economic rationale for a new 
direction in the event of changing structure of conglomerates and associated banking 
industry structure when relationship banking is prevailing irrespective of whether 
they are collective or independent. 
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Figure 4.1 Overview of Banking Relationship 
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Figure 4.3 Examples of Group Ownership Fluctuation 
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Table 4.2 Overview of Companies by Group 
Group 
Dummy 
Holding Co. TotalAsset 
Size 
of the 
Holding Co. 
AvgAsset 
Size 
per 
Subsidiary 
No. 
Of 
Sub' 
Co's 
No. 
Of 
CRB 
No. 
Of 
INDB 
No. 
Of 
SW 
G14 Samsung 71.9 1.198 60 40 18 2 
G13 LG 58.1 1.186 49 15 31 3 
G15 SK 43.4 0.835 52 14 38 - 
G9 Hyundai Motor 42.9 2.258 19 9 10 
G6 Hanjin 24.0 1.714 14 10 3 1 
G5 Hanhwa, 10.3 0.468 22 18 4 - 
G12 Kumho 9.9 0.762 13 3 10 
G4 Doosan 8.5 0.447 19 5 14 - 
G8 Hyundai 7.0 0.636 11 7 4 - 
G3 Dongah 6.7 1.117 6 2 4 - 
G16 Ssanyong 5.3 0.331 16 9 7 - 
G2 Daewoo 4.9 0.445 11 2 9 
G7 Hyosung 4.9 0.377 13 6 4 3 
GI Daelim 4.6 0.354 13 7 6 
GIO Hyundai Oil 3.8 1.900 2 2 
GII Kohap 1.8 0.600 3 1 2 
Total 308.0 0.954 323 150 164 9 
N. B.: Assel size in trillion Korean won as ofDec. 2002 & the No. ofsubsidiaries throughout the sampleperiod 
Source: Financial Supervisory Service & Korea Information Service 
Table 4.3 Company Breakdown by Industry 
Industry 
Dummy 
Industry No. of Co's 
NO 
No. 
Of 
CRB 
No. 
Of 
INDB 
No. 
Of 
SW 
INDI Mining l(O. 3%) - I 
IND2 Manufacturing 101(31.3%) 55 43 3 
IND3 Utilities (electricity, gas, water, 16(5.0%) 1 14 1 
etc. ) 
IND4 Construction 17(5.3%) 8 8 1 
IND5 Retail and wholesale 30(9.3%) 16 13 1 
IND6 Hotel and food service 7(2.2%) 3 4 - 
IND7 Transportation 29(9.0%) 15 13 1 
IND8 Telecommunication 11(3.4%) 3 7 1 
IND9 Financial services and insurance 38(11.8%) 15 22 1 
INDIO Real estate conveyance and 3(0.9%) 12 
leasing 
IND II Business and research support 56(17.3%) 31 25 
and service 
IND12 Sports and entertainment 13(4.0%) 1 12 
IND13 Other public and private repair 1(0.3%) 1- 
services 
Total 323(100%) 150 164 9 
N. B.: Estimations with the industry dummy variables had dropped the observations in IND] and INDIJ due to the sample size 
in the sub-group. Source: Korea Infonnation Service 
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Table 4.4 Description of Variables 
Variables Type Operational Definition 
Dependent Variable 
CRB B/D I= Collective relationship banking; 0= otherwise 
Independent Variables 
OWN L/C Major shareholding by the group company 
NIAR C Net income to asset ratio 
AGE L/C Age of the company 
Industry Dummies 
INDI B/D I= mining; 0= otherwise 
IND2 B/D I= manufacturing; 0= otherwise 
IND3 B/D I= Utilities (electricity, gas, water, etc. ); 0 otherwise 
IND4 B/D 1= construction; 0= otherwise 
IND5 B/D I= retail and wholesale; 0= otherwise 
IND6 B/D I= hotel and food service; 0= otherwise 
IND7 B/D I= transportation; 0= otherwise 
IND8 B/D 1= telecommunication; 0= otherwise 
IND9 B/D 1= financial services and insurance; 0= otherwise 
INDIO B/D I= real estate conveyance and leasing; 0= otherwise 
INDII B/D I= business and research support and service; 0= otherwise 
IND12 B/D I= sports and entertainment; 0= otherwise 
IND13 B/D I= other public and private repair services; 0= otherwise 
Group Dummies 
GI B/D I=Daelim; O=otherwise 
G2 B/D I=Daewoo; O=otherwise 
G3 B/D 1=Dongah; O=otherwise 
G4 B/D I=Doosan; O=otherwise 
G5 B/D I=Hanhwa; O=otherwise 
G6 B/D I=Hanjin; O=otherwise 
G7 B/D I=Hyosung; O=otherwise 
G8 B/D I=Hyundai; 0--otherwise 
G9 B/D 1=Hyundai Motor; O=otherwise 
GIO B/D I =Hyundai Oil; O=otherwise 
GII B/D I =Kohap; O=otherwise 
G12 B/D I=Kumho; O=otherwise 
G13 B/D 1=LG; O=otherwise 
G14 B/D I=Samsung; O=otherwise 
G15 B/D I=SK; O=otherwise 
G16 B/D I=Ssangyong; O=otherwise 
Firm Creation Dummy 
TM B/D I=Taken over or Merged; O=otherwise 
N. B.: Binary (B), Likert (L), Continuous (C), and Discrete (D) 
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Table 4.5 Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable 
CRB . 516 . 500 0 
1 
Independent Variables 
0" 33.159 32.055 0 100 
MAR -. 768 21.. 498 -479.26 372.46 
AGE 17.827 14.208 0 72 
Industry Dummies 
IND 1 . 004 . 064 IND2 . 341 . 474 IND3 . 056 . 230 IND4 . 063 . 243 IND5 . 091 . 288 IND6 . 025 . 155 IND7 . 085 . 279 IND8 . 022 . 147 IND9 . 125 . 331 INDIO . 010 . 099 INDI 1 . 135 . 342 IND12 . 040 . 
195 
IND13 . 002 . 042 
Group Dummies 
GI . 037 . 
190 0 
G2 . 039 . 193 
0 
G3 . 023 . 148 
0 
G4 . 056 . 230 
0 
G5 . 071 . 257 
0 
G6 . 051 . 221 
0 
G7 . 041 . 198 0 G8 . 036 . 187 
0 
G9 . 055 . 228 0 GIO . 008 . 090 0 GII . 009 . 094 0 G12 . 045 . 207 0 G13 . 154 . 361 0 G14 . 173 . 378 0 G15 . 149 . 357 0 G16 . 053 . 223 0 
Firm Creation Dummy 
TM . 305 . 461 0 
Number of companies: i= 323 
Number of years: t=9 
Total number of observation 
(unbalanced panel): NxT=2222 
N. B.: Some ofthefigures may differfrom those in Tables 4.2 & 4.3 as they were constructedfrom thefirm-level 
cross-sectional data whilst Table 4.5 is based on the entire panel Nx T. 
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Table 4.6 Binary Choice Models for Collective Relationship Banking (CRB) 
Dependent 
Variable: 
(CRB) 
Random Effects Population A veraged Complementary Log-log 
Logit Logit Population Averaged 
Coef z Coef z Coef z 
(S. E) (S. E) (S. E) 
OWN -. 024 -2.43** -. 001 -2.17** -. 001 -2.13** 
(. 009) (. 000) (. 000) 
MAR . 009 1.67* . 001 2.20** . 
001 2.12** 
(. 006) (. 000) (. 000) 
AGE . 020 0.96 . 008 
3.68*** . 006 3.64*** (. 021) (. 002) (. 002) 
Constant . 639 1.00 -. 154 -1.33 -. 
479 . 5.55*** 
(. 6 2) (. 116) (. 086) 
_ (3) 11.65** 21.03*** 20.24*** 
Log -308.11 
likelihood 
No. of 323 323 323 
groups 
No. ofobs 2191 2191 2191 
Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
t", ***Z-valuessigniticant at the 5Yo, Z5Ya, and I% levels respectively 
t*t*** X2 -values signii1cant at the 5YS, IX and 0.1 % levels respectively 
N. B.: Due to the missing values in NIAR, the total number ofobservations is 2191 instead of2222 
Table 4.7 Marginal Effects after the Binary Choice Estimations 
Dependent Random Effects Population Averaged Complementary Log-log 
Variable: Logit Logit Population Averaged 
(CRB) (dyldx) (dyldx) (dyldx) 
OWN -. 0059** -. 0003** -. 0003** 
MAR . 0023* . 0002** . 0002** 
AGE . 0050 . 0021*** . 0020*** 
Y predicted . 202 . 490 . 489 
at the mean 
Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
Z-values significant at the 5? 16ý 2.5%, and I% levels respectively 
Z2 -values significant at the 5%, 1 016, and 0.1 % levels respectively 
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Table 4.8 Population Averaged (PA) Models with Take-over and Merger 
Dummy (TM) Variable 
Dependent Population Averaged (PA) Complementaty Log-log 
Variable: Logif Population A veraged(PA) 
(CRB) 
Coef z Coef z 
(S. E) . E) OVVN -. 0009 -2.22** -. 0006 -1.99** 
(. 0004) (. 0003) 
MAR . 0007 2.52*** . 0004 2.40*** (. 0003) (. 0002) 
AGE . 0079 3.94*** . 0053 3.84*** (. 0020) (. 0014) 
TM -1.0518 -4.24*** -. 7775 -4.00*** 
(. 2479) (. 1942) 
Constant . 1986 1.41 -. 2372 -2.45*** (. 1408) (. 0970) 
z2 (4) 41.89*** 40.46*** 
Log 
likelihood 
No. of 323 323 
groups 
No. ofobs 2191 2191 
Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
Z-values significant at the 5? 16ý 2.5 916, and I% levels respective ly 
ZI -values significant at the 5Y*, I Yoý and 0.1 % levels respectively 
N. B.: Due to the in issing values in NIA R, the total num ber ofobservations is 2191 instead of2222 
Table 4.9 Marginal Effects after the PA Estimation with TM Dummy Variable 
Dependent 
Variable: 
(CRB) 
Population Averaged 
Logif 
61yldx) 
Complementary Log-log 
Population Averaged 
(dyldx) 
OWN -. 0002** -. 0002** 
MAR 
. 0002*** . 0001*** 
AGE 
. 0020*** . 0018*** 
TM -. 2543*** -. 2492*** 
Y predicted . 497 . 489 at the mean 
Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
*, ". ***Z-valuessignificant at the J? lo, 2.5% and I %levels respecovely 
*9**#*** X2 -values significant at the SY6,1 ! 16, and 0.1% kveisrespectively 
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Table 4.10 PA Models with Industry and TM Dummy Variables 
Dependent 
Variable: 
(CRB) 
Population Averaged 
Logit 
Coef z 
(S. E) 
Complementary Log-log 
Population Averaged 
Coef z 
(S. E) 
OWN -. 0011 -2.11** -. 0008 -2.49*** 
(. 0005) (. 0003) 
MAR . 0007 
2.02** . 0004 
2.06** 
(. 0003) (. 0002) 
AGE . 0090 
3.56*** . 0054 
3.87*** 
(. 0025) (. 0014) 
IND3 -2.9040 -2.82*** -2.4538 -2.35*** 
(1.0314) (1.0437) 
IND4 -. 2765 -. 53 -. 1904 -. 51 
(. 5233) (. 3698) 
IND5 -. 0370 -. 09 -. 1123 -. 39 
(. 4163) (. 2911) 
IND6 -. 5500 -. 70 -. 6576 -1.07 
(. 7849) (. 6146) 
IND7 -. 1362 -. 32 -. 0566 -. 19 
(. 4210) (. 2918) 
IND8 -. 5799 -. 90 -. 3676 -. 76 
(. 6479) (. 4817) 
IND9 -. 5993 -1.56 -. 6540 -2.23** 
(. 3841) (. 2930) 
INDIO -. 9670 -. 78 -1.0048 -. 99 
(1.2375) (1.0165) 
INDI 1 . 0855 . 
25 -. 0546 . 24 
(. 3352) (. 2302) 
IND12 -2.8567 -2.59*** -2.3049 -2.19** 
(1.1018) (1.0524) 
TM -. 7758 -3.90*** 
(. 1991) 
Constant . 1451 . 
71 -. 0146 . 
10 
(. 2043) (. 1523) 
Z'(13)=36.32*** Z2 (14) =55.49*** 
No. of 321 321 
groups 
No. ofobs 2178 2178 
Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
Z-values significant at the 5 Yo, 2.5%, and I% levels respectively 
Z2 -values significant at the 5? 16,1 Yo, and 0.1% levels respectively 
N. B.: 
1) Only the population averaged effects are estimated as industry dummies are time invariant, 
2) As industries with only onfirm observation (INDI and INDB) are dropped, the total number ofobservation 
is 2178 instead of2191. 
3) For the inclusion ofafirm creation dummy (TM), only the result ofcomplementary log-logpopulation 
average is presented due to a non-convergence in population average logit. 
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Table 4.11 Marginal Effects after the PA Estimations with Industry and TM 
Dummy Variables 
Dependent Population Averaged Complementaty Log-log 
Variable: Logit Population Averaged 
((WB) (dy1dr) (dy/dr) 
0 VIN -. 0003** -. 0003*** 
MAR . 0002** . 0002** AGE . 0022*** . 
0018*** 
IND3 -. 4566*** -. 4403*** 
IND4 -. 0727 -. 0605 
IND5 -. 01414 -. 0363 
IND6 -. 1362 -. 1856 
IND7 -. 0387 -. 0185 
IND8 -. 1429 -. 1116 
IND9 -. 1489 -. 1914**** 
INDIO -. 2218 -. 2554 
INDII . 0162 . 
0181 
IND12 -. 4421*** -. 4160*** 
TM -. 2372*** 
Y predicted . 467 . 451 
at the mean 
Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
Z-values significant at the 5%, 2.5%, and I% levels respectively 
z2 -values significant at the 5016,1 016ý and 0.1 % levels respectively 
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Table 4.12 PA Model with Group and TM Dummy Variables 
Dependent 
Variable: 
(CRB) 
Population Averaged Marginal Effects at lite mean X Logit 
(Y-%5026) 
Coef 
(S. E) 
z dyldx 
OWN -. 0012 -1.84* -. 0003* 
(. 0007) (. 0002) 
MAR . 0008 1.83* . 0002* (. 0004) (. 0001) 
AGE . 0101 3.16*** . 0025*** (. 0032) (. 0008) 
G1 -. 5404 -. 83 -. 1324 
(. 6484) (. 1527) 
G2 -2.5671 -2.93 -. 4482*** 
(. 8753) (. 0770) 
G3 -2.1848 -2.37*** -. 4084*** 
(. 9201) (. 0968) 
G4 -1.8748 -3.06*** -. 3808*** 
(. 6122) (. 0852) 
G5 . 5292 . 84 . 1297 (. 6329) (. 1493) 
G6 -. 0484 -. 07 -. 0121 
(. 6882) (. 1720) 
G7 . 0121 . 02 . 0030 (. 66648) (. 1662) 
G8 -. 6507 -. 93 -. 1580 
(. 6961) (. 1594) 
G9 -. 8254 -1.49 -. 1974 
(. 5526) (. 1214) 
GIO 5.7981 . 33 . 0506 (17.4377) (. 0642) 
GII -2.0480 -1.63 -. 1390 
(1.2562) (. 1358) 
G12 -2.4392 -3.34*** -. 4402*** 
(. 7296) (. 0732) 
G13 -1.5616 -3.67*** -. 3500*** 
(. 4254) (. 0792) 
G15 -1.8473 -4.26*** -. 3979*** 
(. 4332) (. 0731) 
G16 -. 7218 -1.21 -. 1744 
(. 5965) (. 1347) 
TM -1.2102 -4.26*** -. 2902*** 
(. 2841) (. 0630) 
Constant 1.1732 3.75*** 
(. 3133) 
71.10*** 
No. of groups 323 
No. ofobs 2191 
Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
Z-values significant at the 5Yo, 2.5yo, and I% levels respectively 
Z2 -values signiftant at the 5? 10,1 YO, and 0.1 % levels respectively 
N. B. : Sam s ung Gro up (G 14) is use d as a refe re nce gro up. 
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Table 4.13 Dynamic Estimation 
Dependent Random Effects Population A veraged Complementaty Log-log 
Variable. Logit Logit Population Averaged 
(CRB) 
Coef z Coef z Coef z 
(S. E) (S. E) (S. E) 
CRBt., 10.874 14.66*** 10.865 14.63*** 6.788 15.90*** 
(. 742) (. 742) (. 427) 
OWN -. 004 -. 38 -. 004 -. 38 -. 004 -1.30 
(. 011) (. 011) (. 003) 
MAR -. 006 -. 52 -. 006 -. 52 -. 001 -. 06 
(012) (. 012) (. 006) 
AGE -. 016 -. 60 -. 016 -. 60 . 004 . 46 (. 027) (. 027) (. 009) 
Constant -4.593 -5.74*** -4.591 -5.73 4.923 -10.42*** 
(. 800) (. 801) (. 473) 
Z2 (4) 229.68** 228.81*** 252.98*** 
Log -56.10 
likelihood 
No. of groups 316 316 316 
No. ofobs 1879 1879 1879 
Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
Z-values significant at the 5Y6,2.5%, and I% levels respectively 
z2 -values significant at the 5 Yo, 1016, and 0.1 % levels respectively 
Table 4.14 Cross-sectional Logit Estimation for Each Year 
Dependent 
Variable: 
(CRB) 
1994 
Coef 
(S. E) 
1995 
Coef 
(S. E) 
1996 
Co ef 
(S. E) 
1997 
Coef 
(S. E) 
1998 
Coef 
(S. E) 
1999 
Coef 
(I E) 
2000 
Coef 
(S. E) 
2001 
Coef 
(S. E) 
2002 
Co ef 
(S. E) 
OWN -006 -. 008 -. 006 -. 004 -. 004 -. 010** -. 008* .. 010*** -. 009** 
(. 005) (. 005) (. 005) (. 005) (. 005) (. 005) (. 004) (. 004) (. 004) 
MAR -. 021 -. 007 -. 023 . 018 . 008 . 019* . 021*** . 010* -. 001 (. 028) (. 014) (. 022) (. 022) (. 008) (. 011) (. 009) (. 006) (. 003) 
AGE . 011 . 004 . 004 . 014 . 016 . 012 . 016* . 010 . 010 (. 013) (. 012) (. 012) (. 011) (. 011) (. 011) (. 009) (. 009) (. 009) 
Constant . 157 . 357 . 323 -. 013 -. 074 . 146 -. 031 . 226 . 162 (. 344) (. 327) (. 338) (. 317) (. 335) (. 313) (. 271) (. 274) (. 287) 
Z2 (3) 
Log 
likclihood 
No. ofobs 
3.32 3.48 3.26 4.19 5.26 10.35* 15.45** 14.89** 9.34* 
-125.85 -133.11 . 139.08 -152.78 -153.76 -165.48 -198.08 . 208.08 -200.33 
185 197 205 224 226 247 299 312 296 
Standard errors are in the parentheses. 
*, **, ***Z-values significant at the 5116ý 2.5%, and I% levels respectively 
t**, *** Z2 -values significant at the Blo, B/o, and 0.1% levels respectively 
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Table 4.15 Summary of Switching in Banking Relationship 
Co. ID NL4Rpriorto AverageNIAR AverageOWN Age as of 2002 Group 
the switch prior to the prior to the (Industry) 
I 
switch switch 
Switche m INDB 4 CRB 
ID78 3 consecutive -1.87 88.3 12 Hanjin 
years of decline (Transportation) 
ID95 2 consecutive -11.74 60 5 Hyosung 
years of decline (Construction) 
ID155 No particular . 92 2.58 33 LG 
pattern around 0 (Manufacturing) 
to I 
ID163 4 consecutive 2.59 40 6 LG 
years of decline Utilities 
_(Energey) ID168 Extremely bad -168.06 100 2 LG 
start (Telecomm) 
ID238 2 consecutive -4.20 65.43 4 Samsung 
years of loss (Financial 
although services and 
improved Insurance) 
Switchedfrom CRB 4 INDB 
ID87 5 consecutive -1.03 100 15 Hyosung 
years of decline (Manufacturing) 
ID94 One year 3.62 33.50 13 Hyosung 
decline (Manufacturing) 
ID223 One year -14.31 54.45 2 Samsung 
decline (Retail and 
I I I I I wholesale) 
_j 
Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
5.1 Overall Conclusions and Observations 
This thesis has challenged the existing research on banking structure by introducing 
some new angles of investigation. The scope of study in banking structure has been 
broadened by bringing in industrial policy, banking regulation and deregulation, 
banking technology, and relationship banking to the investigation. An evolutionary 
approach to the East Asian banking structure allowed the thesis to assess and to 
analyse the recent banking restructuring in relation to the industrial policy and the 
history of the banking regulation and deregulation in the region. The review of the 
East Asian banking structure and the analyses presented in chapter 2 indicated that 
the banking structure was influenced by the industrial policy and the changes in the 
regulation which were to maintain the financial stability and to favour economic 
growth. 
Investigating consumer adoption of a new banking technology, the internet 
banking, allowed the thesis to link the behaviour of banks and customers and 
carefully assess the background technology policy in Korea which made the adoption 
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more successful than elsewhere. This investigation in chapter 3 adds a particularly 
important value to the banking studies as intermediation between customers and 
banks is one of the main functions of banks. The evolution of banking technology 
was reviewed and the results found the position of the customers in the social 
network as a significant factor which affected the speed of their internet banking 
adoption. 
Finally, a new concept for relationship banking, namely 'collective 
relationship banking (CRB)' was introduced in chapter 4 in contrast to 'independent 
banking (INDB). ' This thesis investigated the relationship between the real sector 
and the banking sector structures and found the cross-ownership structure amongst 
the borrowing companies as an important factor for the choice of banking 
relationship. In the same context, changes in the ownership structure of a firm appear 
to cause the switching in banking relationship. 
This thesis has attempted to broaden the focus from the banking sector in 
isolation to other adjacent sectors such as the real sector and their policy changes 
when investigating the banking structure and its evolution. As the thesis has pointed 
out the importance of the Government policies in shaping the banking structure, the 
next section concludes each chapter by having some policy discussions related to the 
banking regulation, banking technology and the corporate governance of the 
borrowers in relation to relationship banking. 
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5.2 Policy Discussions 
The recent financial crises around the world have raised concerns over banking 
structures as no country seems to be immune to the risk of experiencing such crises. 
Then, one may ask what policies and/or (de)regulations are available as 
precautionary measures to such undesirable outcomes. In order to answer this 
question, we need to first define what the desirable outcomes are and what we have 
in terms of current banking structure. Without assessing the current position of 
banking structure, it is not possible to identify a way from the current structure to a 
more desirable one. This is why the evolution of banking structure is an important 
subject for investigation especially when the sector gets into trouble. More 
importantly, given the dynamic policy implications, the study of banking structure 
also needs a dynamic consideration looking at both past and current positions, which 
has been implemented throughout the thesis. 
As described in the previous chapters, another key implication of our analysis 
is to direct research on banking structure towards those with more inter-industry and 
inter-sector considerations. The banking system plays an important role as 
intermediaries linking lenders and borrowers. In this context, it is essential to 
investigate what individual banking customers do as depositors as well as borrowers. 
Similarly, we also need to identify the relationship between the real sector and the 
banking sector for corporate customers. Therefore any policy concerned with the 
banking structure would affect the adjacent individual and corporate customers via 
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financial transfers. In the same principle, policies affecting individuals and corporate 
customers would also have an impact on the banking structure. 
As the literature on financial crises and regulation so far appears to focus only 
on the banking system in isolation, the following sections further discuss the policy 
implications associated with each chapter in the thesis and pose some further 
important policy questions. 
5.2.1 Industrial Policy and Banking Restructuring 
For the consideration of dynamic policies and the analysis of adjacent industries, 
especially between the banking and the industrial sectors, the evolution of banking 
structure in East Asia provides a useful area of investigation. As discussed in length 
in chapter 2, the history of industrialisation in Japan and Korea shows strong 
evidence of a Government-led and well-thought out industrial policy, consisting of 
several stages run over a few decades. Whilst these successful industrial policies 
have worked on the economic progress, it was crucial to have some policy 
coordination between the industrial and financial sectors in order to facilitate the 
necessary project funding. 
Therefore, the recent efforts made on banking regulation in the aftermath of 
financial crises create some concerns in countries like Korea as they focus on the 
performance and efficiency improvement in the banking sector in isolation when the 
evolution of its banking sector has been driven by the industrial policy. As countries 
differ in their evolution of banking and the associated industrial policies, a very 
240 
important and related question to ask in the context is whether implementing a single 
international guideline and requirement for the entire global banking sector such as 
Basel Accord I and II is really an appropriate measure. It is doubtful that Korea 
would have achieved the same economic success under the current BIS ratio 
requirement set by the Basel Accords. It seems to be a difficult task for a single 
international financial authority to satisfy policy coordination in different countries 
and provide an effective unilateral regulation across when countries are in different 
stages of industrial developments and under the influence of different development 
policies. One should also note that the changes in banking structure and associated 
policy and regulation did not follow an identical and concurrent path in Japan and 
Korea that we believed to be the closest. 151 
Another important question to pose is whether the implementation of BIS 
ratio has made small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) face funding sources 
scarce as banks become more reluctant to provide loans to SMEs under the stricter 
guideline of risk assessment. If we recall the discussion regarding prevailing Keiretsu 
and Chaebol structures in East Asia, this lack of funding for SMEs can be potentially 
detrimental to the economy. 
We acknowledge that some parts of the above policy discussion do not 
emerge from the work presented in the thesis. However, we feel that it is crucial to 
raise the above issues in relation to banking regulation and industrial policy and they 
certainly appear to be important issues for further in-depth research. 
15 ' These questions can draw a parallel case from the current debate on the stability of Euro and the 
European constitution which involves rule-making exercises by a single authority for many countries. 
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5.2.2 Technology Policy and Banking 
The study on internet banking adoption in chapter 3 has also taken into account of 
the adjacent sector namely the banking customers as well as the dynamics of the 
adoption. There are two main questions to pose when we introduce a new 
technology: I/ whether to adopt the new technology, and 2/ if adopted, how fast it 
should be adopted. However, when we are concerned with a banking technology, the 
above two issues may need to be assessed for both banks and customers as society 
does not benefit from the new technology when it is not adopted by customers. Then, 
the policy implication in this case needs primary coordination between the banking 
policy in technology and the general technology policy in terms of public education 
for technology and the necessary foundation of technological infrastructure. 
The successful adoption of internet banking in Korea strongly advocates the 
above policy coordination in banking technology. Although the empirical analysis 
presented in the thesis does not directly explain why Korea has experienced a 
successful adoption of internet banking, the public policy towards high-technology 
infrastructure seemed to have worked favourably for Koreans to adopt a new 
technology. For example, Korea had a government policy to wire the entire country 
with a high-speed cable network and has successfully achieved an extremely high 
level of home computer ownership and broadband internet connection. This e-culture 
naturally provided a good ground for internet banking adoption. 
However, one must point out that risks associated with internet banking have 
not been fully addressed in the process of promoting internet banking in many 
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countries and appropriate regulations regarding internet banking still needs careful 
attention. This is related to the second question posed above regarding 'if adopted, 
how fast it should adopted' as there exist security threats of potential banking frauds 
in internet banking. The thesis does not elaborate to answer the above questions 
whilst focusing on the consumer adoption. However, the welfare effects of its 
premature adoption provide an important area of further investigation. 
5.2.3 Corporate Governance and Relationship Banking 
Another inter-sector consideration adopted in the thesis is in reference to the 
relationship between the changes in real sector and the banking sector. A valuable 
new concept of collective relationship banking is introduced in chapter 4 as a result 
of bridging the gap between the two sectors. Following the crises in Asia, authorities 
in the region have urged sound corporate governance and corporate restructuring as 
discussed in chaprter 2. Therefore, companies in the region were encouraged or 
rather forced to restructure via mergers and acquisitions (M&As) or divestiture. 
However, the results on collective relationship banking show a negative relationship 
between holding company's stake and collective relationship banking. The empirical 
results of chapter 4 do not directly deal with the causality between the real sector 
restructuring and the undesirable dominance and concentration in the banking sector. 
However, one could further question whether this implies, the real sector 
restructuring through divestiture would create more collective relationship banking 
and hence a more concentrated banking structure with only a few dominant banks. In 
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other words, a sound policy in one sector namely the real sector restructuring may 
have caused a sub-optimal outcome in the other, e. g. the dominance of a small 
number of large banks. Given the limitations of the analysis brought forward in 
chapter 4, considering adjacent sectors for policy implementation, of which the 
effects differ across sectors, is possible future work to make further elaborations 
especially for those industries with an intermediary nature across sectors. 
5.3 Concluding Remarks 
5.3.1 Summary of Contributions 
In each of the main chapters of the thesis, we have investigated different ways of 
analysing banking structure and behaviour and their evolution. The thesis adopted 
largely empirical tools in investigating and assessing the different aspects of banking 
structure. Each chapter has benefited from different methodologies in investigating 
the respective issues of banking structure: whether they are theoretical or empirical; 
quantitative or qualitative; static or dynamic. 
The novel idea of broadening the focus from banking sector in isolation to 
linking with other adjacent sectors such as the real sector and their policy changes 
improved our understanding of the banking structure. As discussed in the above 
section, there are many possible ways of policy implications in one sector 
influencing an adjacent sector substantially. In this thesis, we have only investigated 
issues related to industrial policy, technology policy, and corporate governance in 
relation to banking. However, we have an almost unlimited horizon for further 
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research extension into other adjacent industries given the nature of banking as an 
intermediary. 
In chapter 2, the impact of industrial policy behind the banking structure was 
rightly pointed out and discussed with respect to relevant regulation and deregulation 
and also in reference to strategic choice of banking behaviour between revenue 
maximising and profit maximising. A simple banking competition model developed 
in the thesis indicated that the transition from a price-cap regulation (interest rate 
controo to a rate-of-return regulation (ROA andlor BIS ratio) induces a more 
concentrated banking structure as banks shift their behaviour from revenue 
maximising to profit maximising. The empirical analysis of commercial banks in 
Japan and Korea in the SCP paradigm framework supported the argument and 
explained the recent consolidation in relation to the changes in regulation and the 
banking competition environment. The changes in regulation were assessed using 
different types of deregulation measures of which the impacts on the banking 
structure vary. Furthermore, the differences between nationwide and regional 
banking structures were analysed and the results suggest that the consolidation in the 
nationwide banking is more noticeable than in the regional banking since the 
regional banks have a certain degree of market power within the region. 
In chapter 3, the behaviour of banks and customers was examined when a 
new banking technology (internet banking) was introduced. The importance of 
consumer behaviour was addressed as consumers drive the final stage of a banking 
technology adoption. This thesis has emphasised the fact that a new technology can 
be wasted in the absence of consumer adoption. The investigation of the Korean case 
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of internet banking adoption has shown a favourable technology policy as essential 
as a macro-level technology policy provided the necessary infrastructure and the 
social environment in favour of a new banking technology. However, the individual 
differences in adoption regarding whether and when to adopt a new banking 
technology depended on personal characteristics. The fast diffusion of IB technology 
was motivated by the early adopters who are middle aged males positioned in the 
core of their social network. The behavioural economics were applied to this chapter 
in explaining how consumers imitate the social reference groups, i. e. norms set by 
middle-aged males in this case. Another important observation to make from the 
perspective of banks is that there was no evidence of first mover advantage in 
introducing internet banking whilst the largest bank in commercial banking remained 
dominant in internet banking as well. 
In chapter 4, a new banking concept, 'collective relationship banking' was 
introduced in order to link the real sector and the banking sector structures. The 
implication of the results are mainly based on the banking behaviour driven by 
signalling and sharing of private information and monitoring it ex post. Although the 
notion of private information monitoring and sharing has been used in the previous 
literature, introducing a new concept of collective relationship banking allowed us to 
show a new approach of direct and indirect monitoring of information. The empirical 
results indicated that the choice between collective relationship banking was 
negatively associated with the holding company's ownership stake in the borrowing 
firms. These firms seemed to have outside options for borrowing as they are 
perceived as good quality and strategically important firms to the holding company's 
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network. Lastly, switching of banking relationship between collective relationship 
banking and independent banking was investigated and the case study results 
suggested that changes in corporate ownership structure influenced the switching. 
Although we observe a small number of switching cases in relationship banking, it 
opens up a new area of research where we could further investigate the relationship 
between the real sector and the banking sector structures as corporate restructuring 
ftulher develops. 
5.3.2 Comments and Future Research 
Most investigation in the thesis is limited to the banking structure in East Asia and 
their experience in reference to the related sectors and industries. However, many of 
the results that we have found can be generalised and applied to other countries. 
Otherwise, cases of other countries would be another interesting field of 
investigation provided that the relevant and reliable data are available. 
We need to note that the simple banking model presented in chapter 2 is a 
stylised model of banking competition extended from the Chiappori et al. (1995) 
model and we do not present extensive justifications for assumptions of the model, 
although the way that the model has been extended has been fully justified. One 
possible way to improve the model can be to take into account the dynamics. This 
will make the model rather complex but it should be a useful exercise given the 
dynamic results that we have found from the empirical analyses. This empirical 
research extension would also benefit from alternative econometric model 
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specifications when the dependent variables are transformed N-firm concentration 
ratios (CNCt or BCNCt) given the insignificant results in Korea. 
Another significant extension can be made by investigating the relationship 
between the specific regulation and the industrial policy in depth, especially looking 
into the structural break around the Asian financial crisis. As discussed earlier in 
section 5.2.1, the impact of a single international banking guidance on different 
countries' industrial policies and their economic developments would be a valuable 
topic for further investigation. 
With respect to chapter 3, the thesis can branch out to at least two more 
policy areas. First, a further in-depth analysis of the Korean technology policy would 
make an important contribution to the field given that we notice the well-thought out 
public policy seemed to have created a favourable environment to adopt a new 
technology such as internet banking and the pro-technology public. Second, as 
mentioned above in section 5.2.2, the welfare effect of premature adoption of a new 
technology would be a useful topic for further research as it is still ambiguous how 
much consumers gain from their early adoption or how much they lose in case of 
their premature adoption. 
On the empirical side, the duration analysis on internet banking adoption used 
only 4-year of monthly data from 1998 to 2001. However, a larger survey with more 
time periods can be a useful extension to establish robustness of the results. 
We can also extend the data set for collective relationship banking up to the 
top 35 chaebols according the list of chaebols monitored by the FSS, provided that 
the reliable firm level data for such extended panel become available. This extension 
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will increase our sample size from 323 companies to over 1500 companies. One 
advantage of the extension is to cover almost 80% of the Korean economy and it may 
allow us to test: I/ the differences between top 10 chaebols and other smaller 
chaebols, and 2/ the industry specific effects can be tested at further detailed industry 
categories, e. g. 2-digit KSIC or higher. Once we have a more comprehensive data 
set, a shift in countervailing power between the real sector (or industries) and the 
banking sector can be also tested dynamically using the market concentration levels 
in both sides. 
As set out in section 5.2.3, a further in-depth research on cross-effects of 
policies across different sectors and their coordination would make a valuable 
contribution to the field as it is still not clear how a sound policy in one sector would 
guarantee an optimal policy outcome or cause a sub-optimal outcome in the other 
sector. 
Finally, the new concept of collective relationship banking explains 
monitoring of private information and the reduction in its cost via indirect 
monitoring. A theoretical model of costs of financial intermediation can be an 
interesting and useful extension. 
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